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ABSTRACT 
 
The effect of institutional ownership and ownership concentration on the firm’s stock returns and 
volatility and financial performance has long been an interesting issue in the international business 
literature. A lot of debate has been going on regarding the relationship between institutional 
ownership, ownership concentration, returns, volatility and financial performance.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to study the effect of institutional ownership and ownership 
concentration on firm stock returns and financial performance of the listed companies in the Egyptian 
Stock Exchange. For this purpose, panel data model is employed.  
 
The results from the analysis show that institutional ownership has no effect on ex post stock returns 
as well as ex ante stock returns. On the contrary, institutional ownership represented by top 
management and individuals have a negative and significant effect on stock volatility, while 
employee associations have a positive and significant effect. No significant effect is detected on ex 
ante risk except for employee associations that have negative and significant effect on ex ante risk. In 
addition, the results show that institutional ownership has no effect on stock liquidity except 
employee associations and individuals that have a negative and significant effect on stock liquidity. 
Finally, the results show that institutional ownership represented by companies, holdings and 
individuals have negative effect on financial performance represented by ROA and ROE. Also, 
institutional ownership has no effect on debt to equity ratio except banks that have negative and 
significant effect and employee associations that have positive and significant effect. The results also 
show that ownership concentration has no effect on ex post stock returns but it has a positive effect on 
ex ante stock returns. Also, it has no effect on ex post risk but it has a positive effect on ex ante risk. 
On the other hand, ownership concentration has a negative and significant effect on stock liquidity. 
Finally, the results show that ownership concentration has no effect on either financial performance 
represented by ROA and ROE or debt to equity ratio. 
 
As such, the thesis makes an important contribution to the literature, since it tests the impact of 
ownership type and concentration on ex ante returns and volatility of stocks in Egypt, an emerging 
country that has been ignored in literature. Also, the analysis extends the literature by decomposing 
institutional ownership to several types. Moreover, it adds two components of volatility, volatility 
clustering and persistence, testing their effect on ex post and ex ante risk, which is not dealt by 
previous studies.  
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CHAPTER (1): INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview  
The effect of ownership structure on the firm’s stock returns, volatility and financial 
performance has long been an interesting issue in the international business literature. A lot of 
debate has been going on regarding the relationship between institutional ownership, 
ownership concentration, returns, volatility and financial performance. 
 
On one hand, ownership type represented by institutional investors, the major concern of our 
study has become very dominant in the world market today and their role has been very 
significant. There is no exact definition of “institutional investors”. What characterize them is 
that they are not physical persons. Instead, they are legal entities, and these legal forms vary 
among institutional investors. They may act independently or as a part of a large group as in 
the case of mutual funds as an example (Celik and Isaksson, 2013).  One other definition is 
that institutional investors are specialized financial institutions, which channel savings 
collectively on behalf of other investors to achieve a specific objective in terms of limited risk 
and maximum returns (Davis, 2001). Another wider definition, based mainly on the theory of 
the firm, is that institutional investors are investment cooperation’s set up to minimize 
transaction costs between investors which are accomplished in a professional method. Since 
the transaction costs differ for different types of investors, several types of institutional 
investors have emerged. Today, various kinds of institutional investors deal with different 
markets and clients, and for various purposes. Therefore, institutional investors are 
heterogeneous group. They are different in terms of contractual relations between the owners 
of the assets and the asset managers (Bjuggren et al., 2007). 
 
According to Friedman (1996), there was an increase in aggregate institutional ownership in 
USA from less than 10% in 1950 to more than 50% in 1994. Also, Schwartz and Shapiro 
(1992) has pointed out that institutions accounted for 70% of the total volume of trade in 
NYSE. This percentage increased to over 90% of the total volume of trade as estimated by 
Kaniel et al (2008).  As defined by Wall Street Words in 2003, “institutional ownership is the 
percentage of a company’ shares owned by mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies 
and other institutional investors (banks, independent advisors such as; large brokerage firm or 
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securities firm)”. Sometimes, the large percentage of institutional ownership could lead to 
large changes in the prices of stocks, if institutional investors buy or sell at the same time.   
 
On the other hand, ownership concentration is measured as the percentage of a firm’s 
outstanding stocks held by the largest five institutional investors. In the USA, ownership 
concentration has not increased as much as the growth in institutional ownership because 
institutional investors have the tendency to diversify their portfolios as they increase the 
number of firms. This is actually due to the obstacles faced by some institutions, imposed by 
the USA legal structure that prohibits them from holding sizeable shares (Edwards and 
Hubbard, 2000).  
 
A central question on corporate governance has been the ability to solve the problems 
accompanied by “dispersed ownership” (Berle and Means, 1932). Over a period of time, the 
dispersion of ownership by individuals has been substituted by institutional ownership, or 
shares managed by institutional investors such as; mutual and pension funds (Chen et al., 
2007). Institutional investors are considered the biggest owners of the USA corporations 
(Gillan and Starks, 2000). 
 
Moreover, if institutions are not developed to a great extent, ownership concentration can be a 
substitute for the defects of the institutions and the weak investor protection rights as a feature 
of corporate governance. Therefore, ownership concentration is supposed to be directly 
related to firm performance especially in institutions of fragile legal structure (Shleifer and 
Vishney, 1997). However, this means that ownership concentration may affect firm 
performance to a high level especially when the institutional environment is fragile. In 
addition, it is highly evident that the effectiveness of ownership concentration differs 
according to the level of institutional development especially in emerging market economies 
(Boubakri et al., 2005). 
 
In the USA, institutional investors have very powerful effect on the financial markets. During 
the period from March 1980 until December 1996, the holdings by institutions in the USA 
increased from $253 billion to $3.98 trillion (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). The reports by the 
Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds stated that institutional ownership in the publicly 
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traded companies in the USA has increased from 10% in the 1950s to above 62% in 2009 
(Belghitar et al., 2011).  
 
A report by the International Monetary Fund in 2005 mentioned that the assets under the 
control of institutions have increased three times since the mid of 1990s, and that institutional 
investors have now become the dominant players in most developed countries. In addition, 
institutional investors began to dominate in OECD countries, recording 6.6% annual growth 
in assets in the period from 1995-2005, or about 40.3 trillion US dollars in 2005 and 162.2% 
of GDP (Gonnard et al., 2008). Moreover, the trend of institutional ownership has been 
increasing in emerging countries too as stated by Khorana et al (2005). This 
institutionalization of stock ownership and the consequences on stock returns and its 
performance make the subject of institutional investors a great importance to the stock market 
experts (Belghitar et al., 2011). 
 
As mentioned by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), institutions as big shareholders, have high 
motive to engage actively in monitoring the corporate managers than the small shareholders. 
To be more specific, institutions can handle the problems of asymmetric information and 
agency costs that commonly accompany the dispersed stock ownership. Consequently, this 
entails that institutional ownership would lead to improvement in corporate governance 
associated with increase in efficiency and increase in the wealth of shareholders (Edwards and 
Hubbard, 2000). 
 
A study conducted by Edwards and Hubbard (2000), based on their OLS regression results, 
finds that institutional ownership is concentrated more in large companies with high stock 
prices and high liquidity. Also, they prefer investing in companies with high market-to-book 
ratios, and those listed in the S&P 500 index. Their existence is very limited in companies 
with more volatile stock returns, and those that pay high dividends. Actually, this is not the 
case in other models that got completely different results. Sias (1996) finds a strong positive 
association between the level of institutional ownership and stock returns volatility, after 
accounting for capitalization. 
 
A lot of debate has been going on regarding the relationship between institutional ownership 
and volatility. Rubin and Smith (2009) find a negative correlation between the level of 
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institutional ownership and the volatility of stock returns, depending on the firm’s dividend 
policy in the USA.  
 
Volatility, in specific, also represents much of concern to us, since stock market volatility 
reflects the ways investors analyze information and the noise coming from liquidity traders. 
Higher volatility is therefore, linked to a growing volume of news or a greater level of 
uncertainty about the future state of the economy. Risk-averse individual investors engage in 
hedging to protect themselves against large and more clustered downswings. Extreme volatile 
problems can threaten the smooth functioning of financial markets if liquidity dries up or 
hedging becomes too costly. As a result, the economy will become more vulnerable to risk 
resulting from tensions in the financial markets and, especially, stock markets in a high 
volatility scenario (Werner and Stapf, 2003). 
 
It was also mentioned that the rise of institutional ownership might be an important factor 
affecting the upward increase in idiosyncratic volatility in recent years in USA. If institutional 
investors make decisions in similar ways as individuals and rely on similar information, then 
shocks to institutional behavior may be an important factor driving increased firm-level 
volatility (Bernasek, 2014). 
 
Institutional ownership has become very dominant, and plays a crucial role in the financial 
market in Egypt as well, the country under study. According to the EGX Quarterly Report, 
during the first quarter of 2010, the institutions accounted for 66.14 % of the total value of 
trade, and they were net buyers, with a net equity of 361.80 million pounds. 
 
In an early study done by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), they realize with empirical evidence that 
ownership concentration is normally associated with both high returns and high stock price 
volatility. On the contrary, in their study of the financial valuation of the German model, 
Clark and Wojcik (2005) find that the relationship between ownership concentration and 
stock market returns negative. In addition, a study by Azzam (2010) examines the relationship 
between ownership concentration and stock return volatility in Egypt and how the dividend 
policy of the firm affects it. The results show that ownership concentration has a negative 
impact on stock volatility. 
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The findings regarding the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance 
are contradictory as was highlighted briefly above and will be explained in more details later 
in chapter 2. Moreover, in developing countries, these kinds of studies are limited. Hence, no 
conclusive results in this specific area can be derived from the existing literature. 
Consequently, in this thesis, I will examine, with empirical evidence, the effect of both 
institutional ownership and ownership concentration on both stock returns performance and 
financial performance of the Egyptian listed companies in the stock exchange. Do different 
ownership structures lead to different firm performance on both the market and the financial 
level? If this is the case, which form of ownership structure is the most suitable for improving 
the firm’s performance? In approaching these questions, data of the companies listed in the 
Egyptian Stock Exchange will be collected for seven years (2005-2011). 
 
In the following sections, I will present an overview of the stock markets’ development in 
emerging countries in general, the characteristics of the African stock markets in specific and 
the emergence of the Egyptian stock market with a brief history of the different stages it 
passed through. Also, I will highlight the risk associated with the emerging stock markets. 
After that, I will list the main objectives of this study in addition to highlighting the 
importance of this topic in particular. 
 
1.2 Overview of Stock Markets’ Development in Emerging Countries 
The emergence of stock markets in many developing countries in the recent decades is 
essential in the process of their financial development. The structure of these stock markets is 
found on the basis of implementing the successful transformation from centrally planned 
economic systems to market oriented ones. In market systems, the stock market is considered 
the most important source of capital formation and business financing for domestic and 
foreign investors. That is why in the process of economic liberalization, the plan to activate 
the stock market and remove any constraints that prevent its development is implemented 
(Butter, 1997 and El-Ahmady, 1997). 
 
Indeed, a lot of financial assistance from the IMF and the World Bank was provided to many 
developing countries in support of their structural adjustment programs to promote economic 
growth and alleviate poverty. Many of these programs in Africa specifically include the 
establishment of a well-developed capital market that encourages the privatization of 
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previously state-owned enterprises, which in turn could increase the sphere of ownership, and 
promote economic efficiency with high performance (Hearn and Piesse, 2009).  
 
Proponents of capital market development claim that the development of newly established 
stock markets in developing countries will provide new source of financial help to promote 
industrial expansion, as this will decrease risk, attract domestic savings, foreign direct and 
indirect investment. Unfortunately, lots of factors hinder the development of a successful 
capital market such as: poor regulatory systems, unstable macroeconomic environments 
resulting in asymmetric information between local and foreign firms. Moreover, most 
developing countries suffer from high income and wealth inequality, a situation that could 
lead to unstable political environment. As a result, the risk factor involved in this case is high 
in addition to low liquidity. And finally, the benefits of the stock market will be limited to few 
social and political elite and not distributed among the population (Hearn and Piesse, 2009). 
 
Indeed, stock markets that have access to capital are very efficient in utilizing it, resulting in 
more savings and investments, which are important for economic development. Also, by 
allowing more diversification across the different assets, the risk borne by investors will be 
reduced, which will reduce the cost of capital and in turn leads to more investment and 
economic growth. Yet, we cannot ignore that the market performance and volatility are two 
important factors that determine the efficiency of the stock market in economic development. 
For example, in an inefficient stock market, where the information on corporate performance 
is little or not available, there will be uncertainty form the investor’ side to choose the optimal 
investment. As a result, the investor will leave the market until the uncertainty issue is solved 
or might be discouraged for a long time (Hassan et al., 2000). 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Egypt, as one of the developing countries began its economic 
reform program and this led to vast changes in its economic structure. One of the sectors that 
witnessed an economic development was the capital market, which was able to attract the 
attention of many local and foreign investors (Hegazy, 1997 and El-Hilaly, 1997). 
 
In the next section, the characteristics of the African securities market in general are briefly 
explained. Then, I will highlight and explain the different stages through which the Egyptian 
stock market was developed.  
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1.3 Characteristics of the African Securities Markets 
The main objective behind the establishment and development of stock markets is ownership 
diversification and increased participation of the economically active local population. This is 
considered as extremely important in case of successful implementation of privatization 
programs. Also, Jefferis (1995) claims that ownership diversification especially by domestic 
investors and foreign multinationals is important for some African countries. Privatization 
programs that spread across Africa led to the growth of stock exchanges, which in return, 
attracted lots of investors, including domestic and foreign investors, institutions (such as 
pension funds, insurance companies and banks) and collective investment schemes such as 
unit trusts and mutual funds. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) witnessed remarkable growth rates over the period 2000-2007, and 
attracted a large number of investors searching for higher returns. However, the financial 
crisis that hit mostly the developed world in August 2007 spread to the developing countries, 
and SSA has been affected as a result.
(1) 
Moreover, in 2009, the African securities were poorly 
performing relative to most other countries in the world.  
 
This was liquidity fueled as investors who faced near zero interest rates searched for higher 
yields in large, liquid stocks and markets. One of the recommendations suggested increase in 
capitalization and liquidity. Since this is considered one of the challenges faced by the 
African stock exchanges, the idea is to enlarge the capacity of institutional investment by 
pension funds (CMA, 2010).  
 
A comparative analysis on the performance of the African stock markets finds out that, in the 
year 2008, South Africa was the most actively traded market in Africa, accounting for over 
70% of the entire African stock exchanges turnover, and as a consequence it is considered the 
most liquid stock market in Africa. Egypt had the second rank, accounting for 17% of the 
entire African stock exchanges turnover. The mean turnover ratio for the African stock 
exchanges for the period 2008-2009 was 13.09%, with South Africa and Egypt registering 
more than the African average, 55% and 41% respectively.  The analysis finds that in the year 
                                                 
(
1
) The global financial crisis and sub-Saharan Africa The effects of slowing private capital inflows on growth; 
Jose Brambila and Isabella Massa; African Economic Conference 2009.  
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2008, South Africa got the first rank registering a mean turnover to GDP ratio of 63%, 
followed by Egypt (57%). The low turnover ratio for most markets could be due to the fact 
that institutional investors have strong trading interest than individuals in contrast to the high 
turnover ratios in some markets, where a large portion of the shares are held by families and 
strategic investors.
(2)
 An evidence is found in the Kenyan stock market, where the institutional 
investors (including foreign investors) hold large portions of the listed companies (75%), and 
the free float available to other investors (25%), of which a large part is kept for a very few 
shareholders.
(3) 
 
In 2008, only three markets enjoyed positive performance in the average annual percentage 
growth of market capitalization namely; Tanzania (36%), Tunisia (27%) and Ghana (17%). 
As of December 2009, the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) total market capitalization 
was US $46.5 trillion, of which the African stock market capitalization accounted for only 
2%. The number of listed companies on the African stock exchanges is also very small 
compared to other emerging markets. During the same year 2009, the mean number of firms 
listed on the African stock markets was 75 compared to 959 and 4955 in Malaysia and India 
respectively. In addition, the number of listed companies declined during the period 2006-
2009 in the well-established markets of South Africa and Egypt, recording a growth rate of -
4%.
(4) 
 
Observing the characteristics of the African capital markets, it is clear that the nature of the 
trading mechanisms are the same, in addition to the systems and products available in these 
markets with the exception of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mauritius, Egypt and 
Morocco. Yet, a lot of similar characteristics are apparent which mainly include: 
 
1. The variety of the available tools used for trading in these markets like: on-line trading, 
margin trading and short selling and borrowing. 
2. No restrictions on foreign trading in the stock market. 
3. Shorter settlement cycles. 
                                                 
(
2
) Source of Data: International Financial Statistics (IMF); Emerging Markets Database (IMF); Table adapted 
from Senbet & Otchere (2008). 
(
3
) A survey on investor profiles at the Nairobi stock exchange (2007) found that over 70% of the available free 
float was in the hands of 20% of shareholders. 
(
4
) Source: World Federation of Exchanges – Annual Report 2008. 
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4. No tax restrictions in some markets such as: Egypt, Morocco and Mauritius. 
 
In addition, Sub-Saharan African stock exchanges gradually got used to the electronic 
systems, although some of them are still using the manual trading systems. Moreover, the 
bulk of African stock exchanges are organized as “mutual entities”, but the process of 
demutualization
( 5 )
 is in progress due to the poor corporate governance attached with 
mutualization. 
 
In spite of the growth in the African stock exchanges, which has been very impressive during 
the last two decades, they are not considered good indicators for economic growth. Excluding 
South Africa, the other emerging markets are by far the smallest, with regards to the number 
of listed companies and market capitalization, with minimal trading activity. Also, the low 
liquidity is a major concern, more than the market capitalization. The empirical evidence 
suggests that the high liquidity is the channel linking stock market development with 
economic performance. The current state of the African stock markets reveals that these 
markets especially in terms of low capitalization and liquidity face many challenges. Their 
performance is considered to a certain extent well in terms of return on investment (CMA, 
2010). 
 
In addition, Ntim (2012) finds out that in spite of the fast growth of the African stock markets 
in their number and size, they still remain highly fragmented, small, illiquid and 
technologically poor, which affect their informational efficiency. 
 
1.4 Historical Overview of the Egyptian Stock Market 
To give a historical background about the Egyptian stock market, it began its activities in the 
year 1883. At that time, there was only one stock exchange in Alexandria, and then Cairo 
Stock Exchange began its operations in the year 1903. Focusing mainly from the mid of the 
last century, the stock market was badly affected by the series of nationalization that began 
during the late fifties. The government acquisition of ninety three of the most active 
companies in the stock market at that time and transferring their shares into government 
                                                 
(
5) “Demutualization, refers to the entire process of changing the legal structure of a stock exchange from a 
mutual association, with one vote per member (and possibly consensus-based decision making), into a company 
limited by shares, with one vote per share with majority-based decision making (IOSCO, 2005). 
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bonds led later on to a decrease in the number of listed companies and the number of 
stockbrokers. Market Capitalization, which is the number of listed shares times the current 
market price, decreased as a percentage of GDP from 13% in 1958 to only 1% in 1974. Also, 
the number of listed companies decreased from 275 in 1958 to 55 in 1974. The number of 
stockbrokers declined as well from 55 to 15 during this same period. Moreover, at the level of 
market activity, the value of trade declined sharply from 66.7 million pounds in 1958 to only 
4 million pounds in 1974. In conclusion, during Nasser’s era nationalization affected the stock 
market negatively. It was open but witnessed a significant slowdown during this period until 
its revival after implementing the Open Door policy. 
 
During Sadat’s era, the stock market was free from the government regulations to encourage 
both domestic and foreign investment. Under the Open Door policy, the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) was established to supervise the activities of the stock market. 
Unfortunately, due to several reasons, such as: the unavailability of securities laws and the 
protection of small investors, the stock market was dormant for about 20 years from 1970-
1990. Added to the above, the weakness of the economy was something that led to the 
underdevelopment of the securities industry until 1992 (Capital Market Authority 1996b).  
 
With the introduction of the economic reform program at the beginning of the 1990s, a new 
capital market law was enacted encouraging the investment by the private sector with more 
protection granted to investors and more involvement of the banks in encouraging the capital 
markets through mutual funds. The economic reform plus the enhancements in the 
macroeconomic indicators and the institutional procedures led to the stock market revival in 
1992. By mid-1996, two important factors led to the accelerated growth in the stock market, 
first; the removal of the two percent tax on capital gains imposed on securities investment in 
1992, second; the implementation of the privatization program. Also, during the same year, 
for the first time Egyptian securities were issued overseas known as Global Depository 
Receipts (GDRs). In the year 2005, there were seven more issues. Moreover, Egypt witnessed 
fast steps to be globally integrated and in 1995 and 1997, the International Finance 
Cooperation (IFC) in its global and investible indices (Capital Market Authority 1998; 
International Finance Cooperation 1997) added Egypt. So, with the implementation of the 
economic reform program, the stock market in Egypt began to witness major and positive 
changes. 
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Since 2001, the formerly known as Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE), the only 
official stock exchange in Egypt and now the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) has been one of the 
most evolving emerging stock markets. EGX consists of two exchanges, Cairo and 
Alexandria, both having the same board of directors and the same trading, clearing and 
settlement systems. EGX30 index is made up of the 30 largest companies being traded. In 
2011, the EGX20 index was used to refer to the most active and liquid stocks on the Egyptian 
Exchange. 
 
1.5 Performance of the Egyptian Stock Market 
Based on the quarterly report of EGX, in the last quarter of the year 2010, the total value of 
shares traded reached L.E. 72.4 Billion. While, the total volume traded reached 7,879 million 
securities done over 2,366 thousand transactions. A drop was witnessed in the first quarter of 
the year 2011 because of the political instability associated with the 25
th
 of January 
revolution, and its consequences. The total value of traded shares reached L.E. 37.7 Billion, 
while the total volume traded was 3,387million shares over 986 thousand transactions. A drop 
of 16% in market capitalization was also witnessed by the end of the first quarter of 2011, 
with a total of L.E. 408 billion. Egypt is considered the second in rank after South Africa with 
regards to market capitalization (Bolbol et al., 2005). 
 
Based on the IFC sustainable investment country report, the market capitalization of the 
Egyptian stock market was 75,212 million US dollars in 2010. In January 2011, the market 
capitalization dropped to 69,661 million US dollars.  During the period from July 2007 to 
June 2008, Egypt was ranked number eight of 28 emerging countries with respect to returns, 
and 18 out of 28 in terms of risk ranked from high to low. The annual market return was 
29.7%, while the market risk was 6.94% for the same period. By the end of June 2008, 
Standard and Poor’s and IFCG Indices for the price – earnings ratio (P/E) for Egypt was 15.7 
compared to an average P/E ratio of 26.4 for emerging markets. This indicates that the prices 
of stocks in the Egyptian market on average are relatively low compared to other emerging 
markets. While developed stock markets can perform efficiently as they possess sound, 
deregulated structures, and the required technical and technological expertise; the emerging 
markets are still at large suffering from poor financial structures, which are reflected among 
others in the low liquidity of their stock markets (Singh, 1999). Like many other emerging 
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stock markets, the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) has embarked on a restructuring program 
aiming to improve market operations by implementing a number of procedures.  
 
According to the UK Trade and Investment Financial Services Sector report in 2009, the 
Egyptian Exchange (EGX) is one of the most active and best performing stock markets in the 
emerging markets with gains reaching 800% between 2004 and 2007. The regulatory system 
is considered one of the best in emerging markets with lots of diversified sectors. The 
Egyptian Exchange (EGX) has 17 sectors represented on its trading platform. In addition, it is 
one of the deepest, highly liquid and open stock exchanges in the MENA region and joined 
the membership of the World Federation of Exchanges in 2005. The number of listed 
companies is 324 covering 17 sectors, and 11 of them have shares traded in the London stock 
exchanges as GDRs. In May 2011, Egypt was one on the S&P CIVETS 60 Index among six 
most favored emerging economies categorized as being dynamic and rapidly changing with 
young and growing population. The S&P CIVETS 60 consists of 10 liquid stocks trading on 
each exchange within the six CIVETS countries (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, 
Turkey and South Africa). 
 
According to the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority’s Research and Development 
Department, the Egyptian Exchange was performing well by the end of 2013, despite political 
and security tensions that affected other economic sectors. The exchange bounced back in the 
second half of 2013 after being negatively affected by political and security conditions in the 
first half. The year ended with a net profit of 51 billion Egyptian pounds ($7.3 billion). The 
main index recorded an overall growth rate of 24% last year, while the volume of transactions 
on the EGX 70 index, which tracks the stocks of small- and medium-sized companies, rose 
more than 200%, from 70 million shares in 2012 to 312 million shares in 2013 (Abu Al-
Khair, 2014). 
 
1.6 Risk associated with Emerging Markets 
In recent decades, the importance of risk measurement and prediction has increased 
dramatically. Investors give much attention and concern to the volatility of stock prices and 
its expected returns for several reasons.  First, high volatility will lead to a high-recorded risk 
associated with the firm, resulting in high capital cost (Froot et al., 1992). On one hand, the 
stock price can become a “noiser signal” of the firm value. On the other hand, the volatility of 
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the stock returns can make the “stock price- based compensation” less effective and more 
costly (Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996). Finally, the large stock price fluctuations, especially 
the drops in prices, are often accompanied by “shareholder class-action lawsuits” (Francis et 
al., 1994). 
 
Although lots of empirical studies have been conducted on the behavior of returns and 
volatility in the stock markets of developed countries, not much attention was given to the 
emerging markets except during the recent years. Errunza (1977, 1983) and Errunza and 
Rosenberg (1982) are among the pioneers in conducting studies on emerging markets. Focus 
on these emerging markets was important because of the increased globalization and 
integration in the world economies especially as far as the financial markets are concerned. 
Indeed, this kind of integration gave lot of opportunities to the local and foreign investors to 
diversify their portfolios (Hassan et al., 2000). 
 
It is well known that emerging markets have high potential, but in addition, they have high 
risk (Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms, 2006). They can grow rapidly and then 
collapse due to a number of factors; some of them were listed above. So, as pointed out by 
Wall Street Words in 2003, investment in emerging markets is counted as risky investment. 
The emerging markets only exist in developing countries, where the growth potential is very 
high but the expected risk is high as well. Lots of factors, as mentioned earlier, contribute to 
the existence of this high level of risk such as; corruption, political instability, currency 
devaluation, income inequality, etc. Consequently, the economic and political instability of 
most of the Arab countries may imply that the markets of these countries are more risky and 
unpredictable than the stock markets in developed countries (Guermat et al., 2003).  
 
Aggarwal et al. (1999) analyze the factors that cause the major shifts in emerging markets’ 
volatility, and they find that, unlike developed countries, the big changes in volatility are 
caused by country-specific events. Due to the different political and economic conditions, 
emerging markets might be considered to be more risky. Arab countries in particular suffer 
from political instability. In this respect, the Middle East has been viewed as highly volatile. 
The conflicts between Israel and the Arab countries have resulted in three wars. Other 
examples can be viewed from long time ago between Iraq and Iran, and how they represented 
serious threats to the stability of the region. In addition, regardless of what happened in the 
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last few years, Egypt and Jordan have been always threatened by the rise of the 
fundamentalists. Moreover, Morocco and Algeria have been always in conflict since 1975.  
 
The risk associated with the Arab stock markets has not drawn much attention in literature. 
Few studies have been conducted on the volatility in the Arab markets. El-Erian and Kumar 
(1995) found that emerging Arab markets are still trying to integrate their stock markets into 
the international market, but they have three main problems, mainly in the Middle East, they 
are; a negative perception of country risk, political instability and institutional and legal 
rigidities.  
 
The events that occurred in Egypt in the year 2011 (The Egyptian Revolution) are a good 
example of what we refer to as a risky emerging market. Although Egypt witnessed strong 
development in its capital market during the last two decades as was clarified in the previous 
section, the drop happened suddenly following the 25
th
 of January revolution. The Egyptian 
Exchange witnessed poor performance during the first quarter of 2011. EGX 30 index 
recorded a drop of 23.5%, while EGX 70 index and EGX 100 dropped by 20.31% and   
20.74% respectively (EGX Report, 2011). After being closed for almost 8 weeks, the stock 
exchange reopened on the 23
rd
 of March, with a drop of 8.9% (Wall Street Journal, 2011). 
1.7 Objectives of the Study 
With the mixed results reached in previous researches; combined with the few studies in 
literature in this area of finance in a developing country like Egypt, the main objectives of the 
study are to  
 Evaluate the effect of institutional ownership on ex-post and ex-ante returns and volatility 
in the Egyptian stock market;  
 To evaluate the effect of institutional ownership on stock liquidity and  
 To study the effect of institutional ownership on firm financial performance. 
 Another objective is to  
 Evaluate the effect of ownership concentration on ex-post and ex-ante returns and 
volatility;  
 Evaluate the effect of ownership concentration on stock liquidity and  
 To study the effect of ownership concentration on firm financial performance.  
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1.8 Importance of the Study 
Ownership structures are central distinguishing features of financial systems. Also, the 
relationship between ownership structure and performance has been the subject of an 
important and ongoing debate in the corporate finance literature. The debate goes back to 
Berle and Means (1932), who find an inverse relationship between ownership dispersion and 
firm performance. The idea has been questioned after that by Demsetz (1983), who claims 
that the ownership structure of a firm is supposed to be an endogenous outcome of the 
decisions that reflect the effect of shareholders and trading of shares in the market.  
 
Yet, the majority of literature on institutional ownership and ownership concentration and 
their effect on stock returns and volatilities deal only with developed economies and large 
emerging economies. Small emerging economies such as Egypt are ignored in literature. This 
study fills part of this gap by examining the effect of institutional ownership and ownership 
concentration on both ex post and ex ante returns and volatilities of stocks listed in Egyptian 
Stock market. 
 
Also, while there is an extensive research on the relationship between ownership structure and 
the financial performance of firms in developed economies, the literature ignores this area of 
research in developing countries, particularly Egypt, where the ownership structure is 
completely different. This is considered a limitation of the existing literature, since it is highly 
dependent on utilizing data from highly developed economies, with strong emphasis on USA 
or highly developed European countries. Studies concentrating on emerging or transition 
economies are limited and again focusing on few similar countries, for example: Czech and 
Poland discussed by Lskavyan and Spatareanu (2006) and China studied by Hong Zou and 
Mike B Adams (2008) as will be highlighted in the literature review. 
 
There is a general debate in literature on the effect of institutional ownership and ownership 
concentration on stock volatility. This study will contribute to the debate on literature by 
examining the effect of institutional ownership and ownership concentration on stock returns, 
volatility, and liquidity in Egypt as one of the small emerging markets that has been 
investigated a little in literature. Further, this study extends the analysis of Rubin and Smith 
(2009) by decomposing the ownership type to insurance companies, employee associations, 
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top management, individuals, public and private banks, holdings, and companies and using ex 
ante returns and risk.  
 
Egypt is a small emerging economy different from USA and other developed economies and 
these differences matter. The legal system in developed economies; the well-established 
financial structures and practices determine and shape the enactment of corporate law. For 
small emerging countries the legislative environment governs the securities markets and is 
influenced by French civil code. Common-law countries generally have the strongest, and 
French civil-law countries, such as Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, have the 
weakest legal protection for investors. The recent studies of corporate governance suggest that 
the geographical locations, the tax system, level of industrial development, cultural 
differences along with other factors can affect the ownership structure, and as a result affect 
the firm performance (Pedersen and  Thompson, 1997). It is not known whether the existing 
differences in institutional structure, regulatory body and legislative system also translate into 
differences in the relationship between ownership and firm performance. 
 
Studying the MENA region, Omran (2009) finds that the political system is highly 
concentrated with a poor mode for national governance, which has a negative effect on its 
corporate governance. Financial markets are underdeveloped and access to external funds is 
limited. In these countries, most of the controlling shareholders are individuals (in many cases 
related to political figures or royal families), influential institutions or families. A single 
family may have controlling stakes in a number of companies whether directly or indirectly. 
Privatization in the MENA region has been progressing slower than other large emerging 
markets. The Egyptian market is part of MENA region countries, which have similar 
characteristics. Still, the results cannot be generalized due to individual factors related to each 
country. The differences between Egypt and large emerging and developed countries in legal 
and political systems, country factors, and market structure and development make Egypt a 
unique opportunity to investigate. This study to this end seeks to find out whether there is a 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance of listed firms in the Egyptian 
Exchange. 
 
Finally, by using a representative sample of 85 firms accounting for 99% of the volume of 
trade in the Egyptian Exchange and covering seven years, I make four important contributions 
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to the literature. First, I provide evidence on the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm stock returns and financial performance while using two variables, which are not 
investigated before as far as the Egyptian economy is concerned and they are ex ante returns 
and ex ante risk. Second, I enrich the knowledge of the importance of the effect of 
environmental and period differences on the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance. Third, I am adding as explanatory variables two volatility components, 
volatility clustering and persistence, examining their effect on ex post and ex ante risk. 
Fourth, I am using GARCH (1,1)-GED  in calculating ex ante returns and ex ante risk of 
stocks to know how they are affected by ownership structure. 
 
1.9 Outline of the Thesis Content 
This research paper will be divided into two parts. First the theoretical part, which contains 
two chapters, that deals with the historical development of the Egyptian Stock Market and its 
performance; the characteristics of the African stock markets while explaining the risk 
associated with the emerging markets. In addition, a literature review is presented concerning 
the previous studies that have been conducted on institutional ownership and its effect on 
stock returns, volatility and financial performance and the previous studies that have been 
conducted on ownership concentration and its effect on stock returns, volatility and financial 
performance. The second part will contain four chapters, which will focus on the data set 
description, definition and analysis, the research methodology explaining the approach used 
in testing my data, the hypotheses and the model used with detailed explanation and definition 
of all the variables used. Also, that part contains the empirical study to test the different 
research hypotheses and to answer the research questions, followed by conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
Chapter One: It is a summary of this research paper and introduces the different parts of this 
thesis in terms of objectives, importance, contribution of the study and outline of the thesis. 
Also, it provides a historical overview of the Egyptian stock market, and its development 
since Gamal Abdel Nasser’s era, followed by Anwar ElSadat and Hosni Mubarak until the 
present, showing the recent development associated with the economic reform program 
highlighting its performance especially in the last decade. The characteristics of the African 
stock markets and the degree of risk associated with emerging markets in general and Egypt 
in particular is also discussed. 
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Chapter Two: It deals with the different models and studies that have been conducted before 
on institutional ownership and ownership concentration and their effect on returns, risk and 
financial performance. 
 
Chapter Three: It deals with the data set description and definition of all variables used in 
addition to the source of data collection plus the descriptive statistics. 
 
Chapter Four: It points out the methodology of the research and the statistical analysis 
techniques that will be used in order to test the impact of institutional ownership and 
ownership concentration on ex post and ex ante returns, risk and stock liquidity in addition to 
firm profitability and firm debt. This chapter deals with the empirical research questions and 
their conversion into research hypotheses. It defines the statistical techniques used in this 
study, i.e. the diagnostic tests, GARCH and panel data models used to test the research 
hypotheses and to evaluate the impact of institutional ownership and ownership concentration 
on ex post and ex ante returns, risk and stock liquidity in addition to firm profitability and 
firm debt. 
 
Chapter Five: It highlights the empirical analysis on three stages. The first stage highlights 
the results of the specification and diagnostic tests on the data set. The second stage presents 
all results of the regression. The third stage analyzes the main findings and interprets the 
regression results.    
 
Chapter Six: It summarizes the findings of this thesis. It mainly concentrates upon the 
findings of the empirical part of this paper. In addition, implications and limitations of the 
study are highlighted. Finally, recommendations are made regarding the possible direction for 
further research studies arising from the conclusions derived from this work.  
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Chapter (2): Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The international business literature for a while has been keen about the effect of institutional 
ownership and ownership concentration on the firms’ stock returns, volatility and financial 
performance. This concern has led to an ongoing debate about the relationship between 
ownership structure, return, risk and financial performance. 
 
With regards to the relationship between institutional ownership and stock returns and risk, on 
one hand, most academic theories suggest the existence of a negative “contemporaneous” 
relationship between institutional ownership and stock volatility. Some researchers (e.g. 
Belghitar et al., 2011) think that institutional investors are more likely to be attracted to less 
risky securities since they follow the prudent man rules. In addition, other authors (e.g. Arbel 
et al., 1983) trace “the well-documented positive relationship between institutional investors 
and capitalization” to their unwillingness to invest in risky and more specifically small 
securities. Moreover, Lin et al. (2007) find that the institutional investors’ access to better 
quality of information is likely to result in investment in less volatile securities.  
 
Institutional investors are likely to act in a rational way than individual traders (Shiller, 1984). 
They are called “smart-money” investors by some academics. They have the ability to 
stabilize the financial market by offsetting the irrational trading patterns of individual 
investors, which will result in less volatile securities held by the institutional investors 
(Zweig, 1973; Delong et al., 1990). 
 
On the other hand, as documented by Potter (1992), there is a positive correlation between 
institutional ownership and stock returns volatility. Several reasons could be behind this 
association, which will be highlighted later in the following section. For example, as 
documented by Sias (1996), institutional investors are more likely to be attracted to more 
risky securities since they have higher market performance than other less risky securities. 
Added to the above, if better information could be revealed about these risky securities, 
institutional investors would be tempted to invest in them. Moreover, the institutional 
investors’ tendency to trade in larger volumes than the individual traders could result in 
higher volatility (Lee, 1992). Furthermore, institutional investors might be involved in 
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“noise” trading, which could give a wrong indication to the other traders that the institutional 
investor has the right information, which is not the case (Brown and Brooke, 1993). 
 
Other researchers (e.g. Lakonishok et al., 1991; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Sias, 2004) 
pinpoint to the “herding”(6) behavior of institutional investors. The reasons, as they mention, 
are the homogenous community of the institutional investors, measuring their performance 
compared to others, and the “asymmetry of incentives”, which means that the losses due to 
underperformance far outweigh the gains from over performance. This herding behavior can 
lead to frequent price alterations and increase in volatility. Last but not least, the popular press 
has always viewed institutional investors as resulting in more volatility since they are “short-
term focused”(7) (Sias, 1996). 
 
In addition, as far as the relationship between institutional ownership and stocks’ returns are 
concerned, previous work done by [Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Grinblatt and Titman 
(1993), Grinblatt et al. (1995), Jones et al. (1999), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Wermers 
(1999,2000), Sias et al. (2002), Parrino et al. (2002)] have shown that this relationship is 
positive with regards to the returns during the past and same quarters. While, it is positive but 
weak with regards to the future returns.  
 
In a study conducted mainly on institutional herding, Sias (2004) has pinpointed about the 
relationship between institutional demand and returns in a small part. The study reaches the 
same conclusion as the previous studies. There is a significant positive correlation between 
institutional demand and the returns during the same and past quarters, while the correlation is 
weak and positive between institutional demand and future returns specifically during the 
following two quarters. 
 
A study conducted by Dennis and Strickland (2002) finds a positive relationship between the 
level of institutional holding and the degree of “idiosyncratic” volatility using both time-
series and cross-section data. In addition, the study done by Landelius and Jornhagen (2008) 
finds a significant direct relationship between institutional ownership and the “idiosyncratic” 
stock returns volatility. Moreover, the study conducted by Sahut et al. (2011) has reached the 
                                                 
(
6
) Institutional investors imitate each other in buying and selling the same securities (Sias, 2004). 
(
7
) Some academics have supported the rationality of institutional investors to be short-term focused (Shleifer 
and Vishney, 1990; Froot er al., 1992). 
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same conclusion as the above studies, where they find a positive relationship between stock 
volatility and institutional ownership, which supports what is called the “herding” attitude of 
institutional investors. According to Cunniff (2000), in the USA, mutual funds, which are 
considered the largest segment of institutional investors, are responsible for the majority of 
trading every day and the high volatility in the market. 
 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) find the relationship between institutional ownership and stock 
returns volatility insignificant. In addition, Faugere and Shawky (2003) find that for the eight 
month period from March - November 2000, during the recession, the Nasdaq composite 
index showed a high mean daily returns and lower volatility measured by the standard 
deviation on daily returns, associated with high level of institutional ownership. While for 
NYSE listed shares covering the same period, there appear to be no significant relationship 
between institutional ownership and either the mean or standard deviation on daily returns. 
 
One of the recent studies that was done by Elysian and Jia (2010) investigates the relationship 
between the level and stability of institutional ownership and corporate firm performance. The 
authors, in explaining the role of institutional investors and their effect on firm performance 
have described three scenarios. One is that, engaging in an active role from the institutional 
investors’ side can result in enhancing the firm performance, since they have the necessary 
experience to monitor the management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The second scenario 
assumes that institutional investors are short-term traders, who do not have the incentive to 
engage in active monitoring of the management, in this case they are considered passive. The 
third scenario happens when institutional investors support the management in order to 
exploit the small shareholders, which is likely to happen in the emerging markets where the 
interests of small shareholders are not protected like in other developed countries (Brickley et 
al., 1988; Cornett et al., 2007).  
 
As far as the relationship between ownership concentration and both stock returns and risk is 
concerned, it is not easy to identify a significant relationship between ownership 
concentration and stock market returns and volatility. One reason might be the attitude of the 
investors who may or may not be rational in some instances (Shleifer 2000; Shiller 2000). 
Thus, it is difficult to determine a certain and concrete relationship between the variables 
under study (Clark and Wojcik, 2005). 
  
22 
In an early study done by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), they realize with empirical evidence that 
ownership concentration is normally associated with both high returns and high stock price 
volatility. On the contrary, in their study of the financial valuation of the German model, 
Clark and Wojcik (2005) find that the relationship between ownership concentration and 
stock market returns is negative. In addition, a study by Azzam (2010) examines the 
relationship between ownership concentration and stock returns volatility and how it is 
affected by the dividend policy of the firm. The results show that ownership concentration has 
a negative impact on stock volatility. 
 
Last but not least, Shleifer and Vishney (1986) mention the relationship between ownership 
concentration and financial performance in one of their studies. They have said that when 
there is a certain level of ownership concentration, there is improvement in the management 
control and therefore, the value of the firm increases. In addition, according to Clark and 
Wojcik (2005), ownership concentration, represented by an organized and effective board of 
directors, has a positive and significant effect on the firm performance. 
 
It is evident that the results of the studies conducted on the relationship between institutional 
ownership, ownership concentration and both stock returns and volatility or firm performance 
are not homogeneous. These variations in the conclusions or the summary results reached by 
the different authors need to be further investigated and analyzed in details in order to know 
the real reasons behind these differences.  
 
The following sections analyze the different studies conducted on the relationship between 
institutional ownership and stock returns and volatility in addition to the effect of institutional 
ownership on financial performance. Because of its importance and its high degree of 
association to institutional ownership, further analysis of the different studies conducted on 
the effect of ownership concentration on stock returns, volatility and financial performance is 
done.   
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2.2 Effect of Institutional Ownership on Returns
 (8)
 and Risk 
A central question in financial economics is testing the relationship between changes in 
institutional ownership and stock returns and volatility. Previous studies which tested the 
relationship between institutional ownership and stock returns conclude three main results. 
First, institutional investors are “momentum traders” and they have tendency to be guided by 
the historical prices (Grinblatt et al., 1995). Second, mutual funds as a category of institutions 
sometimes engage in institutional “herding” (Wermers, 1999). Third, the coexistent 
relationship between changes in institutional ownership and stock returns is more solid than 
the “trend chasing effect” (9) (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999). 
 
Sias (1996) conducts one of the pilot studies, which investigates the relationship between 
institutional ownership and volatility in 1996. He has two hypotheses if a positive relationship 
exists between the two variables. The first one is that institutional investors might be attracted 
to more risky securities, believing that they can have higher market performance, which 
means that higher volatility will result in more institutional holdings. But, the empirical 
evidence is very weak with regards to this respect. The second hypothesis is the other way 
around; the high volatility will be the result of more institutional ownership. Most academic 
work do not support this view because it has been known that with more institutional 
ownership, there will be more stability in the financial markets. This means that the increase 
in institutional ownership will lead to less volatility in the market.  
 
Other researchers (e.g. Rubin and Smith, 2009) find that, on the contrary, more institutional 
holdings lead to an increase in volatility, something, which is proved and accepted by Sias 
(1996) in his study. He tests the “contemporaneous” relationship between volatility and 
institutional ownership, and finds that volatility of stocks increases following an increase in 
institutional ownership, with capitalization held constant. The analysis covers 15 years, which 
is the period between 1977 until 1991, and has the weekly returns, percentage held by 
institutional investors and the market capitalizations for all the securities listed in New York 
                                                 
(
8
) Since stock market returns reflect the variations in the market value of the firm, the factors that affect this 
value have to be mentioned. According to the most well-known methods of valuation, the value of a company’s 
share is determined by its expected future dividends, and this in its own reflect the extent of the firm’s riskiness 
(Bodie et al., 2002). There are countless other factors such as: factor prices, demand behavior, the 
competitiveness of the firm, the internal structure of the firm, its efficiency and its ability to adapt to the 
variations of the outside environment (Shleifer, 2000 and Shiller, 2000). 
(
9
) Market participation increases following an increase in the stock price and vice versa (Orosel, 1998). 
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Stock Exchange for that purpose. In addition to the result reached by Sias mentioned above, 
he finds that the changes in volatility can be forecasted by the variation in the lag changes in 
institutional ownership. 
 
Another study points to the relationship between institutional ownership and stock price 
volatility and how they are affected by the company’s disclosure practices (Bushee and Noe, 
2000). Guided by previous research, more corporate disclosure practices lead to increase in 
the percentages of institutional ownership (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Moreover, as reported 
by Potter (1992), more institutional ownership is accompanied by high stock returns 
volatility. This means that there is an indirect relationship between the disclosure practices 
and stock returns volatility through the attraction of more institutional investors.  
 
The authors differentiate between three types of institutional investors. The “transient 
institutions” do lot of trading in the short run, and prefer to invest more in companies with 
higher disclosure ratings. While, the “Quasi-indexer institutions” do not trade frequently, but 
they have “large diversified portfolios”. These institutions also invest more in companies with 
higher disclosure rankings, but unlike the transient institutions, they do not respond quickly 
by increasing their holdings with more enhancements in the disclosure practices by firms. 
Finally, the “dedicated institutions” are not affected by the disclosure practices of firms, since 
they hold large, stable shares in a small number of firms. 
 
The study of Bushee and Noe (2000) shows that there is a positive correlation between the 
level of transient institutional ownership and the future stock returns volatility. Moreover, 
there is a negative correlation between the level of quasi-indexer ownership and the future 
stock returns volatility. 
 
The study contributes to the literature on the relationship between institutional ownership and 
stock returns volatility at that time. They find that the increase in the level of transient 
institutional ownership has a direct and significant effect on daily stock returns volatility, 
either measured on a yearly basis or “around earnings announcements”. In addition, another 
form of stock returns volatility, which is the large, one-day stock price movements, and is 
highly related to the “shareholders class-action lawsuits”, is highly affected by the transient 
institutional ownership. 
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The desire by transient institutions to indulge in massive trading behavior, especially with the 
spread of bad news, results in high stock returns volatility (Porter, 1992). While the passive 
trading behavior by the quasi-indexer institutions leads to lower stock returns volatility. Yet, 
the changes in quasi-indexer institutional ownership are not accompanied by changes in future 
stock returns volatility due to their passive trading behavior as mentioned earlier. The 
transient institutions, on the other hand, have a strong and positive effect on future stock 
returns volatility especially in the short run due to their aggressive trading behavior (Bushee 
and Noe, 2000).   
 
While Gompers and Metrick (2001) test the ability of institutional ownership in forecasting 
the stock returns, they find that the number of institutional holdings has a significant positive 
forecasting power of returns in the subsequent quarter, while changes in institutional 
ownership have insignificant effect on next quarter returns. Their study is conducted in the 
USA and they cover quarterly data over the period from 1989 until 1996. They say that this 
positive relationship can be due to the experience of institutions which is, of course, better 
than the individuals.  They are smart to choose the stocks with higher expected returns. This 
result contradicts with Sias (2004) who finds a weak positive correlation between changes in 
institutional ownership and returns in the next two quarters. Yet, similar to most past studies, 
Sias (2004) finds changes in institutional ownership positively related to the same and ex-post 
quarter returns. His results tilt more towards the conception that institutional demand is more 
positively correlated to previous institutional demand than ex-post returns. 
 
The study by Bushee and Noe (2000) is conducted on 4,314 firms in the USA. The firms are 
rated by AIMR (The Association for Investment and Management Research) between 1982 
and 1996. Going through a series of regressions and tests, their results show that the net effect 
of having both types of institutions (transient and quasi-indexer) owning shares in a firm is 
negligible. Yet, with more improvement in the firm’s disclosure practices, it is expected that 
transient institutions increase their holdings of shares relative to the quasi-indexer institutions, 
which leads to an increase in the stock returns volatility. 
 
Another final point to be added here, Bushee and Noe (2000) find it important to the 
managers in specific, is examining other forms of stock returns volatility and how they are 
affected by the changes in disclosure practices and institutional ownership. They are 
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concerned with the systematic and unsystematic risk
 ( 10 )
 components of stock returns 
volatility. Actually, their findings are similar to that mentioned above regarding the stock 
returns volatility. 
 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) conduct an analysis of the demand by institutional investors for 
stocks and the consequences on stock prices and returns in a study under the name of 
“Institutional Investors and Equity Prices”. They are concerned about the institutions as a 
separate group of investors, who abide by the prudent man rules. Hence, they demand stocks 
with certain characteristics that are assumed to be more liquid, have higher historical returns, 
less volatile and included in the S&P index.  
 
Another explanation added to the above regarding the positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and future stock returns, is the increase in the institutional share of the 
market, that leads to “demand shocks” (11) in the stocks favored by institutions. Demand 
shocks influence stock prices, and consequently the “contemporaneous” returns. Thus, in case 
of the validity of the demand shocks explanation, it is expected that institutional ownership in 
the preceding period would be able to predict returns better than the change in institutional 
ownership. In testing the two explanations, the results support the demand shocks explanation 
in determining the ability of institutional ownership to forecast stock returns. There is no 
supporting proof for the smart institutions explanation (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). 
 
Similar to Gompers and Metrick (2001), Ali et al. (2002) find a strong positive association 
between changes in institutional ownership during a certain quarter and the three-day 
abnormal returns during the next quarter, which means that some institutions are well 
informed to forecast the future returns. In addition, this positive association is higher for 
ownership by institutions such as: independent investment advisors, investment companies, 
insurance companies and banks than for institutions like; pension funds, college and 
university endowments, due to the short-term focus by the former institutions mentioned.  
 
                                                 
(
10
) Systematic risk is the “stock returns volatility around earnings announcements”, while the Unsystematic risk 
is the effect of a big one-day price alterations (Bushee and Noe, 2000). 
(
11
) Demand shocks can be the result of institutional herding. These shocks would come as a simultaneous 
relationship between variations in institutional ownership and stock returns (Wermers; Nofsinger and Sias, 
1999). 
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Ali et al. (2002) think of one reason for this positive association, which could be the 
combination between “post-earnings-announcement drift”( 12 ) and “window dressing by 
institutions”(13). Another possible reason, as documented by the authors, for this positive 
association, is that institutions are momentum traders, which is approved by Sias et al. (2006). 
Yet, the results they obtain do not coincide with these two possibilities. Even the risk factors 
such as: size and book-to-market are not the reasons behind this positive association. It 
remains that the kind of information obtained by these short-term focus institutions that 
allows them to earn abnormal returns in the future. The source of this information is not clear 
for the authors, since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prohibits “selective 
disclosure of material information”. It has been demonstrated, by Lin et al. (2007) that 
institutional investors have informational advantages over retail investors in IPO auctions in 
Taiwan. 
 
Griffin et al. (2003) think of one potential explanation for the strong relationship between 
changes in institutional ownership and ex-post returns. They say that institutions and 
individuals react to the price variations in a completely different manner and this reflects on 
their trading pattern. It is evident that institutions react to the positive returns movements by 
purchasing more, while individuals respond to the same movements by selling. Furthermore, 
their results show that the relationship between variations in institutional ownership and stock 
returns is very strong and positive at the daily level. 
 
The results by Griffin et al. (2003) are similar to those by Choe et al. (1999) in Korea, who 
find trend chasing and daily herding behavior by the foreign and Korean institutional 
investors. On the contrary, the results are not the same in the study conducted by Nofsinger 
and Sias (1999), who do not observe trend chasing in the daily institutional trading in NYSE 
securities during a three month interval (in 1990 to 1991), and similarly trend chasing and 
herding behavior are not observed by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) in their study conducted 
on the strategies of the Finnish institutions.  
 
                                                 
(
12
) In financial economics, post–earnings-announcement drift, or PEAD is the “tendency for a stock’s 
cumulative abnormal returns to drift in the direction of an earnings surprise for several weeks (even several 
months) following an earnings announcement.”(Bernard and Thomas, 1989). 
(
13
) Window dressing is the buying of stocks with good performance in the recent periods (Bildersee and Kahn, 
1987). 
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In another paper, it has been noted that there is a strong and positive relationship between 
changes in institutional ownership and the same quarterly stock returns (Sias, et al., 2006). 
They also indicate that this positive correlation could be the result of institutions having better 
access to information so they can find the right time to trade. Another explanation is that 
institutional investors have the tendency to be “Short-term Momentum Traders” ( 14 ). 
Moreover, the activity of buying and selling by institutions as a whole tends to have 
immediate effect on returns.  
 
The study has concentrated mainly on the relationship between quarterly variations in 
institutional ownership and “higher frequency returns”. The authors have calculated daily, 
weekly, monthly and quarterly data of stock returns for all NYSE securities for the period 
from December 1979 until December 2000. The results show that changes in institutional 
ownership are high and positively correlate with the same quarter returns and previous quarter 
returns. Their results coincide well with Bennett et al. (2003), Chen et al. (2002) who find that 
variations in institutional ownership have strong positive relationship with both the current 
and previous returns. One explanation given by the authors for that positive correlation is that 
institutional investors “follow short-term intra-quarter positive feedback trading strategies” 
(Sias et al., 2006). This explanation goes well with the explanation of momentum trading, 
which states that institutional investors have the tendency to buy well-performing stocks and 
sell the poor-performing ones (e.g., Grinblatt et al., 1995; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Wermers 
1999, 2000; Cai and Zheng, 2004; Bennett et al., 2003; Parrino et al., 2002; Sias, 2004).  
 
The results of Sias et al. (2006) further show that there is significant growth in the number of 
institutions holding a company’s shares which is 125 in the year 2000 compared to a mere 54 
in 1980. This growth has been witnessed again in the average fraction of a firm’s shares 
owned by institutions, which was 44% in 2000 compared to 24% in 1980. The results reflect 
the relative importance and development of institutions over time. Moreover, the independent 
investment advisors are the reason behind most of the growth in institutional ownership over 
the sample period covered, which is consistent with Gompers and Metrick (2001) study. 
 
                                                 
(
14
) Institutional momentum trading is a certain type of herding, where the investors herd by selling stocks with 
low returns and buying those with high returns (Sias, 2004). Grinblatt et al.(1995) have noticed strong 
momentum trading by mutual funds, in addition, Badrinath and Wahal (1998) find that the desire of trend 
chasing or momentum trading differs according to the type of institution. 
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In addition, it has been noted that institutional investors have the ability to predict intra-
quarter returns, which means that the stocks purchased by institutional investors will have 
high performance than the stocks sold by them. The ability to forecast by institutional 
investors can explain the high correlation between changes in institutional ownership and the 
same quarterly returns. In summary, it is evident that the variations in aggregate institutional 
ownership have significant positive effects on stock returns, since institutional investors have 
better access to information than individual investors. On the contrary, Cai and Zheng (2004) 
find that changes in institutional ownership do not predict the stock returns. 
 
One important point has to be mentioned here, which is consistent with the previous studies. 
There is a strong positive correlation between changes in institutional ownership and stock 
returns during the same and past quarter for all categories of institutional investors. Just for 
mutual funds and independent advisors, there is a strong positive relationship between 
variations in their ownership and future returns, as measured by the following quarter. This 
means that these institutions have better access than the others to information and they might 
“exploit return momentum” (Sias et al., 2006). 
 
Bohl et al. (2007) have studied the impact of institutional ownership on stock market returns 
dynamics in Poland during the period 1994-2003. Utilizing a modified Markov-Switching-
GARCH analysis, they find out that change in institutional ownership is associated with a 
temporary change in the volatility structure of aggregate stock returns. 
 
Some studies find that the direction of the relationship between institutional ownership and 
stock volatility is strongly affected by the company’s dividend policy. Rubin and smith 
(2009) have proved that this relationship is positive for the dividend paying stocks but 
negative for the non-dividend paying stocks. The lower volatility due to the high level of 
institutional ownership is due to institutional investors’ easy access to information on prices, 
called “Institutional Preference hypothesis” (West, 1988). It refers to the institutional 
investors’ preference to invest a large component of their portfolios in low risk non-dividend 
paying shares. The reason is that most institutions follow the “Prudent” man rules, since they 
invest on behalf of other people.  
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On the other hand, the “Institutional Turnover Hypothesis” could explain the positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and stock volatility in the dividend paying 
stocks. This hypothesis refers to the high frequency of portfolios’ turnover by institutional 
investors, more than individual investors. Karpoff (1987) says that this high portfolio turnover 
indeed has a positive impact on stock volatility. Moreover, institutional herding is closely 
associated with dividend paying stocks than non-dividend paying stocks, meaning that 
institutional investors follow the same pattern in buying and selling stocks (Sias, 2004). 
 
The study conducted by Zou and Adams (2008) is one of the few studies that tested the 
impact of certain kinds of corporate ownership (other than managerial ownership) on the 
company’s stock returns and stock volatility in an emerging country. They selected China as 
an emerging country that is rich in different kinds of corporate ownership. Studying the 
relationship in a country like China is of extreme importance because of its large investment 
opportunities and China is one of the largest recipients of foreign direct and indirect 
investment during the last ten years prior to the study (Pan and Chi, 1999). This trend of 
capital inflow has increased in China especially after it joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Moreover, in 2002, China launched the “system of qualified foreign institutional 
investors (QFII)” to allow for more foreign investment in its rapidly expanding economy (Sun 
and Tong, 2002, 2003). 
 
They said that the different kinds of ownership structure could have a significant effect on the 
firm’s stock returns and volatility, since the different shareholders could exercise different 
degrees of power to achieve their own self-interests, and this ultimately could lead to different 
“agency costs” and different degrees of “financial performance” among the Chinese 
companies. If the data on financial performance is included in the market price, this could 
affect the stock returns. In addition, the different kinds of corporate ownership have varying 
targets and variety of risk choices, and this in return could affect the company’s business plan, 
resulting in different levels of equity risk.  
 
The study of Zou and Adams (2008) has used a sample of 259 Chinese PLCs for the period 
1996-2000, and the panel model was used for estimation. The results show that the companies 
with more state ownership have higher stock volatility and lower stock returns in relation to 
the companies with more “legal-person” ownership that have lower stock volatility and higher 
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stock returns. The reasons for this are mainly due to the agency problems resulting from the 
owner-manager relationship, political costs and the unavailability of professional managers, 
associated with state ownership. While the “legal-person” ownership has a positive effect on 
the firm’s stock returns, the negative effect on the stock volatility reveals the efficiency of 
placing the State owned enterprises (SOEs) as intermediate shareholders between the 
government and the firms (Chen and Yuan, 2004). 
 
In another study led by Gutierrez and Kelley (2009), they find that herding affects abnormal 
returns negatively in the second year after the herding but it does not affect abnormal returns 
in the first year, which contradicts the findings of Wermers (1999) and Sias (2004).
( 15 )
 
Dominated by the original measure of herding, changes in institutional ownership forecast 
return reversal in the second year. This result coincides with Dasgupta et al. (2010), who find 
that changes in institutional ownership over several quarters lead to return reversal in the 
future. In addition, Yan and Zhang (2009) analyze the short-term and long-term institutions, 
and find that variations in the ownership of short-term institutions forecast stock returns in the 
second year. Consequently, this means that herding forecasts future returns reversal. 
 
A recent paper by Belghitar et al. (2011) analyzes the effect of institutional investors on 
equity prices and stock performance. They focus mainly on “Prudent Strategic” institutional 
investors since they have similar attitudes and their shares are not included in the normal 
trading but held for the long run. The previous studies are mainly depending on the first two 
moments to measure stock performance. They find that the first two moments, can lead to 
misleading results. Thus, they measure the stock performance by the whole distribution of 
stock returns using the concept of marginal conditional stochastic dominance (MCSD) 
innovated by Shalit and Yitzhaki (1994). The only assumption for this method is that 
“investors are risk averse utility maximizers”. 
 
One of the difficulties faced by the researchers is that institutional investors are considered 
heterogeneous group since they have different plans, so their effect on stock performance will 
                                                 
(
15
) Wermers (1999) studies herding in mutual funds only while, Gutierrez and Kelley (2009) along with Sias 
(2004) study herding in 13F institutions. The 13F data provides data for the holdings of all institutions with at 
least $100 million under management and outstanding shares of at least $200,000 or 10,000 shares. 
Consequently, the 13F data is better in reflecting the overall institutional demand. 
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not be the same. Yet, in common they have their respect to the “Prudent man rules”.(16)  That 
is why they focus mainly on the “prudent strategic”(17) shareholders, since they are similar in 
their attitude towards fund management, That is to say, they are “legally bound by prudent 
man rules”.(18) In addition, since the strategic shareholders keep their shares for a long period 
of time, their effect on the corporate governance and consequently on the stock performance 
will have time to be implemented, as opposed to the non-strategic institutional shareholders.  
 
According to Belghitar et al. (2011), the disadvantage of the past studies, performed on the 
relationship between institutional ownership and stock returns and volatility is that they are 
assuming that investors are only concerned by the first two moments of the return 
distribution. There is no problem in that assumption if the assets distribution follows a normal 
distribution, but according to Mandelbrot (1963), it is a well-documented fact that this is not 
the case. As a result, the third and the fourth moments of the return distribution (skewness and 
kurtosis) are very important to investors (Athayde and Flores, 1997).  
 
Belghitar et al. (2011) have conducted their study on USA listed nonfinancial firms on NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ for the period from 2002-2009. Their results show negative 
relationship between the yearly average daily stock returns and institutional ownership, which 
proves the prudent behavior of the institutional investors. Moreover, there appears to be a 
positive relationship between strategic institutional ownership and stock performance.  
 
Another recent study by Hassanzadeh et al. (2013) examines the relationship between 
institutional ownership and stock returns fluctuations in Iran during the period 2006-2010. It 
is one of the few studies conducted on emerging economies. The results of their study support 
a positive relationship between institutional ownership and stock returns fluctuations. They 
use the pooled data approach as their estimation method. 
 
The study by Chen et al. (2013) analyzes the effect of foreign institutional ownership on firm-
level stock returns volatility in China between 1998 and 2008. The empirical results show that 
share ownership by foreign institutions increases firm-level stock returns volatility, even after 
                                                 
(
16
) Prudent man rules impose on the institutions, since they act on behalf of their clients, to be “risk averse”, 
when they manage their funds.  
(
17) Strategic shareholding means the shares of the company’s capital that is not included in the normal trading 
“in the free float and held only for the long run”. 
(
18
) A study by Del Guercio (1996) analyzes the shares of mutual funds and banks in 1988, and she finds that 
banks have more tendency to invest in “prudent” stocks, and this tendency was stable from 1988 to 1991. 
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controlling for firm size, turnover, and leverage, and correcting for endogeneity. Furthermore, 
they document a positive relationship between domestic shareholdings (individual, 
institutional, and governmental) and firm-level stock returns volatility.  
 
The study by Alzeaideen and AL-Rawash (2014) however, could not provide a significant 
relationship between the individual and institutional shareholder in one hand, and share price 
volatility on the other, based on their analysis of 51 Jordanian companies between 2005 to 
2009. A panel data method is employed with two empirical models OLS and SUR (seemingly 
unrelated regression). 
 
In summary, it is evident that the studies conducted on the relationship between institutional 
ownership and either stock returns or volatility have different results. Most studies examine 
the relationship between the level or changes of institutional ownership and both the past and 
contemporaneous returns. Little emphasis is given to the relationship between institutional 
ownership and future returns. It is logical to have these differences since each study is done 
using different sample periods and sometimes, different countries. The important factor is the 
reasons mentioned to justify the underlying relationship. 
 
On one hand, some studies document a negative relationship between institutional ownership 
and both stock returns and volatility. So, we find researchers such as: Lin et al. (2007) and 
Belghitar et al. (2011) in support of this relationship. Their reasons mainly are; institutional 
investors being followers of the prudent man rules, having access to better quality of 
information that allow them to invest in less risky securities, their tendency to act in a rational 
way unlike the individual traders as mentioned by Shiller (1984) and being smart-money 
investors. Bushee and Noe (2000) find negative correlation between the level of quasi-indexer 
institutional ownership and both the present and future stock returns volatility due to their 
passive trading behavior. 
 
Although most academic theories suggest a negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and both stock returns and volatility, the empirical evidence is different. Most 
studies document a positive relationship between institutional ownership and both stock 
returns and volatility. Researchers such as: Potter (1992) and Sias (1996) rationalize this 
relationship by the temptation of institutional investors to invest in risky securities since they 
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have higher market performance, added to this, their ability to get better information about 
these risky securities. Lee (1992) has added that trading in larger volumes by institutions 
results in higher volatility. Moreover, the herding behavior, followed by institutional 
investors, could result in frequent price alterations and increase in volatility.  
 
Most researchers such as: [Grinblatt (1989), Grinblatt et al. (1995), Jones et al. (1999), 
Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Wermers (1999, 2000), Sias et al. (2002), Chen et al. (2002), 
Parrino et al. (2002), Bennett et al. (2003), Sias (2004), Sias et al. (2006)] have documented a 
positive relationship between institutional ownership and stock returns during the past and 
same quarters, while it is positive but weak with respect to future stock returns. These 
findings were approved by Griffin et al. (2003). They add that the reaction of institutions to 
the positive returns movements by purchasing more is behind the strong positive relationship 
between changes in institutional ownership and ex-post returns. The same results apply to 
Choe et al. (1999) in Korea. This is due to trend chasing as mentioned by the above 
researchers.  
 
In addition, this positive association has been explained due to the tendency of institutional 
investors to “follow short-term intra-quarter positive feedback trading strategies”, that goes 
well with the explanation of momentum trading. Others like; Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) do not observe trend chasing. 
 
On the contrary, Ali et al. (2002) find a strong positive association between changes in 
institutional ownership during a certain quarter and the three days abnormal returns during the 
next quarter. Their rationalization is that some institutions are well informed to forecast future 
returns. This is higher for institutions such as: independent investment advisors, investment 
companies, insurance companies and banks, due to their short-term focus. Other reasons 
mentioned for these positive associations are; the combination between “post-earnings-
announcement drift” and “window-dressing by institutions” and some institutions being 
momentum traders. In addition, researchers such as: Gutierrez and Kelly (2009) and Yan and 
Zhang (2009) have found that changes in institutional ownership forecast return reversal in 
the second year due to herding. 
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Moreover, other researchers such as: Bushee and Noe (2000), Dennis and Strickland (2002) 
and Landelius and Jornhagen (2008) find a positive relationship between the level of 
institutional holdings and the degree of “idiosyncratic” volatility. In addition, Sahut et al. 
(2011), Rubin and Smith (2009) and Sias (2006) trace a positive relationship between the 
level of institutional holding and stock returns volatility. They also add that changes in 
volatility could be forecasted by the variation in the lag changes in institutional ownership.   
 
Furthermore, some institutions as mentioned by Rubin and Smith (2009), are affected by the 
company’s dividend policy, which exhibit positive relationship with the stock returns 
volatility for the dividend paying stocks and negative relationship for the non-dividend paying 
stocks. The negative relationship is explained by the “Institutional preference hypothesis” 
(West, 1988), and following the prudent man rules, since the institutions invest on behalf of 
other people. On the contrary, Rubin and Smith (2009) find this relationship positive due to 
“Institutional turnover hypothesis”. However, this positive relationship is only for the 
dividend paying stocks.   
 
Finally, other researchers such as: Gompers and Metrick (2001), and Faugere and Shawky 
(2003) after examining the eight month period from March to November 2000 for NYSE 
listed shares, find the relationship between institutional ownership and stock returns volatility 
insignificant. Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that institutional ownership has a significant 
positive forecasting power of returns in the subsequent quarter due to the experience of 
institutions, which is indeed better than individuals. 
2.3 Effect of Institutional Ownership on Firm Performance 
Recently institutional investors have been increasingly involved, in monitoring mangers to 
work for the sake of the shareholders’ interests using their ownership rights. With the increase 
in their percentage of ownership in firms, more concentration is given to the role of 
institutional investors in monitoring and guiding the corporate managers (Cornett et al., 
2007). Shleifer and Vishney (1986) have pointed the high motives of institutional investors to 
observe the managers more than the members of the board of directors, who do not have any 
shares invested in the firm. 
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In addition, the institutional investors have such capabilities and resources to observe and 
affect the managers. Moreover, McConnell and Serveas (1990), Nesbitt (1994), Smith (1996), 
and Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) have reached certain results that go well with the 
hypothesis that “corporate monitoring” from the institutional investors’ side can push the 
managers to concentrate more on firm performance and less on their self-interests.  
 
According to Maug (1998), the desire by institutional investors to monitor the mangers is 
dependent upon the size of their shares in the firm. They are more motivated if they are 
investing for the sake of long-term profitability. And since monitoring is proportional to the 
amount and size of shares they control, they could lead to a decrease in the marketability of 
shares and lower valuation. 
 
Before the year 2005, few studies have been conducted and they have not reached a concrete 
result on the effect of institutional ownership on financial performance. On one hand, 
McConnell and Serveas (1990) find a positive correlation between the percentage of 
institutional ownership and the firm’s Tobin’s q.(19) In addition, Nesbitt (1994), Smith (1996), 
and Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) document a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and different measures of firm performance. Moreover, Chen et al. (1998) find that 
institutional investors have a positive impact on firm performance.  
 
On the other hand, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Karpoff et al. (1996), Duggal and Miller 
(1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) find the above-mentioned relationship insignificant.  
 
Other studies pinpoint to the negative impact of institutional ownership on financial 
performance. Graves and Waddock (1994) find that an increase in the level of institutional 
ownership has led to a decline in the performance of American companies. Also, Coffee 
(1991) and Demirag (1998) conclude that institutional investors will be more involved in buy-
sell strategies, and will not be preoccupied by proper monitoring. 
 
Consequently, it means that the effect of institutional ownership on firm performance is not 
clear or gives mixed results. Yet, Bhattacharya and Graham (2009) pinpoint to the importance 
                                                 
(
19
) The ratio Tobin's q is calculated by dividing the market value of a company by the replacement value of the 
book equity: 
Tobin's q = (Equity market value + Liabilities book value)/(Equity book value + Liabilities book value). 
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of classifying institutional ownership into different groups to examine their effect on firm 
performance. 
 
Cornett et al. (2007) conduct a study examining the relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm performance. They measure the firm performance using “cash flow return 
on assets”. Moreover, they consider the firm’s performance as a function of the kind of 
institutional investor whether he is pressure -sensitive or pressure-insensitive.
(20)
 Their study 
consists of firms listed in the S&P 100 since their size attracts more institutional investors. 
The authors have used the return on assets to measure the firm performance, which is, as they 
say, better than the Tobin’s q. Return on assets focuses more on the present performance, 
unlike Tobin’s q which is more concerned with the expected growth in the coming years.  
 
The authors follow Hartzell and Starks (2003) in their measures of institutional investor 
ownership. Furthermore, they follow Brickley et al. (1988) and Almazan, Hertzell and Starks 
(2005) to know the impact of certain categories of investors on firm performance. Moreover, 
like the formerly mentioned authors, they utilize the CDA spectrum coding to separate the 
data on institutional investor ownership as either pressure-insensitive or pressure-sensitive, to 
test their impact separately on firm performance. 
 
The results of Cornett et al. (2007) show that there is a strong positive relationship between 
changes in institutional ownership and the firm’s financial performance as indicated by the 
industry-adjusted ROA. The results prove that high institutional ownership is closely linked to 
better operating performance and monitoring of corporate managers. Moreover, in 
differentiating between the two groups of institutional investors (pressure-sensitive and 
pressure-insensitive), they find that improved firm performance is highly related only to the 
number of pressure-insensitive institutional investors. This result confirms that pressure-
sensitive institutional investors are more likely to have insignificant effect on ROA through 
their decisions against the management. Uwuigbe and Olusanmi (2012) reach the same 
conclusion as Cornett et al. (2007). Testing the Nigerian listed firms during the period 2006-
                                                 
(
20
) Pressure-sensitive are those institutional investors who have interests with other firms, and for the sake of 
these interests, they prefer not to interfere with the management decisions. Good examples are; insurance 
companies and banks. Pressure-insensitive are less likely to get influenced by any pressure from the firms they 
invest in and they can have the ability to observe, guide and set rules for the corporate managers. Good examples 
are; investment companies and independent investment advisors. 
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2010, using a multivariate multiple regression analysis, they find that institutional ownership 
has a positive and significant impact on firm’s performance using return on assets as a 
measure of performance. 
 
Bhattacharya and Graham (2009) are the first to combine the use of simultaneous equation 
estimation method and the disaggregated institutional ownership data. The possibility of an 
endogeneity problem between firm performance and ownership structure leads the authors to 
use a three-stage least squares to deal with the problem. They conduct their study using data 
from Finnish companies, where it is known that special characteristics of ownership structure 
exist in Finland. According to Ilmanen and Keloharju (1999), the local Finnish institutions 
own more than half the investment capital in Finland. In addition, the ownership structures for 
most of the Finnish-listed shares during the period from 1993-2000 have been reported to be 
stable (Maury and Pajuste, 2005). Consequently, it is expected that there is no changes in 
ownership over time. That is why the authors conduct a cross-sectional analysis for one year, 
2004 ownership data.  
 
Similar to Cornett et al. (2007), Bhattacharya and Graham (2009) categorize institutional 
owners into two groups, pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive. In addition, since 
ownership concentration in Finnish firms does not necessarily mean voting power 
concentration by institutional stakeholders, examining the voting power associated with the 
equity ownership of each institutional group is important. When they compare the Tobin’s Q 
values for both pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive owners, they find that firms under 
pressure-sensitive owners have a positive effect on performance, which is better than that of 
pressure-insensitive owners. The same result occurs when return on equity is used as an 
alternative measure for firm performance. Moreover, they find that there is a negative 
relationship between firm performance and voting power proxies for the firms owned by both 
pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive owners, which means that with more equal 
distribution of the voting power among the largest institutional stakeholders, the firm 
performance could be enhanced.  
 
One study done by Elysian and Jia (2010) investigates the relationship between the level and 
stability of institutional ownership and corporate firm performance. The authors explain the 
role of institutional investors and their effect on firm performance. They have described three 
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scenarios. One is that, engaging in an active role from the institutional investors’ side can 
result in enhancing the firm performance, since they have the necessary experience to monitor 
the management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The second scenario assumes that institutional 
investors are short-term traders, who do not have the incentive to engage in active monitoring 
of the management, in this case they are considered passive. The third scenario happens when 
institutional investors support the management in order to exploit the small shareholders, 
which is likely to happen in the emerging markets where the interests of small shareholders 
are not protected like in other developed countries (Brickley et al., 1988 and Cornett et al., 
2007).  
 
Elyasiani and Jia (2010) are concerned more with the first and second moments in their study 
of the stability of institutional ownership distribution and its effect on firm performance. The 
authors prefer to use the institutional ownership stability plus the ownership level to test its 
effect on performance for several reasons. Stable institutional investors have better chance to 
have more information about the investing firms and to observe them on a regular basis, 
which minimizes the agency costs and the information asymmetry. In addition, stable 
institutional investors, are better in motivating the management to invest for the long-term, 
which means better long-term performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Moreover, stable 
institutional owners with large holdings can enhance the corporate governance, and guide the 
management towards long-term profitability instead of pursuing their self-interests only 
(Hartzell and Starks, 2003).  
 
Aghion et al. (2010) find that monitoring by institutional investors can minimize the 
information asymmetry between shareholders and managers, which can lead to enhancement 
of the management motives to concentrate on long-term investments. Similarly, Wahal and 
McConnell (2000) have said that institutions have better access to information than the 
individual traders, and their existence in the firms result in large finances on investments with 
long-term profitability and good performance. In addition, Rubin and Smith (2009) prove that 
institutional ownership minimizes stock volatility in non-dividend paying stocks, which are 
accompanied by high information asymmetry. The reason lies in the high skills of 
institutional investors in collecting and analyzing information. This, in return, means that 
stable institutional investors minimize the cost of information asymmetry associated with 
dispersed ownership because of their good monitoring.   
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The results of Elyasiani and Jia (2010) confirm that with more stability of institutional 
ownership, the corporate firm performance is better, and it is much better under pressure-
insensitive institutional investors. 
 
Contrary to the above studies, another recent study by Namzi and Kermani (2013) find that 
institutional ownership has a negative and significant impact on firm performance. The 
authors use data from Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2003-2008 and employ a 
panel data model. The authors here identify two main ownership structures: institutional 
ownership and private ownership. They take only the percentage of the stocks that is owned 
by the public corporations in referring to institutional ownership. They use return on assets 
and return on equity as measures of financial performance. 
Also, the study by Zeitun (2009) investigates the effect of ownership structure on the 
company’s performance in a panel estimation using 167 Jordanian companies during the 
period from 1989-2006. The empirical evidence shows that inefficiency is related to 
institutional ownership, and that there is a significant negative relationship between 
government ownership and the firm’s accounting performance. The firm’s profitability 
represented by ROA is negatively and significantly correlated with the percentage of 
institutional ownership. 
Hsu and Wang (2014) investigate the influence of shareholding stability of institutional 
investors on firm performance. They analyze 647 sample companies listed in the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2009 using the coefficient of variance on institutional holding 
proportion as the measure of ownership stability. The empirical results show that increasing 
stability of institutional holdings is accompanied by better firm performance. The low-risk 
and younger firms with higher CEO incentive compensation, larger insider holdings, and 
higher growth usually have better performance. Moreover, when the long-term institutional 
shareholdings, particularly of foreign institutions, are higher, the firm performance is better. 
Yet, in most developing countries, there appear to be no association between institutional 
ownership and firm performance. This is evident in the studies of Aljifri and Moustafa (2007) 
in United Arab Emirates and Dwivedi and Jain (2005) in India. They both employ cross-
sentional regression and use Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance. 
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In summary, most of the studies done on the relationship between institutional ownership and 
firm performance reveal that it is a positive relation. According to McConnell and Serveas 
(1990), Nesbitt (1994), Smith (1996) and both Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999), “corporate 
monitoring” by institutional investors pushes the managers to focus more on firm 
performance. Maug (1998) adds that this desire by institutional investors increases when they 
invest for the sake of long-term profitability. 
 
Moreover, most studies classify institutional investors into: pressure-sensitive and pressure-
insensitive owners. In contrast, the measures used to account for firm performance differ 
across studies. Some use Tobin’s q as a measure of performance, while others use cash flow 
return on asset. Cornett et al. (2007) document a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm performance, and it is better under pressure-insensitive investors. In 
addition, Bhattacharya and Graham (2009) find a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm performance, but unlike the above-mentioned authors, they observe that 
the firm performance is better under pressure-sensitive owners. 
 
Furthermore, Elysian and Jia (2010) notice a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm performance, and like Cornett et al. (2007), it is better under pressure-
insensitive institutional investors. But, Elysian and Jia (2010) are more concerned with the 
stability of institutional ownership and its effect on performance. They find that with more 
stability in ownership, agency costs and information asymmetry are minimized, which has its 
positive effect on performance.  
 
Finally, the reasons mentioned for this positive relationship do not differ to a great extent 
among the studies, yet they all complement each other. Examples of this are the institutional 
investors’ better access to information and their tendency to encourage investments with long-
term profitability (Wahal and McConnell, 2000). In addition, as pointed by Rubin and Smith 
(2009), institutional ownership minimizes stock volatility in non-dividend paying stocks 
because they have high skills in collecting and analyzing information, which in return 
minimize the cost of information asymmetry, leading to good firm performance. 
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2.4 Effect of Ownership Concentration on Risk and Return 
Ownership concentration is measured as the percentage of a firm’s outstanding stocks held by 
the largest five institutional investors. In the USA, ownership concentration has not increased 
as much as the growth in institutional ownership because institutional investors have the 
tendency to diversify their portfolios as they increase to more firms. This is actually due to the 
obstacles faced by some institutions, imposed by the USA legal structure that prohibits them 
from holding sizeable shares (Edwards and Hubbard, 2000).  
 
Actually, it is not easy to identify a significant relationship between ownership concentration 
and stock market returns. Added to the reasons discussed in a previous section in this chapter 
about the factors affecting the stock market returns evaluation, there is the attitude of the 
investors who may or may not be rational in some instances (Shleifer 2000 and Shiller 2000). 
Thus, it is difficult to determine a certain and concrete relationship between the two variables 
under study (Clark and Wojcik, 2005). 
 
In an early study done by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), they realize that with empirical evidence 
ownership concentration is normally associated with both high returns and high stock price 
volatility. 
 
In their study of the financial valuation of the German model, Clark and Wojcik (2005) find 
that the relationship between ownership concentration and stock market returns is negative. 
They have conducted their study by analyzing the companies of the DAX100 stock market 
index from 1997-2001. The DAX100 consists of two indices, DAX30 and MDAX
(21)
. The 
DAX30 contains the top 30 highly traded German companies in Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
according to their size or market capitalization. The other 70 companies, which are considered 
the mid-capitalization firms, are included in the MDAX. Over the period under study, DAX30 
represented about 85% of the total market capitalization and 96% of the turnover of DAX100 
(Deutsche Borse 2003). 
 
In analyzing the relationship between ownership concentration and stock market returns, the 
authors have used two measures of ownership concentration: the share of the largest holder 
                                                 
(
21
) In March 2003, the structure of the German stock market indices witnessed a change, and MDAX was 
reduced from 70 to 50 firms covering only the traditional industries. 
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with voting rights in the company, and the Herfindahl index, which is calculated based on 
“the structure of holdings of major voting rights”. The results show that for the three indices 
under study, the relationship between ownership concentration and stock market returns is 
negative. In addition, the authors find that the effect of ownership concentration on adjusted 
returns is stronger than that for unadjusted returns. This means, according to Sharpe ratio,
(22) 
there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and volatility of stock market 
returns. The closed corporate governance system associated with high ownership 
concentration means that the outside investors have little information and there is a high 
probability of insider trading. As a consequence, these companies tend to have more volatile 
stock market prices (Clark and Wojcik, 2005). 
 
Clark and Wojcik (2005) extend their analysis of the relationship between ownership 
concentration and stock market returns by including some control variables. One of these 
control variables is the size of the company. Previous literature has concluded with the result 
that there is a negative relationship between ownership concentration and size. This can be 
explained by the large amounts of capital needed by large companies, which cannot be 
provided except by diversified sources of capital (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985 and Morck et al., 
2000). 
 
Another control variable, which is included by the authors, is the inclusion in the DAX30 
index. They find that this variable is important for two reasons. The investors could prefer the 
companies listed in this index due to their “market visibility” (Morck et al., 2000). In 
addition, it is expected that a relationship exists between ownership concentration and 
inclusion in the index. Inclusion means more participation in trading as portfolio investors. 
This means that the companies included should have more dispersed ownership to achieve the 
needed level of liquidity for its shares (Jurgens and Rupp, 2002). 
 
The result reached by the authors after accounting for the control variables is that there is still 
a negative relationship between ownership concentration and stock market returns (Clark and 
Wojcik, 2005). 
                                                 
(
22
) Sharpe ratio is a measure of the excess return or risk premium per unit of deviation in an investment asset. It 
is used to calculate how well the return on asset compensates the investor for the risk taken. The higher the 
number of the Sharpe ratio the better. 
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A study by Alzeaideen and AL-Rawash (2014) investigates the effect of different ownership 
structure on the share price volatility of listed companies in Amman Stock Exchange. They 
apply a panel data procedure to the dataset that includes 51 Jordanians companies from 2005 
to 2009. The results reveal a positive and significant relationship between the five greatest 
shareholder and share price volatility. 
In summary, it seems that identifying a significant relationship between ownership 
concentration and both stock returns and volatility is difficult due to the irrational behavior of 
investors. According to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), they find with empirical evidence that 
there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and both stock returns and 
volatility. Clark and Wojcik (2005) in their financial valuation of the German model, find that 
the relationship is negative with respect to stock returns, even after adding control variables, 
and positive with respect to stock return volatility. The reason as mentioned by Clark and 
Wojcik (2005), is the closed corporate governance system associated with high ownership 
concentration, which prohibits the outside investors to have the necessary information, and 
therefore, the probability of insider trading increases. The companies in this case will have 
more volatile stock market prices. Finally, Alzeaideen and AL-Rawash (2014) find positive 
and significant relationship between the five greatest shareholder and share price volatility. 
2.5 Effect of Ownership Concentration on Firm Performance 
A central question on corporate governance has been the ability to solve the problems 
accompanied by “dispersed ownership” (Berle and Means, 1932). Over a period of time, the 
dispersion of ownership by individuals has been substituted by institutional ownership, or 
shares managed by institutional investors such as; mutual and pension funds (Chen et al., 
2007). Institutional investors are considered the biggest owners of the USA corporations 
(Gillan and Starks, 2000). With more ownership concentration, it is expected that the large 
block holders will exercise some kind of control over the management, which could enhance 
the firm performance. If ownership dispersion exists, the main reliance is on the secondary 
market trading to create concentration whenever needed to induce some kind of intervention 
in the management decision-making. Although ownership concentration enhances firm 
performance as evident from most of the past literature, there are still some benefits 
associated with ownership dispersion mainly greater market liquidity and better risk 
diversification (Bolton and Thadden, 1998). 
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Moreover, if institutions are not developed to a great extent, ownership concentration can be a 
substitute for the defects of the institutions and the weak investor protection rights as a feature 
of corporate governance. Therefore, ownership concentration is supposed to be directly 
related to firm performance especially in institutions of fragile legal structure (Shleifer and 
Vishney, 1997). Consequently, this means that ownership concentration may affect firm 
performance to a high level especially when the institutional environment is fragile. In 
addition, it is highly evident that the effectiveness of ownership concentration differs 
according to the level of institutional development especially in emerging market economies 
(Boubakri et al., 2005).  
 
According to Shleifer and Vishney (1986), when there is a certain level of ownership 
concentration, there will be improvement in the management control and therefore, the value 
of the firm will increase. The evidence is provided by the experience of the German and 
French companies in that respect. Small shareholders do not have enough information and 
experience to monitor the management efficiently. 
 
According to Clark and Wojcik (2005), in contrast to the relationship discussed in the past 
section, ownership concentration, represented by an organized and effective board of 
directors, has a positive and significant correlation with the firm performance. Theoretically 
speaking, the costs of coordination are lower when there are few shareholders, which will 
affect the firm’s performance positively. As a matter of fact, in such cases the motives will be 
high to supervise the managers’ work, and cooperate with the other board members to recruit 
the highly skilled and experienced representatives. Also as mentioned by Hutton (2002), 
ownership concentration is better for both the shareholders and stakeholders. 
 
Moreover, Bhattacharya and Graham (2009) have revealed that the voting power associated 
with the three largest institutional owners is important in taking decisions linked to the firm 
performance and firm value, using share differences and share concentration as proxies for 
vote. 
 
Balsmeier and Czarnitzki (2010) analyze the relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance in 28 central and Eastern European countries, where the level of 
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institutional development differs to a certain extent. As for other companies situated in the 
non-European member countries with less developed legal structures, the results show that the 
above relationship is inverted u-shape. This means, according to the authors, that there is an 
agency problem due to weak monitoring from the side of the shareholders and it increases 
with low ownership concentration.  Berle and Means (1932) are the first to point out this 
problem, whereby the managers of the firm seek their own self-interests at the expense of the 
shareholders. Another interpretation could lie in the weak investor protection rights that 
prevail in these countries. So, in either high or low ownership concentration, the investors are 
afraid to invest, which hinders the potential of growth in these less developed countries. 
 
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2006) investigate whether there is strong evidence supporting the 
belief that differences across firms in observed ownership structure result in systematic 
variations in observed firm performance. They test this hypothesis by analyzing the effect of 
the structure of ownership on corporate performance measured by profitability, using data for 
175 Greek firms. Empirical results suggest that a more concentrated ownership structure leads 
to higher firm profitability.  
 
The existing literature shows that the equilibrium ownership structure of a firm depends on 
the legal environment (La Porta et al., 2000). In weak legal environment, it is difficult to find 
external investors because of the existence of high private benefits control (Zingales, 1995; La 
Porta et al., 1999, and Bebchuk, 1999). Moreover, in such environments, the owner’s 
reputation is important to get external funds without losing the control rights (La Porta et al., 
2000). That is why the highly concentrated firm ownership exists in small countries among 
few families or individuals and they gain political power in their countries where the firms are 
located (La Porta et al., 1999). Based on these arguments, it is expected that there is a 
negative correlation between ownership concentration and firm performance. 
 
Also, the study by Zeitun (2009) on 167 Jordanian firms covering the period from 1989-2006 
shows with empirical evidence that there is a negative correlation between ownership 
concentration and firm performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. Similarly, Roszaini 
and Mohamed (2006) find a negative association between ownership concentration and firm 
performance measured by return on assets in Malaysia using OLS regression.  
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Hence, we have two opposing arguments. On one hand, there is an argument of positive 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance due to the low agency 
costs. On the other hand, there is a negative relationship due to lost investment opportunities 
and high private benefits of control. 
 
According to the existing empirical literature, the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance has always been non-linear. Some studies find an 
up/down/up relationship (Cho, 1998; Short and Keasey, 1999; Cosh et al., 2001, Gugler et al., 
2004). According to these studies, when ownership concentration is low, raising it will lower 
the agency costs until a certain point; this positive effect will be offset by the negative effect 
of rent seeking by large investors at the expense of the small investors. With high ownership 
concentration, there is not much exploitation of small investors and there is more agreement 
between the shareholders and managers, which results in the upward slope of the ownership 
concentration performance relation at the right tail of the distribution.  
 
Other studies find an inverted U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm performance, which means that the positive effect of good alignment of interests between 
shareholders and managers in the case of high ownership concentration could be small 
relative to the negative effect resulting from the private benefits of controlling shareholders 
(McConnell and Serveas, 1990; Han and Suk, 1998; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000).  
 
Balsmeier and Czarnitzki (2010) conduct their study on 28 different transition economies, 
since most of the past studies concentrate on the highly developed economies especially the 
USA. The authors’ study covers countries such as: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Bosnia, Bulgria, Croatia, Czech and Estonia. These countries have different levels of 
institutional development. Moreover, the authors use pooled cross-sectional data to avoid the 
loss of many observations, and to analyze the differences in institutional development at the 
firm level for each country. The method and the variables used in the regression are analyzed 
in the literature review summary table at the appendix. According to the Freedom House 
ratings of political rights and civil liberty, a country is considered institutionally weak if the 
score is 5 points or more, where the scale is 1 for the highest and 7 for the lowest.  
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The results show that a single shareholder owns the majority of firms in the countries under 
study, so a high ownership concentration exists in these countries. This is an expected result 
since in these transition economies, the capital markets are less developed than in other 
developed economies such as the USA and Japan. It is clear that ownership concentration 
increases when there is weakness in the institutional environment, all else constant. The 
largest owner in the non-EU member countries holds about 1.2% more than in EU countries. 
Moreover, the results show that ownership dispersion increases with the larger and older 
firms, those firms employing a higher percentage of skilled labor, publicly quoted firms and 
firms with more access to foreign markets.    
 
Furthermore, the results show that for the whole sample, the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance is inverted U-shape. The interpretation given is the same 
as mentioned above for the previous studies. The estimated slopes show that the efficient 
monitoring effect is offset with high ownership concentration in the non-EU member nations. 
In weak legal structures, high ownership concentration is preferred to dispersed ownership 
structure. The models for the subsamples of EU countries, where there is strong legal 
structure, show that the ownership concentration has no impact on firm performance. In these 
countries, the private benefits of control are not common as in the weaker institutional 
environment plus large owners are not needed for effective monitoring as such. In the other 
transition economies, firm performance increases in terms of employment growth with firms 
above 50% ownership concentration, but it decreases after reaching a certain peak around 
55% on average. 
 
Actually, the studies based on most developing countries show no association between 
ownership concentration and firm performance. This is evident in the studies conducted by 
Karaca and Eksi (2012) in Turkey, and Najjar (2012) in Bahrain and Wahla et al. (2012) in 
Pakistan. The three studies employ panel regression, pooled data method and multiple 
regression respectively. 
 
A study by Alimehmeti and Paletta (2012) investigates the ownership concentration as a 
governance mechanism, and its effects on firm value. They conduct an empirical analysis 
over all Italian listed firms in a four-year period (2006-2009). Their results show a positive 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm value except in 2008, when the results 
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show a non-linear relationship, suggesting that the financial crisis had a strong effect at that 
time. 
The study by Soliman (2013) seeks to examine the effect of ownership concentration on firm 
financial performance in Saudi Arabia, using pooled cross-sectional observations from the 
listed Saudi firms for three years between 2006 and 2008. He finds that firms’ financial 
performance measured by the accounting rate of return on assets and rate of return on equity 
generally improves as ownership concentration increases. He also finds that firm performance 
peaks at intermediate levels of ownership concentration. The study provides some empirical 
support as most of the other studies support the hypothesis that as ownership concentration 
increases the positive monitoring effect of concentrated ownership first dominates but later is 
offset by the negative effects, such as the expropriation of minority shareholders.  
Scholten (2014) analyzes the effect of total ownership concentration and insider ownership 
concentration on two measures of firm performance. With sample of two annual observations 
of 2011 and 2012 for 80 Dutch listed companies, significant empirical evidence is detected 
for a quadratic effect of total ownership concentration on firm performance measured by the 
ROA-ratio. The firm performance first improves when total ownership concentration 
increases, and after a certain point (around 48% of total ownership concentration) firm 
performance decreases.  
In summary, it is clear that ownership concentration can be a substitute for weak institutional 
environment as a feature of corporate governance. That is why it is highly related to firm 
performance. Moreover, the effectiveness of ownership concentration differs according to the 
level of institutional development especially in emerging market economies. The experience 
of German and French companies shows that with a certain level of ownership concentration, 
there is improvement in the management control and the value of the firm increases. 
 
Most studies document a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. According to Clark and Wojcik (2005), the costs of coordination are lower with 
few shareholders. Moreover, Bhattacharya and Graham (2009) reveal that the voting power 
associated with the three largest shareholders is important in taking decisions related to firm 
performance. Balsmeier and Czarnitzki (2010) show that the relationship is inverted U-shape 
in the transition economies of central and Eastern Europe. The reasons as they mentioned are 
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the agency costs associated with low ownership concentration and the weak investor 
protection rights. Soliman (2013) finds that as ownership concentration increases; the positive 
monitoring effect of concentrated ownership first dominates but later is offset by the negative 
effects, such as the expropriation of minority shareholders. Finally, Scholten (2014) detects a 
quadratic effect of ownership concentration on firm performance. 
2.6 Literature on Egypt 
Abdel Shahid (2003) has done one of the pioneer studies investigating the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm value in Egypt. She takes a sample of the 90 active 
companies, which constitute the bulk of trading at that time. Analysis is based on a cross-
sectional single year data, which is the year 2000. She tests how the ownership type affects 
some key accounting and market performance indicators of the Egyptian listed firms namely; 
return on equity and return on assets as accounting performance measures, and price-earning 
ratio and price to book value as stock market performance measures. Her ownership structure 
variables consist of the top four means of ownership namely; other private institutions, 
holding companies, public banks and insurance firms. She uses the OLS method. Her results 
show the existence of significant relationship between ownership structure and accounting 
performance measures and insignificant relationship with regards to the stock market 
performance measures.  
 
Another study by Abdelsalam et al. (2008) shows that there is a strong positive association 
between institutional ownership and firm performance, as well as the dividend decision and 
the payout ratio, using pooled cross-sectional observations from the top 50 listed Egyptian 
companies between 2003-2005. 
 
The study of Azzam (2010) shows that, for the period from 2004 to 2007, private institutional 
ownership has a positive impact on stock volatility for the non-dividend paying stocks only 
because of the institutional herding effect unlike the dividend paying stocks, which has no 
effect on stock returns. On the other hand, ownership by public companies, individuals, 
insurance companies and top management has insignificant impact on stock volatility. His 
study shows that the dividend policy has a significant effect on the direction of the 
relationship between institutional ownership and stock volatility. Azzam (2010) uses the 
panel data method in estimation, after testing for endogeneity, to investigate the relationship 
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between institutional ownership and dividend policy on stock returns and volatility of the 50 
most actively traded companies in the Egyptian Stock Exchange during the period from 2004-
2007. He finds no endogeneity problem. He uses risk, return and payout ratio as dependent 
variables. While, the independent variables are percentage of equity ownership held by 
institutional investors, ownership concentration and a number of control variables including 
return on assets, return on equity, debt ratio, size and market to book ratio. He finds out that 
only private institutional ownership has positive significant effect on stock volatility, while 
ownership concentration has significant and negative effect on volatility. On the other hand, 
he finds that institutional ownership has no effect on stock returns. 
 
Desoky and Mousa (2012) have done the most recent study, and they investigate how board 
ownership and characteristics affect the firm performance of 96 of the most active listed 
companies in the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX). Their financial performance is measured 
by return on assets, return on equity and Tobin’s Q. The ownership variables include 
chairman ownership, CEO ownership, directors’ ownership, board size and non-executive 
directors. They employ OLS regression analysis. The results reveal that some managerial 
ownership and board characteristics variables affect financial performance when measured by 
return on assets. When measured by return on equity, only one of the managerial ownership 
variables is significant. Findings related to the market measure of financial performance, 
Tobin’s Q show that all models are insignificant.  
 
2.7 Summary 
In conclusion, it is evident that the studies, conducted on the relationship between institutional 
ownership and either stock returns or volatility have different results. Most studies examine 
the relationship between the level or changes in institutional ownership and both the ex post 
and contemporaneous returns. Little emphasis is given to the relationship between 
institutional ownership and future returns. In my study, analyzing the impact of institutional 
ownership on ex ante returns and volatility will fill this gap left by former studies.  
 
Most studies document a negative relationship between institutional ownership and both stock 
returns and volatility. Yet, other studies find a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and both stock returns and volatility. Other researchers such as: Gompers and 
Metrick (2001) find the relationship between institutional ownership and stock returns 
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volatility insignificant, but they have significant positive forecasting power of returns in the 
subsequent quarter due to the experience of institutions.  
 
Moreover, most of the studies done on the relationship between institutional ownership and 
firm performance reveal that it is a positive relation. The reasons mentioned for this positive 
relationship do not differ to a great extent among the studies, yet they all complement each 
other. Examples are the institutional investors’ better access to information and their tendency 
to encourage investments with long-term profitability. Yet, most studies on developing 
countries reveal that there is no association between institutional ownership and firm 
performance. 
 
In addition, it is evident from the studies conducted, that identifying a significant relationship 
between ownership concentration and both stock returns and volatility is difficult due to the 
irrational behavior of investors. Furthermore, it is clear from the previous studies that 
ownership concentration can be a substitute for weak institutional environment as a feature of 
corporate governance. That is why it is highly related to firm performance. Also, the 
effectiveness of ownership concentration differs according to the level of institutional 
development especially in emerging market economies.  
 
It seems that the existing literature focuses more on the effect of institutional ownership and 
ownership concentration on ex-post returns and volatility and firm performance. Moreover, 
the previous studies pay little attention to the small emerging countries, where the above-
mentioned relationship could be different than what the previous papers have concluded, and 
have only dealt with developed and large emerging economies. In Egypt specifically, very 
few studies are conducted as pointed earlier. 
 
In light of the above, this research attempts to study the effect of ownership structure on 
financial and firm stock returns performance. The study will be analyzed and tested using data 
from the Egyptian stock market, which is one of the emerging markets that are dealt by very 
few studies in literature. Both the effect of institutional ownership and ownership 
concentration on ex-post and ex-ante returns and risk will be examined, in addition to their 
effect on financial performance. Most studies in literature focus on all institutional investors 
as a group. While institutional investors share some important properties, they are not 
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homogeneous. An important aspect of heterogeneity is the investment time span. Institutions 
may have varying investment horizons because of differences in investment objectives, legal 
obstacles, and competitive burdens; in addition, their investment horizons may differ because 
of their different informational sources (Yan and Zhang, 2009). The analysis will extend the 
literature by decomposing the institutional ownership to several types which are; insurance 
companies, employee associations, public and private banks, holdings, and companies and 
using ex post and ex ante returns and risk. In addition, the effect of institutional ownership 
and ownership concentration on stock liquidity will be tested plus their effect on financial 
performance. Also, most studies use panel data approach while applying the pooled 
regression, which is not that efficient especially with unbalanced data.  
 
Egypt, as a small emerging economy, is different than other developed and large emerging 
economies and these differences matter. The legal system in developed economies; the rooted 
financial structures and practices determine and shape the enforcement of corporate law. 
Egypt is characterized by late industrialization and the dominance of centrally planned system 
from 1952 until the mid of 1970s, when the open door policy was first adopted. The market 
economic system did not enter the picture dynamically except in 1990/1991, when Egypt 
started its economic reform and structural adjustment program, imposed by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Abdel Shahid, 2003). In spite of the decrease in state 
intervention, there is state dominance felt in sectors of the economy such as oil, banks, 
textiles, etc. Therefore, concentrated ownership exists. The Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) countries have the weakest legal protection of investors.  Hence it is important to 
emphasize that the MENA region countries including the Egyptian market exhibit similar 
characteristics. But the results from this study cannot be generalized. It is a unique 
opportunity to investigate Egypt as it differs from the large and developed countries in a 
number of ways, which include the legal and political systems, country factors, market 
structure and development.   
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Chapter (3): Data Sources and Description 
3.1 Population and statistical Sample  
A total of 213 companies were listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange by the year 2011. The 
market capitalization of these listed companies was 293.6 billion pounds by the end of 2011 
(ElSherif, 2015).
23
 The sample includes 85 Egyptian companies with small, medium and large 
firms to avoid any selection bias. I collected daily data on prices of stocks and volume of 
trade for these companies for the period from 2005-2011. The daily stock prices and volume 
were collected from the Egyptian stock exchange. The daily total volume of these 85 
companies represents on average 99% of the market daily total volume of trade, which means 
that the sample is relatively representing the population (CASE, 2011). The companies’ 
annual financial data were collected from the Egyptian stock exchange. Then, the ratios from 
the annual financial data for the period 2005-2011 were calculated. While, the annual 
ownership structure data were collected from Egypt for Information Dissemination (egID)
24
. 
The total number of observations is 323 after removing the outliers. 
Table 3.1 lists the market capitalization of the Egyptian Stock Exchange in Egyptian 
Pounds for all indices from 2005-2014. 
Year The Whole Market EGX 30
25
 EGX 70
26
 EGX 100
27
 
2005 460,364,375,415 245,756,287,810   
2006 533,974,963,435 300,512,098,158  414,411,171,502 
2007 768,277,414,311 449,470,053,404  605,015,313,227 
2008 473,741,940,347 169,834,871,922 53,871,278,335 223,706,150,258 
2009 499,613,710,047 228,739,772,532 70,452,327,107 299,192,099,639 
2010 488,209,352,757 258,260,246,093 53,530,801,152 311,791,047,246 
2011 293,592,802,841 159,565,248,245 30,991,734,988 190,556,983,233 
2012 375,612,638,473 207,738,490,988 62,813,223,796 270,551,714,784 
2013 426,810,398,402 175,675,314,274 130,511,573,406 306,186,887,680 
2014 500,020,829,725 224,278,294,439 45,280,720,499 269,559,014,938 
                                                 
23
 More details on the market capitalization during the period under study are provided in table and figure 3.1. 
24
 “For more than ten years now Egypt for information dissemination –egID has been the sole aggregator and 
authorized distributor of the Egyptian exchange listed companies information”- www.egidegypt.com (accessed 
on 18/10/2014)   
25
 Represents the most active and most liquid 30 companies in the Stock Exchange. 
26
 Represents the most active small and medium 70 companies in the Stock Exchange excluding the companies 
in EGX 30. 
27
 Represents the most active 100 companies in the Egyptian Stock Exchange. 
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Figure 3.1: The market capitalization of the whole market from 2005-2014. 
 
These 85 companies constitute the EGX 100 index. The sample ends at 2011, since the 
starting year of data collection is the beginning of the year 2013. The financial statements of 
each year are only available at the end of the first quarter a year after. So, it is not feasible to 
get the data until the year 2012 since the financial statements are available in April 2013
28
.  
Daily data for prices and volumes for each of these stocks are used to calculate ex post and ex 
ante returns and volatilities. In order to minimize the effect of outliers on the results, the 
observations with the highest and lowest 20% of each return measure used in this sample are 
omitted. The reason is that the daily price limit movement is 20%. The percentage of equity 
ownership held by institutions in a company’s shareholders and ownership concentration are 
calculated from the ownership structure data. It should be mentioned that the data available 
about ownership structure in Egypt is very limited. Collecting the data on ownership structure 
and concentration for each firm constituted a large part of the research for this thesis. This big 
effort is what made this research possible, since the analysis uses real figures. Moreover, the 
changes in real figures over years are helpful in the sense of shedding light on the effect of 
changes in ownership structure on firm performance. Also, it is worth noting that the 
unavailability of enough data for the years following 2011 prevented the researcher from 
further investigation of the possible effects that could have accompanied the post 25
th
 of 
                                                 
28
 According to Ohlson (1980), the timing issue is a vital problem in data collection. It happens because firms’ 
financial statements are not always available to the public on a timely basis. 
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January revolution. In addition, the Egyptian stock exchange collapsed after the revolution for 
a long period of time causing the total returns of most stocks to be negative. 
 
The data collected are representing quantitative micro variables of 85 companies; they are 
considered cross section data of time series observations covering seven years. The years that 
have a lot of missing data on the variables required for the empirical test are eliminated from 
the sample, and thus the final sample consists of 323 observations. 
 
Regarding the firm stock returns performance variables, this study has used ex post returns, 
ex ante returns, ex post risk, ex ante risk and volume of trade as dependent variables. As far as 
the financial performance is concerned, the study has used return on assets, return on equity 
and debt to total assets ratio as dependent variables for the measure of firm performance since 
they are considered accounting ratios usually used to measure the effective performance of 
management. On the other hand, institutional ownership with its different decompositions and 
ownership concentration are used as independent variables. The data on other control 
variables are also collected as will be highlighted and extensively discussed in the table below 
and the data collection section. 
 
3.2 Data Description and Sources  
Sources and descriptions of all variables are given in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Description of Variables 
Variables Description Source 
Age  Number of years since the establishment 
of the firm 
Egyptian Exchange (EGX) 
Cash Ratio of cash to total assets EGX 
Volatility 
Clustering 
Estimate of the parameter of the GARCH 
model 
Calculated from the stock 
prices from EGX 
Debt Ratio Ratio of total debt to total assets EGX 
Employee 
Associations 
Percentage of equity ownership held by 
employees association in a company
 
egID 
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Variables Description Source 
Ex-Ante Returns The expected return of a stock forecasted 
from the GARCH model 
Calculated from the stock 
prices from EGX 
Ex-Ante Risk The future expected risk of a stock 
forecasted from the GARCH model 
Calculated from the stock 
prices from EGX 
Ex Post Returns Average daily total return for year i 
calculated as ln ( ) – ln ( ),  
where is the daily price of the stock at 
time t 
Calculated from the stock 
prices from EGX 
Ex Post Risk Standard deviation of the daily total 
return for year i 
Calculated from the stock 
prices from EGX 
Free Float Percentage of stocks available to the 
public to trade to the number of listed 
shares 
egID
 
GDRs Percentage of global depository receipts 
to the number of listed shares 
egID
 
Individuals Percentage of equity ownership held by 
individuals in a company
 
egID 
Investment Funds Percentage of equity ownership held by 
investment funds in a company
 
egID 
Market Return 
 
Calculated from the market 
index (EGX30) from EGX
 
Market Risk Standard deviation of the daily market 
return 
Calculated from the market 
index (EGX30) from EGX
 
Market to Book 
Value 
Market price per share for common stock 
divided by book value per share of 
common stock
 
EGX 
Net Profit Margin Net income divided by sales EGX
 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Percentage of equity ownership held by 
the largest three institutional investors 
(own more than 5%) in a company 
 
egID 
Pt Pt-1
Pt
lnindext - lnindext-1
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Variables Description Source 
 
Payout Ratio 
 
Dividends divided by earnings per share 
(EPS) 
 
EGX 
Volatility 
Persistence 
Estimate of the parameter of the GARCH 
model 
Calculated from the stock 
prices from EGX 
Private and Public 
Banks 
Percentage of equity ownership held by 
private and  public banks in a company 
egID 
Private and Public 
Companies 
Percentage of equity ownership held by 
private and  public companies in a 
company 
egID 
Private and Public 
Holdings 
Percentage of equity ownership held by 
privat and  public holdings in a company 
egID 
Private and Public 
Insurance 
Percentage of equity ownership held by 
private and public insurance companies 
in a company 
egID 
Return on Asset 
(ROA) 
Net income divided by total assets
 
EGX 
Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
Net income divided by shareholders’ 
equity
 
EGX 
Size Natural Logarithm of total assets
 
EGX 
Top Management  Percentage of ownwrship held by top 
management of a company 
egID 
Volume Daily volume of trade of a stock EGX
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The following table provides the summary of statistics for our sample that includes 85 
companies listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange. The means, medians, minimum, maximum, 
standard deviation, Jarque-bera test and other summary measures for 29 variables are 
calculated. 
 
According to the statistics in table 3.3, the mean proportion of institutional ownership with its 
several decompositions adds up to 48.5%, with the highest percentage dominated by private 
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and public companies (18.3 %) and the lowest by investment funds (0.02%). The table also 
shows that on average 44.4% of the companies’ finances was through debts. The average free 
float is approximately 42.7%. Moreover, the mean ownership ratio for the largest three block 
shareholders is 47.8%. The average age of the companies in our sample is approximately 37 
years. The ratio of cash to total assets represents on average 11%. The mean ex post daily 
return of all companies from 2005-2011 is 0.02%. The mean ratios of return on assets and 
return on equity are 6.4% and 14.4%, respectively. The relatively high mean of return on 
equity compared to return on assets is due to having an average debt ratio of 44.4%. The 
mean net profit margin is 30%. The mean payout ratio is 28%, which means that the 
companies on average distribute 28% of their earnings and retain 72%. Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 
3.4 display the mean of the variables used in this study.  
 
Moreover, the table highlights that the variability is quite similar for ex post returns and ex 
ante returns (0.006 and 0.008, respectively), and it is higher than the variability in market 
returns (0.002). Regarding the financial performance indicators, debt ratio displays the highest 
variability (0.235) compared to ROA (0.072) and ROE (0.171). The skewness results for all 
variables show that the null hypothesis of skewness coefficients in compliance to the normal 
distribution value of zero is always rejected at the 5% significance level. Also, most variables 
display excess kurtosis, which means that the null hypothesis of coefficients in compliance to 
the normal value of three is rejected. Thus, the distributions have thicker (fatter) tails than a 
normal distribution. Therefore, the hypothesis of unconditional (normality) is always rejected 
by Jarque-bera test statistics showing that the variables are not normally distributed, and 
confirming the results based on either skewness or kurtosis.  
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides summary of the statistics for a sample that includes 85 companies listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange. The table reports the means, medians, 
minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, Jarque-bera , probability, sum, sum sq. Dev. and observations for 29 variables. All variables are defined in Table 3.2. 
                                                 
29
 The value of the skewness coefficient for a normal distribution is equal to zero. 
30
 The value of the kurtosis coefficient for a normal distribution is equal to 3. 
31
 The Jarque-Bera test for normality distributed as c2
2
(2 degrees of freedom). The critical value for the null hypothesis of normal distribution is 5.99 at the 5% significance 
level. Higher test values reject the null hypothesis. 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. Skewness
29
 Kurtosis
30
 Jarque-
Bera
31
 
Probability Sum Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
Observations 
Age 36.718 33 6 107 23.326 1.226 4.296 103.526 0.000 11860 175203.4 323 
Cash 0.111 0.072 0.0002 0.658 0.113 1.477 5.141 179.17 0.000 35.77 4.092 323 
Clustering 0.675 0.736 -0.312 1.254 0.262 -1.344 4.909 146.34 0.000 218.06 22.12 323 
Debt Ratio 0.444 0.461 0 0.94 0.235 0.087 2.142 10.31 0.006 143.39 17.76 323 
Employee 
Associations 
0.012 0 0 0.1 0.025 2.067 6.167 365.09 0.000 3.84 0.209 323 
Ex Ante Return 0.001 0 -0.049 0.055 0.008 2.362 25.46 7092.22 0.000 0.415 0.018 323 
Ex Ante Risk 0.044 0.036 0.000 0.622 0.048 7.800 81.21 85591.4 0.000 14.36 0.734 323 
Ex Post Return 0.002 0.0001 -0.023 0.048 0.006 2.964 21.04 4851.02 0.000 0.485 0.012 323 
Ex Post Risk 0.038 0.036 0 0.124 0.015 1.498 7.63 408.9 0.000 12.297 0.076 323 
Free Float 0.427 0.386 0 0.99 0.225 0.433 2.44 14.32 0.0008 137.96 16.32 323 
GDR 0.034 0 0 0.847 0.127 4.59 25.13 7725.6 0.000 10.99 5.19 323 
Individuals 0.039 0 0 0.807 0.103 4.39 26.47 8449.8 0.000 12.75 3.44 323 
Investment 
Funds 
0.002 0 0 0.116 0.011 7.81 65.79 56359.06 0.000 0.506 0.042 323 
Market Return 0.0001 0.0007 -0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.365 1.891 23.73 0.000 0.039 0.002 323 
Market Risk 0.019 0.021 0.011 0.026 0.005 -0.339 1.95 21.15 
 
0.000 6.11 0.008 323 
Market to Book 
Value 
2.776 1.58 0 45.37 4.66 5.706 44.12 24511.8 0.000 896.77 7005.7 323 
 
Net Profit 
Margin 
0.299 0.166 -1.904 10.61 0.76 8.62 110.68 160063.1 0.000 96.85 186.47 323 
Ownership 
Concentration 
0.478 0.486 0 0.956 0.245 -0.109 2.148 10.42 0.005 154.36 19.33 323 
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32
 The value of the skewness coefficient for a normal distribution is equal to zero. 
33
 The value of the kurtosis coefficient for a normal distribution is equal to 3. 
34
 The Jarque-Bera test for normality distributed as c2
2
(2 degrees of freedom). The critical value for the null hypothesis of normal distribution is 5.99 at the 5% significance 
level. Higher test values reject the null hypothesis. 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. Skewness
32
 Kurtosis
33
 Jarque-
Bera
34
 
Probability Sum Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
Observations 
Payout Ratio 0.288 0 0 2.72 0.42 5.917 40.93 21248.93 0.000 207.93 1360.42 323 
Persistence 0.833 0.908 -0.006 1.108 0.213 -2.224 8.075 612.94 0.000 269.02 14.55 323 
Private & 
Public Banks 
0.045 0.002 0 0.729 0.106 3.439 16.78 3190.8 0.000 14.63 3.61 323 
Private & 
Public 
Companies 
0.183 0.061 0 0.956 0.235 1.178 3.448 77.35 0.000 59.17 17.82 323 
Private & 
Public Holdings 
0.117 0 0 0.917 0.211 2.081 6.704 417.79 0.000 37.83 14.39 323 
Private & 
Public 
Insurance 
0.033 0.001 0 0.343 0.060 2.449 9.621 912.85 0.000 10.51 1.173 323 
ROA 0.064 0.052 -0.159 0.404 0.072 1.142 6.609 245.50 0.000 20.75 1.69 323 
ROE 0.144 0.115 -0.411 1.039 0.171 1.378 8.77 550.19 0.000 46.59 9.45 323 
Size 8.985 8.863 6.605 12.69 0.874 0.459 3.453 14.11 0.0009 2902.09 246.16 323 
Top 
Management 
0.093 0.001 0 0.858 0.181 2.208 7.022 480.04 0.000 29.99 10.55 323 
Volume 5.633 5.639 2.868 7.581 0.767 -0.371 3.641 12.96 0.002 1819.45 189.29 323 
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                                                                   Figure 3.2 
 
                                                                   Figure 3.3 
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                                                          Figure 3.4 
 
3.4 Summary 
The chapter explains the data set and the variables used in the study, the sample compared 
to the whole population and the sources of data collection. Also, a complete definition of 
all the variables used is provided. In addition, the chapter includes a table of descriptive 
statistics with elaboration plus some figures representing the mean ratios of all variables 
used. Each step is explained in details in order for the reader to have a comprehensive 
understanding of the data collection process. 
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Chapter (4): Research Methodology 
4.1 Research Questions 
Most of the previous studies focus on the effect of institutional ownership and ownership 
concentration on ex-post returns and volatility of stocks. Few studies concentrate on the 
effect of institutional ownership and ownership concentration on ex-ante returns and 
volatility. Moreover, the attention is mainly devoted to developed countries and large 
emerging countries. Little attention is given to the small emerging countries like Egypt. In 
this study, the effect of institutional ownership and ownership concentration on stock 
returns and financial performance in Egypt is tested. 
 
To evaluate the impact of institutional ownership and ownership concentration on stock 
returns and financial performance in Egypt, the research attempts to answer the following 
three questions. 
 
Question No.1 
What is the impact of institutional ownership on ex-post and ex-ante returns and volatility 
of stocks in the Egyptian market, and to what extent does this affect the stock liquidity? 
Does institutional ownership influence the firm financial performance positively or 
negatively? 
 
Question No.2 
What is the impact of ownership concentration on ex-post and ex-ante returns and 
volatility of stocks in the Egyptian market, and to what extent does it affect the stock 
liquidity? Does ownership concentration influence the firm financial performance 
positively or negatively? 
 
Question No.3 
What is the effect of the firm characteristics on ex-post and ex-ante returns and volatility, 
and to what extent do they affect the stock liquidity? Do firm characteristics influence the 
firm financial performance positively or negatively? 
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It could be argued that the impact of institutional ownership and ownership concentration 
should have a positive effect on both returns and volatilities in the stock market, and also a 
positive effect on the firm financial performance. As most of the previous studies 
concentrate on developed and large emerging countries and this study is conducted in 
Egypt, one of the small emerging countries, different relationships might emerge.  
 
In the next section, the main hypotheses to answer these questions are addressed. 
 
4.2 Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 Institutional Ownership, Ownership Concentration, Ex post and Ex 
ante Returns 
It is evident that the studies conducted on the relationship between institutional ownership 
and either ex post returns or future returns have different results. Most studies examine the 
relationship between the level or changes of institutional ownership and both the past and 
contemporaneous returns. Little emphasis is given to the relationship between institutional 
ownership and future returns. It is logical to have these differences since each study is 
done using different sample periods and sometimes, different countries under study. What 
is important, are the reasons mentioned to justify the underlying relationship. Also, it 
seems that identifying a significant relationship between ownership concentration and 
stock returns is difficult due to the irrational behavior of investors. Accordingly, I propose 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a. There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and ex 
post returns.  
Hypothesis 1b. There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and ex 
ante returns. 
Hypothesis 1c. There is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and ex 
post returns. 
Hypothesis 1d. There is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and ex 
ante returns. 
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4.2.2 Institutional Ownership, Ownership Concentration, Ex post and Ex 
ante Risk 
Although most academic theories suggest a negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and volatility, the empirical evidence is different. Most studies document a 
positive relationship between institutional ownership and volatility. Researchers such as: 
Potter (1992) and Sias (1996) rationalize this relationship by the temptation of institutional 
investors to invest in more risky securities since they have higher market performance, 
added to this, their ability to get better information about these risky securities. Lee (1992) 
has added that trading in larger volumes by institutions results in higher volatility. 
Moreover, the herding behavior, followed by institutional investors, could result in 
frequent price alterations and increase in volatility. Also, it seems that identifying a 
significant relationship between ownership concentration and volatility is difficult due to 
the irrational behavior of investors. Accordingly, I propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a. There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and ex 
post risk. 
Hypothesis 2b. There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and ex 
ante risk. 
Hypothesis 2c. There is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and ex 
post risk. 
Hypothesis 2d. There is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and ex 
ante risk. 
4.2.3 Institutional Ownership, Ownership Concentration, and Stock 
Liquidity 
In their study regarding institutional investors and equity prices, Gompers and Metrick 
(2001) find out that with more institutional demand for liquid stocks, institutional 
ownership is positively related to stock liquidity. So, it is expected that institutional 
ownership will have a positive effect on stock liquidity. Also, it is well known that with 
more ownership dispersion, there is greater market liquidity than with ownership 
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concentration (Bolton and Thadden, 1998; Jacoby and Zheng, 2010). Accordingly, I 
propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a. There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and stock 
liquidity. 
Hypothesis 3b. There is a negative relationship between ownership concentration and 
stock liquidity. 
4.2.4 Institutional Ownership, Ownership Concentration, and Firm 
Financial Performance 
Most of the studies done on the relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
financial performance reveal that it is a positive relationship. According to McConnell and 
Serveas (1990), Nesbitt (1994), Smith (1996) and both Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999), 
“corporate monitoring” by institutional investors pushes the managers to focus more on 
firm performance. Maug (1998) adds that this desire by institutional investors increases 
when they invest for the sake of long-term profitability. Also, most studies document a 
positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. According to 
Clark and Wojcik (2005), the costs of coordination are lower with few shareholders. Yet, 
in developing countries, the studies show that there is no association between institutional 
ownership, ownership concentration and firm financial performance. Accordingly, I 
propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a. There is no significant relationship between institutional ownership and 
firm financial performance. 
Hypothesis 4b. There is no significant relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm financial performance. 
 
4.3 Model Building 
The study tries to answer the question of whether ownership structure matters for firm 
performance. The starting point for the analysis is the agency theory by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), which predicts the positive significant relationship between higher levels 
of managerial ownership structure and firm performance due to an incentive effect. Other 
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authors as a consequence have suggested that large outside owners might have a role to 
play as monitors of the management and might thus improve performance (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1986). On the other hand, the private benefits literature
35
 (Barclay and Holderness, 
1989 and Bebchuk, 1999) suggests that high ownership concentration may result in 
drawing out the firm’s resources by the dominant owners at the expense of other 
shareholders. In my study, combining other stock market performance measures utilized by 
Fama and French (1993) in their five factor model
36
, in addition to the agency theory 
proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and analyzing the effect of ownership structure 
on that stock market based performance measures will highlight the whole picture from a 
market and financial based performance criteria. As one single model combining 
ownership structure, stock market and financial performance variables does not exist, 
models have to be specified separately out of theoretical and empirical findings and have 
to meet statistical requirements.  
 
I propose a panel model that directly links the predetermined firms ownership structures 
and firm characteristics to time and cross sectional varying stock returns and financial 
performance measures. Using a large cross section of companies over time, I 
parsimoniously
37
 estimate returns, risk, volume and financial performance ratios of 
companies as functions of ownership structure variables and firm characteristics. In 
comparison to Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency theory and Fama and French (1993) 
five factor model, my stock market and financial based performance model provide a 
comprehensive overview of the main determinants affecting historical and expected returns 
and risk, volume and financial performance of companies listed in the Egyptian Stock 
Exchange from 2005-2011. In this respect, I am following Heracleous (2001) who 
                                                 
35
 The private benefits can be divided into benefits coming from ownership and benefits coming from 
control. Hwang and Hu (2009) find that private benefits grow slowly with respect to the ownership level but 
grow rapidly with respect to the block holder’s likelihood of exercising control.  
36
 In their paper “Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds”, Fama and French (1993) identify 
the stock market risk factors related to the stocks as an overall market factor and factors related to firm size, 
leverage and market to book ratio. Yet, they find that either these factors used alone or in combination with 
other variables have little information about average returns. Size and market to book ratio used together do a 
good job in explaining the cross-section of average returns on NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ stocks for the 
1963-1990 period. 
37
 Going from more generic models using the ownership structure variables and firm and market control 
variables listed in section 4.6 in this chapter to more parsimonious ones, I chose the most significant 
explanatory variables in my final model. 
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motivates researchers to develop other methodologies that can combine multiple and multi-
directional factors that can affect firm performance, and avoid models that relate only one 
element such as ownership structure with firm performance. 
 
In this model, I am seeking to discover the significance of a variable, in other words 
determining the main variables affecting the dependent variable. In this case, the method 
best utilized is called “multi-variant regression”. The multivariate regression method has 
different forms and all related to the way of independent variables selection (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 2001). In my case, the statistical data could be managed via the panel data 
method. It has to be mentioned that most of the previous researches in related topics have 
utilized the panel data method as well. The panel data method is the approach combining 
time series of cross sectional observations. In this study, the data type and the analysis 
approach are best tackled by the panel method. By employing this method, I can use a 
large number of cross sectional variables (N) obtained during a time period (T). In this 
case, the numbers of observations are N´T, and can be estimated by different models. 
Also, using the panel data method will result in efficient estimators.  
 
4.3.1 Panel Data Model  
A panel data model is estimated with unbalanced data after controlling firm characteristics. 
In panel data, the same cross-sectional units (example; institutional ownership, firms, 
ownership concentration) are surveyed over time. The panel data is now being used 
extensively in economic research.
38
 
 
Baltagi (2005) lists some advantages of panel data, which can be 
summarized as follows 
1. The techniques of panel data estimation can take into account the heterogeneity 
accompanied by different individuals, firms, countries, etc., over time. 
2. Panel data gives “more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among 
variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency” since it combines time 
series of cross-section observations. 
3. Since it combines the frequent cross section of observations, panel data is better at 
                                                 
38
 The regression using panel data is done by E-views 8 software package. It is econometric modeling 
software that assists in estimating efficiently statistical and forecasting equations. It can rapidly analyze time 
series, cross section and panel data. Also, it can produce presentation quality graphs and tables. Moreover, 
several tests on the data can be done using specification and diagnostic tests. 
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analyzing the dynamics of change. 
4. Panel data can capture the factors that cannot be detected in pure cross-section or 
pure time series data. 
5. Panel data is better at studying the more complicated behavioral models. 
6. The availability of data for several thousand units, using panel data, can reduce the 
bias that could result from the “broad aggregates” of firms and individuals. 
 
4.3.2 General Modeling Framework for Analyzing Panel Data 
The basic advantage of a panel data set over a cross section is that it allows the researcher 
greater flexibility in modeling differences in behavior across entities. The general form of 
the panel model is  
itipi
S
p
pjit
K
j
jit ZYXY   
 12
1                                                               (1) 
In this formula, Y is the dependent variable, X is the observed explanatory variable and Z 
is the unobserved explanatory variable, affecting the dependent variable each period. There 
are K regressors not including a constant term. T is the time duration, while j and p are 
observed and unobserved variables. it is the estimated errors of the panel model. The 
model seems to be a classical regression model. If there are no unobserved explanatory 
variables, the entire model can be treated as ordinary linear model fitted by least squares. 
The problems arise with the unobserved effects, which is the case in most applications. 
The assumption is that the error term is uncorrelated with the independent variables in all 
periods. Another assumption, that underlies the random effects model, is that the 
unobserved variables are uncorrelated with the included variables, and in this case, they 
may be included in the error term. While, in the fixed effects model, the unobserved effects 
will enter into the fixed statement of the regression model. Here, the effects of the 
unobserved variables can be controlled (Greene, 2010). 
There are a variety of different models for panel data. They can be arranged as follows: 
1) Pooled Regression: If there are no unobserved variables, and Z in the above 
equation contains only a constant term, then ordinary least squares is the best 
method for producing consistent and efficient estimators.  
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2) Fixed Effects: If there are unobserved variables Z, and correlated with X. In this 
case, the least squares method will produce biased and inconsistent estimators. In 
this case, the model will be  
 
ittijit
K
j jit
XY    21                                                                      (2)
                
and pi
S
p pi
ZY  1  embodies all the observable effects and determines an 
estimable conditional mean. The fixed effects model takes i to be a “group-
specific constant term in the regression model.” 
3) Random Effects: If the unobserved individual heterogeneity is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the included explanatory variables, then the model can be 
formulated as  
itijit
K
j jit
uXY    21                                                         (3)
      
In this case, it is a linear regression model with a compound disturbance that can be 
consistently, yet inefficiently, estimated by least squares. This approach “specifies 
that ui is a group-specific random element, similar to it except that for each group, 
there is but a single draw that enters the regression identically in each period.” 
 
The most important distinction between the fixed and random effects model is 
whether the unobserved individual effects have elements correlated with the 
regressors in the model or not, and not whether these effects are stochastic or 
nonstochastic (Greene, 2010). 
 
4.3.3 General Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) 
 Most financial decisions are based on forecasted returns and risk. It is important because 
the volatility over a future period is the one that should be considered the risk. Hence, the 
forecast of volatility is needed as well (Engle, 2004). Also, the average investor is not only 
worried about the rate of returns on his or her own investment but also about the risk of the 
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investment and the volatility of this risk. Consequently, it is very important to empirically 
show whether the stock markets display any volatility behaviors such as volatility 
clustering or volatility persistence. It is worth mentioning that Mecagni and Sourial (1999) 
are among the pioneers in using GARCH (p,q)-M models in estimating the four best 
known daily indices in Egypt (Capital Market Authority Index, Egyptian Financial Group 
Index, Hermes Financial Index, Prime Index for Initial Public Offerings). Their results 
indicate significant departures from the efficient market hypothesis, and the tendency for 
returns to exhibit volatility clustering. Also, they find a significant positive association 
between risk and returns. 
In calculating ex ante returns and ex ante risk, the GARCH (1,1) is used. Pilotte and 
Sterbenz (2006) have used the GARCH (1,1) to forecast ex ante returns and ex ante risk in 
modeling total returns and volatility of bonds markets. Their goal was to identify a 
substantial amount of the predictable variation in returns. Also, Azzam and Fouad (2010), 
in evaluating the impact of day trading on the Egyptian Stock Market, have used the 
GARCH (1,1) to predict the ex ante returns and risk. They specifically examine the effect 
of day trading on ex ante returns and risk using GARCH (1,1)- GED model. A more 
detailed explanation of the model is provided below. 
 
The Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model, (Engle, 1982) and its 
generalization, the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) 
model (Bollerslev, 1986) are widely used methodologies applied on daily financial data. 
Engle (1982) introduced the standard Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) model, and proposed model time-varying conditional volatility using past 
innovations to estimate the variance of the series. Bollerslev (1986), seeing that high 
ARCH orders are sometimes needed to catch the dynamics of the conditional variance, 
introduced the Generalized ARCH (GARCH) model, which modeled time-varying 
volatility as a function of both historical disturbances and ex post volatility. Today, the 
ARCH and GARCH models have grown extremely and their applications have expanded 
from stock returns to other variables such as interest rates, inflation, exchange rates and so 
on. Actually, the importance of estimating and forecasting the financial market volatility 
has grown recently due to its “importance in the portfolio selection and asset management 
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processes, in addition to its importance in the pricing of primary and derivative assets” 
(Engle and Ng, 1993).  
 
Engle and Ng (1993) find that in spite of the agreement by most researchers on the 
possibility of predicting volatility in many asset markets, they differ on how to model this 
volatility predictability within an ARCH/GARCH context. As a result, a variety of new 
representations were produced, some of which are the result of pure theory, while others 
are simply empirical trial-and-error suggestions. Among the most widespread are GARCH-
M, EGARCH and PGARCH. Other famous asymmetric GARCH models include 
Threshold GARCH (TGARCH) of Zakoian (1994), the Quadratic GARCH (QGARCH) of 
Sentana (1995), the Volatility Switching ARCH (VS-ARCH) of Fornari and Mele (1996), 
and Logistic Smooth Transition ARCH (LST-ARCH) of Gonzales-Rivera (1998) and 
Hagerud (1997).  
Also, the method of estimation is very important in the GARCH world. GARCH models 
are estimated using a Maximum Likelihood (ML) approach. ML assumes and maximizes a 
density function for the parameters that are conditional on a set of sample outcomes. 
Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) suggest a Quasi Maximum Likelihood (QML) method 
that corrects small deviations from normality. This technique’s estimator, however, is 
inefficient, as the deviation from normality increases making the “fully efficient ML 
estimates more preferred” (Bollerslev et al., 1992). So, there is clearly a penalty imposed 
for being unaware of the true conditional density. This has accordingly led to the use of 
non-normal distributions to better represent third and fourth moments “because it may be 
expected that high kurtosis and skewness shown by the residues of conditional 
heteroscedasticity models will be minimized when a more convenient distribution is 
used”(Lambert and Laurent, 2000). Bollerslev (1987) and Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) 
among others use Student-t distribution while Nelson (1991) and Kaiser (1996) propose 
the Generalized Exponential Distribution (GED). 
Moreover, the financial literature, (Arago and Nieto, 2005) use the application of GARCH 
models with a wide variety of densities (i.e. Normal, GED (Generalized Error 
Distribution), Student-t, GED with a fixed parameter, and Student-t with a fixed degree of 
freedom).  
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To determine whether the error εt in equation 1 follows an autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity model, an ARCH Lagrange multiplier (LM) test is run on εt, to 
investigate whether the standardized residuals exhibit additional ARCH effects. The 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test is one of the principal tools to detect ARCH and GARCH 
effects in financial data analysis. 
 
Then the normality of εt is tested using the Jarque-Bera test. The Jarque–Bera test is a 
goodness-of-fit test, which analyzes whether sample data have the skewness and kurtosis 
matching a normal distribution. Since skewness and kurtosis are important features in 
financial applications, the use of a GARCH model seems more appropriate. If the residual 
is not normally distributed, a GARCH model with Generalized Error Distribution (GED) 
must be applied, and the GARCH model is added to the GED log-likelihood function for a 
normalized random error (Nelson, 1991 and Hamilton, 1994). 
 
The GARCH (1, 1)-GED model is as follows 
                         (4)                
                                            
                                       (5)                                 
        
  
                                                                                 (6) 
   
For v (positive parameter for the thickness of the tails of distribution) = two, constant λ = 
one, the GED becomes the standard normal distribution.  
 
To sum up, the above-mentioned GARCH (1, 1)-GED model is used to generate ex-ante 
returns and volatility and to estimate volatility clustering and volatility persistence. 396 
GARCH equations are run, comprising the 85 companies, for the seven years period from 
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2005-2011, to calculate ex-ante returns, ex-ante risk, volatility clustering and volatility 
persistence. Ex-ante returns are the average of the forecasted returns from the mean equation 
in the GARCH (1, 1)-GED model (Equation 4). The ex-ante risk is the ex-ante standard 
deviation, which is the average of the square root of the variances generated from the variance 
equation of the GARCH (1, 1)-GED model (Equation 5). The volatility clustering, which 
means high volatilities are followed by high volatilities and vice versa, is measured by β2 in 
equation 5. The volatility persistence is measured by the sum of β1+ β2 in equation 5. 
Based upon preceding explanations, this study’s model is presented as below. 
4.4 Model Specification 
Our econometric model has eight equations. The first five equations have the stock returns 
performance as the dependent variable represented by ex post returns, ex post risk, ex ante 
returns, ex ante risk and volume. The last three equations have the firm financial 
performance as the dependent variable represented by return on assets, return on equity 
and debt ratio. 
 
4.4.1 Ownership Structure and Firm Stock Returns Performance 
4.4.1.1 Institutional Ownership, Ownership Concentration, Ex post and 
Ex ante Returns 
PostRetit = f (Institutionit,Concentit,Sizeit,MBit,ROAit,Volumeit,MarketRetit,Uit ) 
AnteRetit = f (Institutionit,Concentit,Sizeit,ROAit,Uit ) 
 
This can be written in explicit form as: 
PostRetit = β0 + it
i
i nInstitutio
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8
1
 +
  
+ β1 ROAit  + β2 Sizeit  + β3 MBit + 
β4 Market Returnit + β5 Volumeit  + Uit             (7)     
AnteRetit = β0 + it
i
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+  β1 Sizeit + Uit                   (8) 
                                                                                                     
Where: 
 PostRetit  = Ex post returns are a proxy for contemporaneous returns of year i. 
itionConcentrat1
itionConcentrat1
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AnteRetit   = Ex ante returns are a proxy for the expected returns of the stock. 
Institutionit = Percentage of equity ownership held by banks, private and public 
companies, employee associations, private and public holding companies, individuals, 
private and public insurance companies, investment funds, and top management. 
Concentrationit= Percentage of a firm’s outstanding stocks held by the largest three block 
holders. 
ROAit= Return on assets is a proxy for firm profitability. 
Sizeit= Size of the company is a control variable. 
MBit= Market to book ratio is a control variable. 
MarketReturnit= Average daily market return is a control variable. 
Volumeit= Proxy for stock liquidity.  
= Error term. 
 
 
4.4.1.2 Institutional Ownership, Ownership Concentration, Ex post and 
Ex ante Risk 
 
  ),,,,,(R ititititititit UPersistClusteringSizeConcentnInstitutiofiskPost   
 
AnteRiskit = f (Institutionit,Concentit,Sizeit,Clusteringit,Persistit,Uit )  
 
This can be written in explicit form as: 
PostRiskit = β0 + it
i
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AnteRiskit = β0 + iti i nInstitutio 
8
1
 +
  
+ β1 Sizeit + 
itit PersistClustering 32   + Uit            (10) 
 
Where: 
 PostRiskit  = Ex post risk is a proxy for the standard deviation of the daily total returns for 
year i. 
AnteRiskit   = Ex ante risk is a proxy for the expected future risk of the stock. 
Institutionit = Percentage of equity ownership held by banks, private and public 
companies, employee associations, private and public holding companies, individuals, 
private and public insurance companies, investment funds, and top management. 
Concentrationit= Percentage of a firm’s outstanding stocks held by the largest three block 
holders. 
Sizeit= Size of the company is a control variable. 
Clusteringit  = Volatility clustering. 
Persistit = Volatility persistence. 
= Error term.
 
 
4.4.1.3 Institutional Ownership, Ownership Concentration, and Stock 
Liquidity 
),,,,( itititititit UROAMBConcentnInstitutiofVolume   
This can be written in explicit form as: 
Volumeit = β0 + iti i nInstitutio 
8
1
 +
  
+ β1 Sizeit  + Uit    
                                                                              (11) 
Where: 
 Volumeit  = Proxy for stock liquidity. 
Institutionit = Percentage of equity ownership held by banks, private and public 
companies, employee associations, private and public holding companies, individuals, 
private and public insurance companies, investment funds, and top management. 
Concentrationit= Percentage of a firm’s outstanding stocks held by the largest three block 
itionConcentrat1
itionConcentrat1
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holders. 
Sizeit= Size of the company is a control variable. 
= Error term.
 
 
4.4.2 Ownership Structure and Firm Financial Performance 
),,,,( itititititit UFreefloatCashConcentnInstitutiofROA   
This can be written in explicit form as: 
ROAit = β0 + iti i nInstitutio 
8
1

  
+ + β1 Cashit + itFreefloat2 + Uit      
                                                                                                               (12) 
                                                      
 
Where: 
ROAit  = Return on assets is a proxy for firm profitability. 
Institutionit = Percentage of equity ownership held by private and public companies, 
private and public holding companies, individuals. 
Concentrationit= Percentage of a firm’s outstanding stocks held by the largest three block 
holders. 
Cashit= Cash holdings is a control variable. 
Free floatit = Free float is a control variable. 
= Error term.
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This can be written in explicit form as: 
ROEit = β0 + iti i nInstitutio 
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Where: 
ROEit  = Return on equity is a proxy for firm profitability. 
Institutionit = Percentage of equity ownership held by private and public companies, 
private and public holding companies, individuals. 
Concentrationit= Percentage of a firm’s outstanding stocks held by the largest three block 
holders. 
Cashit= Cash holdings is a control variable. 
Free floatit = Free float is a control variable. 
= Error term.
 
 
 
),,,,,( ititititititit UionConcentratGDRFreefloatSizenInstitutiofDABOOK   
This can be written in explicit form as: 
Dabookit = = β0 + iti i nInstitutio 
8
1
 +
  
+ β1 GDRit  + β2 Sizeit  + β3 
Free floatit + Uit                                                                             (14) 
                                                      
Where: 
Dabookit  = Debt ratio is a proxy for firm debt. 
Institutionit = Percentage of equity ownership held by private and public companies, 
private and public holding companies, individuals. 
Concentrationit= Percentage of a firm’s outstanding stocks held by the largest three block 
holders. 
Sizeit= Size of the company is a control variable. 
GDRit = Global depository receipts is a control variable. 
 Free floatit = Free float is a control variable. 
= Error term.
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4.5 Identification and Specification of Dependent Variables 
It is important to identify and introduce the key variables of our model separately. As 
dependent variables, I use ex post returns and risk, ex ante returns and risk and stock 
liquidity as a proxy for stock returns performance. Also, I use return on assets, return on 
equity and debt ratio as a proxy for financial performance.  
4.5.1 Ex-post returns and risk 
The ex-post returns is another term for actual returns, and is defined as the average daily 
total returns for year i. Following Sias (2004), the daily total returns is calculated as ln ( ) 
– ln ( ), where is the daily price of the stock at time t. Following Belghitar et al. 
(2011), the ex-post risk is the standard deviation of the daily total returns for year i. 
4.5.2 Ex-ante returns and risk 
The ex-ante returns are the expected returns of a stock. While, ex-ante risk is the future 
expected risk of a stock. I use the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model to generate ex-ante returns and ex-ante risk. Ex-ante 
returns are the average of the forecasted returns from the mean equation in the GARCH 
model. The ex-ante risk is the ex-ante standard deviation, which is the average of the 
square root of the variances generated from the variance equation of our GARCH model. 
Using the E-Views 8 software package, I estimate equation using GARCH method. In the 
GARCH specification in the software, there are two equations needed. The first is the 
mean equation, and the second is the variance equation. In the mean equation, I run 
autoregressive AR (1) model where I regress the daily total returns on their lag and the 
volume. I do not include any exogenous variables in the variance equation. I use the GED 
specification for the residuals. The residuals then are tested and are found not normally 
distributed. After estimating the GARCH (1,1) - GED model, I command the software to 
forecast the total returns from the mean equation and the variance of the returns from the 
variance equation. Then, the ex-ante return is the average of the forecasted total returns 
generated from the mean equation, and the ex-ante variance is the average of the forecasted 
variance generated from the variance equation. The ex-ante risk is the square root of the 
ex-ante variance. This process is done for each individual stock for each year.   
Pt
Pt-1 Pt
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4.5.3 Stock Liquidity 
Liquidity is the degree to which an asset or security can be bought or sold in the market 
without affecting the asset’s price. A high level of trading activity characterizes the liquid 
stocks. It will be calculated as the average daily trading volume of the stock. I follow 
Girard and Omran (2009) in selecting trading volume as a measure of liquidity. 
4.5.4 Firm Profitability 
Profitability is the way any firm assesses its ability to generate earnings as compared to its 
expenses and other costs incurred during a specific period of time. Return on assets is used 
as a measure of firm profitability. It is calculated as net income divided by total assets. It is 
an indicator of how profitable a firm is relative to its total assets. Also, return on equity is 
used which is calculated as net income divided by shareholders equity. The main reason 
for selecting these accounting variables is that they keep a stable relationship with the 
firm’s strategies and performances. Also, they have been used frequently in related 
literature, including the following: Omran et al. (2008), Cornett et al. (2007) and Elyasiani 
and Jia (2008). 
4.5.5 Firm Debt 
Debt is the money raised by a firm by selling bonds, bills, or notes to individuals and/or 
institutional investors. In return, the individual or the institutional investor receives a 
promise that the principal and the interest on the debt will be repaid. Debt to assets ratio is 
used as a measure of firm debt. It is calculated as ratio of total debt to total assets. It is a 
measure of the firm’s financial risk by determining how much of the company’s assets are 
financed by debt. This variable has been used by (Lee, 2008) to explain the variation in 
firm performance in South Korea. 
 
4.6 Identification and Specification of Independent Variables 
Under the panel data model, a number of independent variables are introduced. The 
following are the specification of each variable.  
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4.6.1 Institutional ownership structure variables 
Similar to Azzam (2010), institutional ownership is decomposed to insurance companies, 
employee associations, investment funds, individuals, top management, private and public 
banks, private and public holdings and private and public companies. Yet differently, I am 
going to add private and public firms for each category together. For example, I will define 
private and public holding companies as holdings and private and public companies as 
companies. 
 
1. Employees Associations: represent the percentage of equity ownership held by 
employees associations in a company.  
2. Individuals: represent the percentage of equity ownership held by individuals in a 
company.  
3. Insurance Companies: represent the percentage of equity ownership held by both 
private and public insurance companies in a company. 
4. Banks: represent the percentage of equity ownership held by private and public 
banks in a company. 
5. Companies: represent the percentage of equity ownership held by private and 
public companies in a company.  
6. Holdings: represent the percentage of equity ownership held by private and public 
holdings in a company. 
7. Top Management: represent the percentage of equity ownership held by the top 
management of a company. 
8. Investment Funds: represent the percentage of equity ownership held by 
investment funds in a company. 
 
4.6.2 Ownership concentration variable 
Following Omran et al. (2009) and Azzam (2010), ownership concentration is measured as 
the percentage of a firm’s outstanding stocks held by the largest three block holders.  
 
4.6.3 Volatility clustering 
In finance, volatility clustering refers to the observation, as documented by Mandelbrot 
(1963) that “large changes tend to be followed by large changes, of either sign, and small 
changes tend to be followed by small changes”. This pattern has been observed by various 
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other studies, such as Baillie et al (1996), Chou (1988) and Schwert (1989). The 
implication of such volatility clustering is that volatility shocks today will affect the 
forecasting of volatility many periods in the future. It will be calculated from the estimates 
of the parameters of the GARCH model as mentioned earlier. 
4.6.4 Volatility persistence 
Volatility is said to be persistent if the current returns has a large impact on the expected 
variance many periods in the future (Engle and Patton, 2001). High persistence means that 
a shock to the stock return stays for a long time. It will be calculated from the estimates of 
the parameters of the GARCH model. 
 
4.6.5 Control variables 
In order to control the effects of other exogenous variables on the performance of the 
companies, some control variables are selected. Control variables are the variables that 
control the separate effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable. Some 
variables are selected from the review of literature as well be mentioned below and as 
shown in the literature review summary table in the appendix.
39
 In our model, the control 
variables are listed as follows. 
 
4.6.5.1 Firm characteristics variables 
1) Size: calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets. This variable has been utilized 
in other studies as well such as Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Habib and Ljungqist (2000). 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue that firm size has a great effect on the agency problems’ 
characteristics. Also, following McConnell and Servaes (1990), size is calculated as 
logarithm of total assets.  
2) Age: is the number of years since the establishment of the firm. This control variable 
has been utilized by Hassanzadeh et al. (2013) in their study of the relationship between 
institutional ownership and stock returns fluctuations in Tehran between 2006-2010. 
3) Debt Ratio: calculated as ratio of total debt to total assets. It is a measure of the firm’s 
financial risk by determining how much of the company’s assets are financed by debt. 
Morck et al. (1988) use leverage measured by total debt to total assets as a control variable. 
                                                 
39
 Some of the control variables are removed after checking their insignificance in the model. Yet, they are 
all presented here. 
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4) Return on Assets: calculated as net income divided by total asset. It is an indicator of 
how profitable a firm in relation to its total assets. 
5) Return on Equity: calculated as net income divided by shareholders equity. It is 
another measure of the firm’s profitability by identifying how much profit a firm generates 
with the money shareholders have invested. 
6) Payout Ratio: calculated as dividend per share divided by earning per share. 
7) Cash: calculated as the ratio of cash to total assets, following Abushammala and 
Sulaiman (2014) in their study of Amman Stock Exchange. 
8) Market to book ratio: calculated as the ratio of market price to the book value. It has 
been used by Gompers and Metrick (2001) in USA, and Namzi and Kermani (2013) in 
Iran. 
9) GDR: calculated as the percentage of the global depository receipts to the number of 
listed shares. 
10) Free float: is the percentage of stocks available for the public to trade to the number of 
listed shares. 
11) Net Profit Margin: calculated as the percentage of net income to sales. 
 
4.6.5.2 Market characteristics variables 
1) Market return: Is the average of the daily total returns of the market calculated as  
Ln Indext-Ln Indext-1. 
2) Market Risk: Is the standard deviation of the daily market return. 
3) Volume of Trade: Is the average of the daily volume of trade of the stock. 
 
 
4.7 Expected signs 
In equation 7, it is expected that the coefficient of ownership type (αi) is positive, which 
indicates that there is a significant positive relationship between changes in institutional 
ownership and ex post returns as reported previously by Sias et al. (2006). Also, 
institutional investors, as mentioned earlier, have better access to information. Griffin et al. 
(2003) think of one potential explanation for the strong positive relationship between 
changes in institutional ownership and ex-post returns. They say that institutions and 
individuals react to the price variations in a completely different manner and this reflects 
on their trading pattern. The expected sign of (δ1) is unclear since it is not easy to identify a 
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significant relationship between ownership concentration and stock market returns. There 
is the attitude of the investors who may or may not be rational in some instances (Shleifer 
2000; Shiller 2000). In addition, there are some other reasons that are discussed in chapter 
2. (β1) is expected to be positive and significant, since the stock prices are the discounted 
value of the expected profits. Fama and French (1993) have found that the high returns of 
small sized firms associated with low market-to-book ratio are a premium for the high risk 
that is not diversifiable. So, a negative and significant (β2) and (β3) is expected. (β4) is 
expected to be positive. It is normal that market returns are positively related to stock 
returns. Large volume of trade is often associated with more liquid stocks, where the return 
is low. So, β5 is expected to be negative and significant.  
 
In equation 8, it is expected that the coefficient of ownership type (αi) will have a positive 
sign, which indicates that there is a significant positive relationship between changes in 
institutional ownership and ex-ante returns as reported previously by Sias et al. (2006) and 
Gompers and Metrick (2001)). Also, it is expected that there is statistically significant but 
weak relationship between institutional ownership and ex-ante returns as documented by 
the above-mentioned authors. The coefficient of ownership concentration d1 is expected to 
be insignificant as reported by Lskavyan and Spatareanu (2006), who find that this is 
especially true in transition countries, where the market monitoring is weak. Fama and 
French (1993) have found that the high returns of small sized firms are a premium for the 
high risk that is not diversifiable. So, a negative and significant (β1) is expected.  
 
In equation 9, according to See Del Guercio (1996), (αi) is expected to have a negative 
sign, which means that there is a significant negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and ex post risk, if prudence considerations are available. (δ1) is expected to be 
negative since there are no market makers in Egypt and the largest three shareholders act 
as the market makers to stabilize the stock prices (Azzam, 2010). Also, it is expected that 
(β1) is negative and significant since the payout ratio is positively related to performance, 
and as a result it is expected that it has a negative and significant impact on volatility as 
mentioned by (Ben-Zion and Shalit, 1975; Rozeff, 1982; Eades, 1982, Nazir et al., 2010). 
Since volatility clustering and volatility persistence are components of the volatility 
structure of returns, it is expected that β2 and β3 are positive. Yet, since volatility clustering 
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is often associated with time series of financial assets returns, it is expected also that the 
effect is insignificant. Larger firms are usually associated with less risk, so a negative β1. 
 
In equation 10, αi is expected to have a negative sign, which means that there is a 
significant negative relationship between institutional ownership and ex-ante risk, if 
prudence considerations are available as mentioned before by Del Guercio (1996). Also, 
(δ1) is expected to be negative since there are no market makers in Egypt and the largest 
three shareholders act as the market makers to stabilize the stock prices (Azzam, 2010). As 
the firm size decreases, the expected risk increases, which results in an expected negative 
(β1). Regarding volatility clustering, it has been usually known that the estimate of 
volatility or correlation over the last n periods is used to forecast volatility over the next n 
periods, and the rationale for this is that long-term volatility predictions should be 
unaffected by volatility clustering behavior. In short-term volatility predictions, the current 
market conditions do matter and so the immediate past returns are used (Alexander, 1998). 
As a result, β2 and β3 are expected to be insignificant.  
 
In equation 11, in their study regarding institutional investors and equity prices, Gompers 
and Metrick (2001) use firm size, per-share stock price and share turnover as proxies for 
liquidity, and they find out that with more institutional demand for liquid stocks, 
institutional ownership is positively related to each of the above variables. So, it is 
expected that institutional ownership will have a positive effect on stock liquidity. 
Therefore, αi is expected to be positive. Also, it is well known that with more ownership 
dispersion, there is greater market liquidity than with ownership concentration (Bolton and 
Thadden, 1998; Jacoby and Zheng, 2010). So, 1 is anticipated to be negative.  
   
In equations 12 and 13, firm profitability is measured by return on assets (ROA) and return 
on equity (ROE). The coefficient sign of cash (β1) is expected to be positive as reported 
Abushammala and Sulaiman (2014), who find a positive significant relationship between 
cash holdings and profitability in testing 65 firms listed in Amman Stock Exchange. In 
addition, it is expected that the coefficient signs of ownership type are positive as reported 
by past studies of Elyasiani and Jia, 2010; McConnell and Serveas, 1990; Nesbitt, 1994; 
Smith, 1996 and both Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999. (Gorton and Schmid, 2000; Mitton, 
2002; and Claessens and Djankov, 1999) find a positive relationship between ownership 
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concentration and firm performance. Therefore, it is expected that the coefficient of 
ownership concentration is positive as reached by the above studies and the studies of 
Shleifer and Vishney (1986) and Clark and Wojcik (2005). Shahrasbi   et al. (2014) find 
that there is a positive relationship between free float and return. Therefore, it is expected 
that free float has a positive effect on profitability. 
 
In equation 14, debt ratio is calculated as ratio of total debt to total assets. It is a measure of 
the firm’s financial risk by determining how much the company’s assets are financed by 
debt. As a result, β1 and β2, the coefficients of size and GDRs are expected to be negative. 
Also, (β3) the coefficient of free float is expected to have a negative sign, since it is 
positively related with profitability. Finally, it is expected that the coefficient signs of 
ownership type (αi) and ownership concentration (δ1) are negative. Michaely and Vincent 
(2012) find a negative relationship between the level of institutional holdings and leverage. 
The theory suggests that institutional ownership is a substitute for debt mainly in the role 
of reducing asymmetric information between management and outside shareholders. 
 
 
4.8 Specification Tests 
4.8.1 Endogeneity Test 
The Durbin-WU-Hausman test is used to test for endogeneity for all of the equation 
regressors. It was first proposed by Durbin (1954), and separately by Wu (1973) and 
Hausman (1978). A regressor is said to be endogenous if it is explained by the instruments 
in the model, whereas the exogenous variables are those that are not explained by the 
instruments. Therefore, I am here testing whether a subset of the endogenous variables are 
actually exogenous, by running a secondary estimation where the tested variables are 
treated as exogenous, and then comparing the J-statistic between this secondary estimation 
and the original estimation. I used the test on the pooled cross section data since it is not 
possible to use it on the panel data.  
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4.8.2 Hausman Test 
Hausman test statistic is used to test whether a fixed or random effects model should be 
used (Hausman, 1978). The test questions whether there is significant correlation between 
the unobserved country-specific random effects and the regressors. If there is no such 
correlation, then the random effects model may be more powerful. A Hausman test is run 
for all panel regressions to choose between fixed and random effects where the null 
hypothesis is that the preferred model has random effects vs. the alternative fixed effects 
(Greene, 2010). It tests whether the unique errors (εi) are correlated with the regressors, the 
null hypothesis is that they are not. The estimates of running both a fixed effects model and 
a random effects model are saved, and then the test is performed.  
 
4.9 Diagnostic Tests 
To test the normality of observations and regression residuals, the Jarque Bera test of 
normality is used. It is a large sample test, which is based on OLS residuals, and computes 
the skewness and kurtosis of the OLS residuals (Jarque and Bera, 1987). It is defined as:  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with S, K, and N denoting the sample skewness, the sample kurtosis, and the sample size, 
respectively.   
 
Also, the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test is used to test for stationarity. In this test, the authors 
Dickey and Fuller have computed the critical values on the basis of Monte Carlo 
simulations (Dickey and Fuller, 1979). It is a test for a unit root in a time series sample. 
The augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) statistic, used in the test, is a negative number. The 
more negative it is, the stronger the rejection of the hypothesis that there is unit roots at 
some level of confidence. The unit root test is carried out under the null hypothesis 0
against the alternative hypothesis of  . Once a value for the test statistic is computed 
it can be compared to the relevant critical value for the Dickey–Fuller Test. 
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If the test statistic is less than the (larger negative) critical value, then the null hypothesis 
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of 0  is rejected, as no unit root is present. The results of the DF test are found in 
chapter 5. Comparing the values of the test statistic with the critical values shows that all 
variables are stationery.  
 
4.10 Summary 
This chapter analyzes the methodology used in this research. It emphasizes the main 
research questions to achieve the main objectives of this research and the main research 
hypotheses to answer these questions. It analyzes the model building and model 
specification along with the specifications of the key variables used in the study. Also, it 
highlights the expected signs of the explanatory variables. It ends with defining the 
specification and diagnostic tests carried out in this study. 
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Chapter 5: Results 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a detailed discussion of the research methodology is addressed. 
The main purpose is to introduce and explain the most important variables that might 
affect the stock returns and financial performance of the Egyptian listed companies in the 
Stock Exchange. The emphasis is mainly on both the effect of institutional ownership and 
ownership concentration, and to what extent they affect the stock returns and financial 
performance in Egypt. 
 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part includes the results of testing the 
data. The second part displays the results of the regression, examining the effect of both 
institutional ownership and ownership concentration on stock returns and financial 
performance of the Egyptian listed companies, after controlling for firm characteristics. 
The third part analyzes and interprets the results.  
As a preliminary step, a pooled OLS regression is run. Because of the variability that is 
available across companies and time in my data, a random or fixed effect model should be 
used. Another econometric issue needs to be addressed here since panel data are used in 
this study. Speaking econometrics wise, there are two major regression models for panel 
data: fixed effects and random effects. There have been discussions about the advantages 
and disadvantages of each model.
40
 Fixed effects model is used when controlling for 
omitted variables that vary between individuals but are constant over time. If some omitted 
variables might be constant over time but differ between individuals, and others might be 
fixed between individuals but vary over time, then random effects model will be the most 
appropriate in taking the two types into account. The random effects model would be 
appropriate if data are representative of a sample rather than the entire population, because 
the individual effect term can be a random outcome rather than a fixed parameter.  
In order to compare the suitability of these models, three tests are run using the data set. 
First, fixed effects are tested by F test and the null hypothesis that all individual effects 
terms except one are zero is rejected at 10% significance level. This suggests that the fixed 
                                                 
40
 More details about each model can be found in chapter 4. 
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effects model is better than the pooled OLS model. Second, random effects are examined 
by the Breusch-Pagen Lagrange multiplier (LM) test and the null hypothesis that cross-
sectional variance components are zero is rejected at 10 % significance level. This argues 
in favor of the random effects model against the pooled data model. According to the 
Breusch-Pagan test the null hypothesis is that random components are equal to zero. This 
test also provides support for the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) over a pooled Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression. Only one model in this study is in favor of the random 
effects model. 
 Finally, Hausman test is used to compare fixed effects and random effects and the null 
hypothesis is that there is no significant correlation between the individual effects and the 
regressors and it is rejected at 10% significance level in this test. My results confirm the 
argument that most of the models are in favor of the fixed effects model against the 
random effects model. Only one model is in favor of the random effects. In sum, the test 
results confirm that the fixed effect model is superior to any other models in dealing with 
the data.  
In each panel model, I run a regression of the dependent variable on all ownership 
structure and control variables representing the firm and market characteristics that have 
been used before in literature, in addition to the variables I introduced.
41
 Then, the model is 
respecified again after removing most of the insignificant variables to find the most 
significant ownership structure and control variables that affect the dependent variables. I 
use the ordinary least squares (OLS), in addition I use in my entire panel least squares 
regressions corrective methods of robust White cross section covariance and White period 
which provide consistent estimates of the coefficient covariances in the presence of 
conditional heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 
 
5.2 Testing for Stationarity 
Comparing the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic with the critical value at the 5% 
significance level, table 5.1 shows that all variables are stationary. 
 
  
                                                 
41
 All variables are explained in chapter 4 plus the new variables introduced in the models. 
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Table5.1: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Results 
Variable Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (Test-Statistic) 
Critical Value at 5% 
significance level 
Probability 
    
Age -6.148 -2.868 0.000 
Ex Ante Return -21.405 -2.869 0.000 
Ex Ante Risk -15.652 -2.869 0.000 
Cash -12.793 -2.868 0.000 
Clustering -17.546 -2.869 0.000 
Debt Ratio -11.322 -2.868 0.000 
Employees 
Association 
-10.126 -2.868 0.000 
 Free Float -9.348 -2.868 0.000 
GDR -7.969 -2.868 0.000 
Individuals -13.219 -2.868 0.000 
Investment Funds -8.875 -2.868 0.000 
Ownership 
Concentration 
-8.447 -2.868 0.000 
Market Return -19.131 -2.868 0.000 
Market Risk -26.122 -2.868 0.000 
Market to Book 
Value 
-16.254 -2.869 0.000 
Payout Ratio -16.294 -2.869 0.000 
Persistence -17.724 -2.869 0.000 
Ex Post Return -20.951 -2.869 0.000 
Ex Post Risk -15.552 -2.869 0.000 
Banks -11.81 -2.868 0.000 
Companies -10.38 -2.868 0.000 
Holdings -9.47 -2.868 0.000 
Insurance 
Companies 
-6.91 -2.868 0.000 
Return on Assets -11.924 -2.868 0.000 
Return on Equity -11.422 -2.868 0.000 
Size -10.044 -2.868 0.000 
Top Management -10.999 -2.868 0.000 
Volume -10.395 -2.869 0.000 
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5.3 Testing for Normality 
The Jarque-bera test for normality of the standardized residuals in table 5.2 shows that the 
errors are not normally distributed.  
Table 5.2: Jarque-Bera Test for normality of the standardized residuals results.  
Variable Jarque-Bera Probability 
Ex Post Return 785.71 0.000 
Ex Ante Return 2647.15 0.000 
Ex Post Risk 188.10 0.000 
Ex Ante Risk 5040.8 0.000 
Volume 77.23 0.000 
Return on Assets 214.53 0.000 
Return on Equity 1339.09 0.000 
Debt ratio 87.74 0.000 
 
5.4 Testing for Endogeneity 
The question of endogeneity has been addressed in this study. According to some studies 
in literature (Bhattacharya and Graham, 2009 and Lskavyan and Spatareanu, 2006), some 
variables are suspected to be endogenous especially the financial performance variables 
with the ownership structure variables. Therefore, I undertook a Durbin Hausman-Wu test. 
As a general rule, when a variable is endogenous, it will be correlated with the error term, 
leading to biased estimators. 
 
So before using a 2SLS or an IV approach, I need to confirm the existence of 
endogeneity.
42
 The test for endogeneity developed by Hausman (1978) is used in the 
structural model. In the first stage, we estimate the eight equations using OLS, using the 
eight dependent variables as the suspected endogenous variables and a list of instrumental 
variables including (Size, market return, market to book value, payout ratio, cash, GDR, 
free float, clustering, persistence, market risk). The Hausman approach tests the null 
hypothesis that there is endogeneity problem. In this case, using IV is more efficient. The 
instruments used have the property of significant correlation with the key independent 
variables. After analyzing each instrument and their combinations, the results confirmed 
that there is no endogeneity in the model, which supports the exogenous ownership-
performance hypothesis.  
                                                 
42
 The 2SLS estimator is less efficient than OLS when the explanatory variables are exogenous (uncorrelated 
with the error term in the structural model). 
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Yet, I have to mention that I do not think that I was in need for such a test since if such a 
problem already exists, another way to solve the it is to use panel data and control fixed 
individual effect. In one of their studies, Himmelberg et al. (1999) find that managerial 
ownership and performance are both endogenously determined by exogenous variations in 
the firms’ contracting environment, i.e. observable and unobservable firm characteristics. 
The unobserved firm heterogeneity may induce a false regression. When they use 
unbalanced panel data from the Compustat universe over the period 1982-1992 and control 
both for observed firm characteristics and firm fixed effects, they find no evidence to 
confirm that managerial ownership affects firm performance. They have also explored the 
use of instrumental variables as an alternative to fixed effects to control the endogeneity of 
ownership, and they find it difficult to choose suitable instruments that are correlated with 
ownership, but not with the error terms of equations.  
 
Moreover, some researchers believe that the endogenous ownership hypothesis is not 
applicable in studying emerging markets, because developing countries do not have liquid 
and developed capital markets, and thus it is difficult for investors to trade and adapt 
ownership structure in response to the changing market circumstances. In other words, 
market forces do not function efficiently in the stock markets of such economies (Stiglitz, 
1994). The evidence in favor of the exogenous ownership hypothesis is consistent with the 
model of the emerging stock market of Egypt.  
 
5.5 Correlation Table Analysis 
The variance covariance matrix table 5.3 is analyzed below. It represents a correlation 
matrix for the selected variables. The Pearson’s correlation matrix shows that the degree of 
correlation between the independent variables is either low or moderate, which suggests 
the absence of multicollinearity between independent variables. As suggested by Bryman 
and Cramer (1997), the Pearson’s R between each pair of independent variables should not 
exceed 0.80; otherwise, independent variables with a coefficient in excess of 0.80 may be 
suspected of displaying multicollinearity. Correlations coefficients in the sample are within 
the acceptable range. The only highest pearson correlation is between volatility clustering 
and volatility persistence, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem. 
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Table 5.3: Variance Covariance Matrix  
 
 
  
AGE ANTERETANTERISKBANKS CASH CLUSTERINGCOMPANIESCONCENTRATIONDABOOKEMPLOYEESFREEFLOATGDR HOLDINGINDIVIDUALSINSURANCEI VESTMENTARKETREUTNMARKETRISKMB NPM PAYOUTPERSISTPOSTRETPOSTRISKROA ROE SIZE TOPMGMTVOLUME
AGE 1
ANTERET -0.001 1
ANTERISK 0.015 -0.064 1
BANKS -0.084 0.110 0.127 1
CASH 0.020 -0.077 0.025 -0.036 1
CLUSTERING 0.003 0.156 0.035 -0.035 0.012 1
COMPANIES -0.086 0.074 0.083 -0.095 -0.041 -0.127 1
CONCENTRATION0.001 0.005 0.078 0.175 -0.053 -0.109 0.311 1
DABOOK 0.123 0.122 -0.029 -0.112 -0.178 0.009 0.017 0.103 1
EMPLOYEES 0.376 0.027 0.070 -0.133 -0.006 -0.002 -0.125 -0.163 0.145 1
FREEFLOAT -0.001 -0.053 -0.085 -0.243 0.060 0.082 -0.330 -0.874 -0.072 0.126 1
GDR -0.102 0.002 -0.066 -0.064 -0.032 -0.039 -0.121 -0.049 0.239 -0.123 0.171 1
HOLDING 0.260 -0.093 -0.002 -0.083 0.167 0.019 -0.279 0.365 0.159 0.099 -0.318 -0.058 1
INDIVIDUALS-0.013 0.166 0.008 -0.022 -0.159 0.012 -0.132 0.006 0.010 -0.039 -0.074 -0.057 -0.167 1
INSURANCE 0.345 0.028 0.003 -0.040 0.103 0.018 0.012 0.059 -0.068 0.243 -0.118 -0.137 0.065 -0.132 1
INVESTMENT 0.114 -0.009 -0.013 0.042 -0.018 -0.005 -0.080 -0.091 0.085 0.149 0.009 -0.037 0.052 -0.029 -0.054 1
MARKETREUTN-0.010 0.243 -0.143 -0.022 0.026 0.078 -0.035 -0.098 0.104 0.059 0.017 0.034 -0.013 -0.034 0.096 0.086 1
MARKETRISK-0.027 -0.129 0.212 0.055 -0.067 0.065 0.047 0.058 0.023 0.004 -0.041 -0.069 -0.028 0.043 0.014 -0.004 -0.611 1
MB 0.173 0.104 0.025 -0.073 0.057 0.119 -0.080 0.061 0.251 0.093 -0.097 0.047 0.160 0.231 -0.008 0.023 0.183 -0.082 1
NPM 0.031 0.028 0.003 0.131 0.155 0.079 0.026 0.026 -0.093 -0.040 -0.010 -0.035 0.027 -0.063 -0.003 -0.013 0.045 0.002 0.020 1
PAYOUT 0.032 -0.018 -0.064 -0.010 0.050 -0.042 0.091 -0.005 0.026 -0.080 -0.025 0.060 -0.024 -0.011 -0.009 -0.006 0.096 -0.018 0.010 0.042 1
PERSIST 0.027 0.052 0.156 -0.031 0.018 0.833 -0.097 -0.054 -0.029 -0.056 0.049 -0.030 0.051 -0.023 0.024 0.006 -0.084 0.081 0.107 0.049 -0.046 1
POSTRET 0.053 0.621 0.070 0.034 0.012 0.094 0.138 0.038 0.118 0.031 -0.082 -0.035 -0.033 0.057 0.070 0.031 0.346 -0.175 0.137 0.027 -0.007 0.004 1
POSTRISK 0.133 0.197 0.272 0.096 0.013 0.105 0.047 -0.040 0.006 0.174 -0.016 -0.142 -0.033 -0.001 0.075 0.000 -0.058 0.336 0.051 0.044 -0.093 0.042 0.156 1
ROA -0.014 0.039 -0.006 0.083 0.298 0.085 0.049 0.103 -0.068 -0.096 -0.172 0.050 0.055 -0.107 0.020 0.015 0.089 -0.068 0.219 0.276 0.102 0.096 0.095 0.081 1
ROE 0.052 0.034 -0.030 -0.017 0.113 0.068 0.050 0.148 0.356 -0.003 -0.131 0.181 0.142 -0.125 -0.066 0.035 0.090 -0.048 0.386 0.186 0.084 0.066 0.074 0.007 0.763 1
SIZE -0.265 -0.167 -0.136 -0.015 -0.142 -0.052 0.113 0.206 0.148 -0.217 -0.132 0.295 -0.050 -0.103 -0.132 0.000 0.024 -0.053 0.036 -0.079 -0.016 0.032 -0.250 -0.439 0.048 0.180 1
TOPMGMT -0.262 -0.052 -0.052 -0.119 -0.110 0.066 -0.264 0.070 0.132 -0.190 -0.091 0.232 -0.239 0.019 -0.214 -0.028 0.028 -0.037 0.008 -0.073 -0.007 0.050 -0.070 -0.103 0.068 0.079 0.117 1
VOLUME -0.093 -0.225 -0.107 -0.112 0.068 0.065 -0.093 -0.191 -0.171 -0.005 0.257 0.096 -0.062 -0.177 0.162 -0.050 0.076 -0.031 -0.032 0.053 0.035 0.130 -0.205 -0.298 0.035 -0.015 0.415 -0.067 1
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Table 5.4: Cross sectional average correlation   
NPM Payout Size ROA ROE Cash MB Age DABOOK TopmgmtIndividuals Holding Companies Banks InsuranceEmployees Investment GDR FreeFloatConcentrationPostRet PostRisk Volume Clustering Persist AnteRet AnteRiskMarketreutnMarketrisk
NPM 1
Payout 0.689282 1
Size -0.51261 -0.37228 1
ROA 0.358633 0.414435 -0.68684 1
ROE 0.409122 0.527442 -0.6425 0.974125 1
Cash 0.45373 0.297541 -0.30905 -0.01947 -0.02762 1
MB 0.583325 0.800601 -0.60668 0.869235 0.901093 0.117087 1
Age 0.123122 0.042997 -0.20151 0.433638 0.298242 0.516676 0.346062 1
DABOOK 0.432183 0.744954 -0.70439 0.82474 0.878591 -0.02736 0.919735 0.064817 1
Topmgmt 0.70668 0.231259 -0.71075 0.533888 0.449072 0.620682 0.455172 0.607257 0.280988 1
Individuals 0.023805 0.10573 -0.2168 -0.45454 -0.40959 0.546201 -0.29419 -0.27719 -0.09701 -0.01904 1
Holding -0.71377 -0.26797 0.437358 -0.16482 -0.15552 0.110043 -0.24728 0.264364 -0.23544 -0.4392 0.095999 1
Companies -0.63592 -0.5743 0.408403 -0.65923 -0.6466 -0.58356 -0.74517 -0.75853 -0.47102 -0.73572 0.259869 0.055424 1
Banks -0.24602 -0.39051 0.303867 -0.04565 -0.06632 -0.91604 -0.20614 -0.45795 -0.14809 -0.39444 -0.62419 -0.36936 0.517685 1
Insurance 0.228069 0.698493 -0.15236 0.583195 0.679356 -0.41013 0.773676 -0.12157 0.79256 -0.17916 -0.4209 -0.1312 -0.27392 0.21369 1
Employees 0.06729 0.611197 -0.29588 0.589267 0.613786 -0.37183 0.744729 0.012523 0.811709 -0.15265 -0.27867 -0.06238 -0.2024 0.125727 0.902628 1
Investment 0.165454 0.46234 -0.12679 0.685593 0.77701 -0.51542 0.700491 -0.10237 0.704344 -0.11383 -0.63761 -0.10653 -0.2792 0.372953 0.90722 0.721053 1
GDR 0.434223 0.384256 -0.6463 0.53554 0.516441 0.808161 0.517134 0.644526 0.424309 0.7473 0.2673 0.140239 -0.77612 -0.82557 -0.06721 -0.00986 -0.06955 1
FreeFloat 0.391433 0.179308 0.153684 -0.40118 -0.37031 0.859342 -0.18072 0.309252 -0.38632 0.346491 0.45169 0.100878 -0.38179 -0.70164 -0.49409 -0.58473 -0.58653 0.439111 1
Concentration -0.69884 -0.76033 0.725566 -0.6919 -0.66636 -0.50345 -0.86397 -0.54127 -0.74077 -0.70891 -0.01945 0.305687 0.815369 0.505716 -0.41446 -0.50279 -0.24861 -0.72165 -0.16379 1
PostRet 0.341924 0.791013 -0.32125 0.713462 0.753594 -0.0519 0.918918 0.29588 0.839508 0.128072 -0.35062 -0.04188 -0.6014 -0.12569 0.89123 0.891425 0.74274 0.291515 -0.25757 -0.72393 1
PostRisk 0.356823 0.382438 -0.62022 0.588191 0.636461 -0.44729 0.561039 -0.41305 0.752457 0.122885 -0.16509 -0.61449 0.024601 0.397013 0.621333 0.588081 0.642047 -0.06436 -0.66671 -0.31818 0.427127 1
Volume 0.584783 0.553532 0.336774 -0.21909 -0.07222 0.303096 0.151101 -0.1104 -0.0501 0.024879 -0.0093 -0.19288 -0.34404 -0.18578 0.203681 -0.12105 0.126533 0.005606 0.616219 -0.13158 0.170348 -0.18049 1
Clustering 0.584807 0.767626 -0.81953 0.586926 0.653839 0.404311 0.745945 0.042871 0.850381 0.455935 0.378599 -0.2538 -0.47506 -0.52704 0.440301 0.48297 0.290775 0.663372 0.026736 -0.78593 0.571112 0.565384 0.058698 1
Persist 0.410643 0.382523 -0.57449 0.196024 0.305056 0.576422 0.241099 -0.1421 0.385217 0.364377 0.63673 -0.03287 -0.24012 -0.63789 -0.06155 -0.13685 -0.05893 0.659598 0.334639 -0.33021 -0.00731 0.232429 0.139719 0.745301 1
AnteRet 0.335966 0.70075 -0.42478 0.814463 0.818896 -0.09035 0.938643 0.369503 0.858412 0.233053 -0.42921 -0.10464 -0.61962 -0.05837 0.851402 0.886828 0.74451 0.318728 -0.35122 -0.75279 0.979116 0.490025 0.026069 0.55973 -0.04842 1
AnteRisk -0.05507 -0.15256 -0.47627 0.257472 0.264806 -0.55457 0.043934 -0.58892 0.351576 -0.06952 0.023474 -0.44723 0.47199 0.513889 0.17475 0.219691 0.281319 -0.25877 -0.73735 0.138549 -0.09426 0.820544 -0.52543 0.248709 0.193805 -0.00085 1
Marketreutn 0.488694 0.845255 -0.1686 0.520047 0.559855 0.171972 0.833137 0.407351 0.642448 0.210714 -0.29359 -0.07295 -0.71549 -0.26117 0.744438 0.707484 0.545778 0.321184 0.080107 -0.75544 0.923985 0.167739 0.441831 0.47099 -0.05659 0.869626 -0.40474 1
Marketrisk -0.02478 -0.15599 -0.15993 -0.25153 -0.19761 -0.48302 -0.28971 -0.87641 0.018788 -0.29221 0.292719 -0.51777 0.726539 0.501861 -0.01728 -0.02857 -0.01315 -0.51895 -0.43745 0.375495 -0.36242 0.597961 -0.20359 0.06869 0.166467 -0.34757 0.836629 -0.52871 1
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Another correlation table 5.4 is also presented above representing cross sectional averages of 
the variables for the seven years from 2005-2011. The mean is calculated for each variable 
every year and then a correlation table is reproduced. It is evident from the table that the 
results of my regressions are compatible with the cross-sectional correlation signs and 
significance of the variables. The above table suggests the potential for at least most of the 
results to be supported (see discussion below). 
 
5.6 Hausman Test Results 
 
Table 5.5: Hauman Test Results 
Variable Statistic Prob.        Decision 
Ex Post Return 4.444 0.000 Reject Null Hypothesis (use Fixed Effects) 
E Ante Return 2.113 0.000 Reject Null Hypothesis (use Fixed Effects) 
Ex Post Risk 6.354 0.000 Reject Null Hypothesis (use Fixed Effects) 
Ex Ante Risk 6.079 0.000 Reject Null Hypothesis (use Fixed Effects) 
Volume of Trade 21.262 0.000 Reject Null Hypothesis (use Fixed Effects) 
Return On Assets 1.087 0.336 Accept Null Hypothesis(use Random Effects) 
Return on Equity 4.527 0.000 Reject Null Hypothesis (use Fixed Effects) 
Debt Ratio 5.935 0.000 Reject Null Hypothesis (use Fixed Effects) 
 
 
5.7 Empirical Results 
The following tables represent the results of my regression for the eight models specified 
before in chapter four. 
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Table 5.6: Regression Analysis of the effect of institutional ownership and ownership concentration on 
stock market performance variables 
The t-statistics in parantheses marked as *, ** and *** denote the 90%, 95% and 99% significance level 
respectively. Statistical significance t-statistics are determined by White standard errors to correct for 
heteroskedasticity. 
Variable 
Ex Post 
Return 
Ex Ante 
Return 
Ex Post 
Risk 
Ex Ante 
Risk 
Volume of 
Trade 
C 0.059 
(5.986)*** 
0.018 
(1.274) 
0.051 
(2.554)** 
0.049 
(0.713) 
6.171 
(90.056)*** 
Size -0.005 
(-4.638)*** 
-0.003 
(-1.648) 
-0.002 
(-0.751) 
-0.008 
(-1.040) 
0.015 
(3.520)*** 
Banks -0.001 
(-0.325) 
0.003 
(0.728) 
0.004 
(0.446) 
-0.003 
(-0.096) 
-0.246 
(-0.671) 
Companies 0.004 
(1.037) 
0.009 
(2.039)** 
-0.002 
(-0.294) 
-0.0003 
(-0.011) 
-0.161 
(-1.368) 
Concentration -0.002 
(-0.558) 
0.009 
(2.923)*** 
0.0008 
(0.095) 
0.072 
(2.946)*** 
-0.894 
(-2.757)*** 
Employees -0.022 
(-1.768) 
-0.013 
(-0.595) 
0.109 
(1.664)* 
0.626 
(4.451)*** 
-2.449 
(-2.225)** 
Holdings 0.0001 
(0.053) 
0.002 
(0.053) 
-0.009 
(-1.608) 
-0.028 
(-1.033) 
-0.128 
(-1.027) 
Individuals 0.009 
(1.905)* 
0.014 
(1.896)* 
-0.025 
(-2.369)** 
-0.027 
(-0.731) 
-1.008 
(-3.028)*** 
Insurance 0.023 
(1.379) 
 0.0009 
(-0.228) 
-0.006 
(-0.121) 
-0.102 
(-0.798) 
-1.527 
(-0.982) 
Investment 0.019 
(0.749) 
-0.005 
(0.749) 
-0.042 
(-0.608) 
-0.160 
(-0.837) 
-1.171 
(-1.138) 
Top 
Management 
0.006 
(1.242) 
-0.0003 
(-0.060) 
-0.019 
(-1.997)** 
-0.015 
(-0.458) 
-0.179 
(-0.583) 
ROA 0.011 
(2.233)** 
    
Volume -0.003 
(-3.981)*** 
    
Market 
Return 
0.663 
(5.725)*** 
    
MB 0.0002 
(2.542)** 
    
Clustering   -0.009 
(-1.671)* 
-0.106 
(-5.341)*** 
 
Persistence   0.014 
(2.275)** 
0.106 
(5.642)*** 
 
R2 0.716 0.552 0.739 0.747 0.911 
Adjusted R2 0.593 0.351 0.619 0.631 0.871 
S.E of 
Regression 
0.004 0.006 0.009 0.029 0.276 
F- statistic 5.838 2.739 6.189 6.450 22.656 
Prob. (F-stat.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 5.7: Regression Analysis of the effect of institutional ownership and ownership concentration on 
financial performance variables 
The t-statistics in parantheses marked as *, ** and *** denote the 90%, 95% and 99% significance level 
respectively. Statistical significance t-statistics are determined by White standard errors to correct for 
heteroskedasticity. 
Variable Return on Assets Return on Equity Debt Ratio 
C 0.039 
(3.734)*** 
0.266 
(6.123)*** 
1.064 
(3.825)** 
Cash 0.079 
(2.282)** 
0.023 
(0.331) 
 
Banks   -0.473 
(-2.400)** 
Free Float -0.036 
(-2.219)** 
-0.144 
(-2.069)** 
-0.492 
(-3.367)*** 
GDR   0.283 
(2.497)** 
Size   -0.044 
(-1.534) 
Companies -0.027 
(-1.848)* 
-0.161 
(-1.969)** 
 
Concentration -0.029 
(-0.833) 
0.009 
(-0.699) 
-0.094 
(-0.705) 
Employees   1.949 
(2.147)** 
Holdings -0.026 
(-2.018)** 
-0.178 
(-1.588) 
 
Individuals -0.055 
(-1.649) 
-0.312 
(-2.019)** 
 
R
2 
0.488 0.636 0.734 
Adjusted R
2 
0.473 0.499 0.630 
S.E of 
Regression 
0.050 0.121 0.143 
F- statistic 32.765 4.638 7.099 
Prob. (F-stat.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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5.8 Discussion of Findings 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 provide findings of the eight models for regression using the stock returns 
and financial performance measures as dependent variables. The results show the explanatory 
power of the eight models as measured by the adjusted R
2
, which provides a better estimation 
of the true population value, especially with a small sample. Values of the adjusted R
2
 are 
0.593, 0.351, 0.619, 0.631, 0.871, 0.473, 0.499 and 0.630. Also, the F (p-value < 0.05) for all 
models confirms that all models are statistically significant. Aiming to achieve improved 
results in some models, some ownership structure variables are eliminated especially in 
models 6, 7 and 8.  
5.8.1 First Hypothesis 
The results of Table 5.6 show that institutional ownership as well as ownership concentration 
has no effect on ex post stock returns as shown in previous studies (Azzam, 2010; Faugere 
and Shawky, 2003). Also, the results coincide with past studies of (Shleifer, 2000; Shiller, 
2000) which state that there is no significant relationship between ownership concentration 
and stock returns. The results do not support hypotheses 1a and 1c in chapter 4.  One possible 
explanation for that insignificant effect is that the Egyptian stock exchange has inefficient 
information, as the information arrives to the market chronologically and there is a lot of 
noise and speculative trading (El_ansary and Atuea, 2012). Thus, it is very difficult to rely on 
a specific variable to explain the variations that happen to stock returns, especially as far as 
the Egyptian Exchange is concerned. Also, the stock market performance is mainly affected 
by economic and market conditions rather than ownership structure variables. The financial 
crisis that happened in 2008 had a sound negative effect on the stock market. In addition, the 
results confirm the market inefficiency of the Egyptian stock market. The stock prices in this 
case might not reflect the costs and benefits of diversification. In other studies (Grinblatt and 
Titman, (1989, 1993); Grinblatt et al., 1995; Jones et al., 1999; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; 
Wermers, (1999,2000), the relationship is proved to be positive and significant due to certain 
factors mentioned before. For example, institutional investors are “momentum traders” and 
they have tendency to be guided by the historical prices (Grinblatt et al., 1995). Also, mutual 
funds as a category of institutions sometimes engage in institutional “herding” (Wermers, 
1999).In addition, the coexistent relationship between changes in institutional ownership and 
stock returns is more solid than the “trend chasing effect” (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999). This is 
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not the case for Egyptian Stock Exchange. The Egyptian Exchange performance sometimes 
moves contradictory to what most theories say, part of it depends on speculation.
43
 
 
Profitability (represented by ROA) has a positive and significant effect on ex post returns (5% 
level), which also coincides with previous studies (Azzam, 2010). Size has a negative and 
significant effect on ex post returns (1% level), since bigger firms are usually associated with 
less returns and lower risk. Also, Volume has significant and negative effect on stock returns 
(1% level). It is true that large volume of trade is often associated with more liquid stocks, 
where the return is low. Market return has a positive and significant effect on stock returns 
(1% level), which is normal. Also, market to book ratio has a positive and significant impact 
on ex post returns (5% level), which is consistent with Zeytinoglu et al. (2012) in their study 
of the impact of market based ratios on stock returns in the insurance sector in Turkey. 
 
The results in Table 5.6 show also that institutional ownership has no effect on ex ante returns 
except for companies, which have a positive and significant effect (5% level) and individuals, 
who have a positive and significant effect (10% level). This means that the effect is very weak 
and this actually coincides with Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Sias et al. (2006) who find 
that the relationship between changes in institutional ownership and next quarter’s returns 
insignificant. Sias et al. (2006) add that the ability to forecast future returns is only strong in 
the case of mutual funds, which means that these institutions have better access to information 
than the others. In addition, Cai and Zheng (2004) find that changes in institutional ownership 
do not predict the stock returns. Moreover, Griffin et al. (2003) find no evidence to support 
that the increase in institutional imbalances forecast future daily returns. In most economies, 
the relationship between changes in institutional ownership and future stock returns might be 
of a concern simply because changes in institutional ownership act as a proxy for changes in 
the strength of corporate governance. It seems that this is not the case in Egypt as evident 
from the results. On the other hand, the relationship between ownership concentration and ex 
ante returns is positive and significant (1% level). This could be the case since Parigi and 
Pelizzon (2006) find that controlling shareholders with the highest concentration get higher 
expected returns than non-controlling shareholders because they can distract a part of the 
profits of the firm they control. The results support hypotheses 1b and 1d in chapter 4. It is 
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All analysis and opinions related to the Egyptian stock market in the empirical section is based on an interview 
with Dr. Islam Azzam, the associate professor and head of Finance in the American University in Cairo and the 
Capital market specialist.  I hereby express my deep gratitude to him. 
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worth mentioning that in computing the ex-ante return, the GARCH model is used, which has 
not been employed in literature before to estimate the forecasted returns. 
 
5.8.2 Second Hypothesis 
The results in Table 5.6 show that institutional ownership represented by top management and 
individuals have a negative and significant effect on stock volatility (10% level). The results 
coincide with most academic studies that support the existence of negative relationship 
between institutional ownership and stock volatility. The positive relationship between 
employees associations and stock volatility (1% level) coincides with the results of table 5.7, 
where there is a positive association between employees associations and debt ratio. It is 
known that companies with high debt to assets ratio are more risky. Belghitar et al. (2011) 
find that institutional investors are more likely to be attracted to less risky securities since 
they follow the prudent man rules. Moreover, Lin et al. (2007) find that the institutional 
investors’ access to better quality of information is likely to result in investment in less 
volatile securities. Furthermore, institutional investors are likely to act in a rational way than 
individual traders (Shiller, 1984). They are called “smart-money” investors by some 
academics. While, ownership concentration has no effect on stock volatility, which is not 
consistent with the past studies by (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Clark and Wojcik, 2005), which 
finds either a positive or negative relationship between ownership concentration and stock 
volatility. The results do not support hypotheses 2a and 2c in chapter 4. Two important 
components of volatility; clustering and persistence show significant relationship with stock 
volatility. Volatility clustering has a negative and significant effect (10% level), while 
volatility persistence has a positive effect (5% level). 
 
Moreover, the results in table 5.6 show that institutional ownership has no effect on ex ante 
risk except for employees associations that have positive and significant effect on ex ante risk 
(1% level), which coincides with the results in table 5.7. As reported by Chicernea, Petkevich 
and Reca (2013), institutional ownership no longer explains idiosyncratic volatility in the last 
decade. As a consequence, it is difficult to predict whether the stock return volatility will 
exhibit an upward or downward trend with the increase in institutional ownership. Sias (1996) 
finds that the changes in volatility can be forecasted by the variation in the lag changes in 
institutional ownership. In our results, this can be true for employees associations, since they 
are the only institutions that show a significant effect on ex ante risk.  
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It is worth mentioning that in the traditional asset pricing theory, the composition of 
ownership on a financial asset does not affect future returns or risk. If the existing holders of 
an asset buy or sell for reasons unrelated to fundamentals, new owners immediately take their 
place, with no effect on price (Greenwood and Thesmar, 2009). Our results regarding the 
effect of institutional ownership on ex ante returns and risk support this theory. 
 
Also, it is worth mentioning that in computing the ex-ante risk, the GARCH model is used 
which so far has not been employed in literature to estimate the forecasted risk. 
 
Moreover, ownership concentration shows positive and significant relationship with ex ante 
risk (1% level). It is logical since it shows a positive and significant relationship with ex ante 
returns. It is known that there is a positive correlation between risk and return. Also, it is 
known that with the closed corporate governance system associated with high ownership 
concentration, the outside investors could have little information and there is a high 
probability of insider trading. As a consequence, the companies with high ownership 
concentration are expected to have more volatile stock market prices. The results do not 
support hypothesis 2b but support hypothesis 2d in chapter 4.  
Two important components of volatility, clustering and persistence show also significant 
relationship with ex ante risk. Volatility clustering has a negative and significant effect (1% 
level), while volatility persistence has a positive effect (1% level), which reveals their 
stronger influence on the expected risk than for the ex post risk. This means that there is a 
high probability of high volatility days being followed by other high volatility days due to 
high volatility persistence. The ultimate outcome is that the tails of the distribution of stock 
market returns become fatter or that there will be a high probability of extreme price 
movements. This means that the stock market in Egypt displays other volatility behavior 
related to clustering and persistence that have to be taken into account when forecasting risk. 
 
 5.8.3 Third Hypothesis 
The results in Table 5.6 show that institutional ownership has no effect on stock liquidity 
except employees associations and individuals who have a negative and significant effect on 
stock liquidity, but with a greater influence of individuals (1% level) than for employees 
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associations (5% level). The results do not support hypothesis 3a in chapter 4. Actually, the 
results regarding the relationship between institutional ownership and stock liquidity are 
mixed. Yet, Golonji et al. (2013) find no significant relationship between institutional 
ownership and stock liquidity. Other studies find negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and stock liquidity (Nekounam et al., 2012). In Egypt, employees associations are 
associated with higher risk and higher debt ratio, so it is expected that they have low stock 
liquidity. High volume of trade is usually associated with low risk.  
 
In addition, ownership concentration has a negative and significant effect on stock liquidity 
(1% level). The result supports hypothesis 3b in chapter 4. Also, the result coincides with the 
study of Nekounam et al. (2012), who find negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and stock liquidity in a study including 74 companies listed in Tehran Stock 
Exchange. It is well known that with more ownership dispersion, there is greater market 
liquidity than with ownership concentration (Bolton and Thadden, 1998; Jacoby and Zheng, 
2010). It is worth mentioning that a key aspect in evaluating the performance of any particular 
financial system is its liquidity. This means that it is expected that firms with high market to 
book ratios are usually associated with higher stock liquidity, as in the case of these results 
(1% level). 
 
5.8.4 Fourth Hypothesis 
The results in Table 5.7 show that institutional ownership represented by companies have 
negative and significant effect on financial performance represented by ROA and ROE (10% 
and 5% level, respectively), and holding companies have negative and significant effect on 
ROA (10% level). While, individuals have negative and significant effect on ROE (5% level). 
In Egypt, firms with more individual ownership are less profitable. Our results show that 
institutional ownership has very weak effect on firm financial performance. The results are 
consistent with Namzi and Kermani (2013) who find that institutional ownership has a 
negative and significant impact on firm performance, using data from Tehran Stock Exchange 
during the period 2003-2008 and employing a panel data model as well. The results contradict 
with Abdelsalam et al. (2008) who show that there is a strong positive association between 
institutional ownership and firm performance using pooled cross-sectional observations from 
the top 50 listed Egyptian companies between 2003-2005. 
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On the other hand, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Karpoff et al. (1996), Duggal and Miller 
(1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) have reached the conclusion that there is no significant 
relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance. One reason might be that 
institutional investors in Egypt do not engage in active monitoring of the management, so 
they are called passive investors or pressure sensitive as classified by Cornett et al. (2007), 
which means that the institutional investors prefer not to interfere with the management 
decisions. Demsetz (1983) analyzes this relationship and argues that there should be no 
systematic relationship between changes in ownership structure and variations in firm 
performance. 
 
Moreover, the results show that ownership concentration has no effect on firm financial 
performance represented by ROA and ROE. The results support hypotheses 4a and 4b in 
chapter 4. The results coincide with the study of Lyskavyan and Spatareanu (2006), who find 
that concentration, is insignificant in explaining performance both in the transition countries, 
where market monitoring is very weak, and even in the UK, where market monitoring is 
considered to be strong. The authors add that this insignificant relationship is the result of the 
availability of different monitoring mechanisms, of which takeover threats are one of the most 
important. Also, the results are consistent with those of Balsmeier and Czarnitzki (2010) who 
find the models for the subsamples of EU countries, where there is strong legal structure, 
showing that the ownership concentration has no impact on firm performance.  
 
Moreover, the results support other results reached by (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz 
and Villalonga, 2000 and Kocenda, 2003) that there is no significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) claim that if 
dispersed ownership is not good, it would not be there in a rational world. They admit the role 
of ownership concentration as a monitoring mechanism, but they say that it might change 
across firms in a way coherent with value maximization. Burkart et al. (1997) say that even if 
shareholders practice tight control in the past and it is efficient, in the future it includes an 
expropriation threat that could limit managerial initiative and non-contractible investments. 
 
Some studies, that find a significant relationship, use Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm 
performance. Compared to return on assets and return on equity, the two measures used in 
this study are much stronger in revealing the degree of firm performance. A Conference 
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Board Survey of financial indicators in 57 companies (Walsh, 1987) has declared that return 
on assets, return on sales, and return on equity are the most important performance measures 
employed. These measures were among those employed by Peters and Waterman (1982) to 
differentiate among excellent and non-excellent companies. Krueger (1989) has stressed on 
the use of return on assets as an important performance measure in management analysis.  
 
Actually, the ownership-performance relationship has been a controversial topic for decades. 
Scholars have not reached an agreement with it, therefore empirical researches become more 
important to examine the logically possible explanations is the most acceptable (Fazlzadeh et 
al., 2011). Based on the above results and the results of past studies, it can be concluded that 
different types of ownership structure may have diverse effect on firm performance due to the 
different environmental conditions. 
 
Cash has a positive and significant effect on financial performance represented by ROA (5% 
level). Cash is usually associated with high firm profitability. Free float has a negative and 
significant effect on ROA and ROE (5% level). This means that companies with relatively 
low ownership by strategic investors and block shareholders are less profitable. 
 
In addition, the results in table 5.7 show that institutional ownership has no effect on debt 
ratio except banks that have negative and significant effect (5% level) and employee 
associations that have positive and significant effect (5% level). According to Stulz (1988), 
institutional ownership affects positively and significantly debt ratio. This is true in the case 
of employee associations in my results. On the other hand, Michaely and Vincent (2012) find 
a negative relationship between the level of institutional holdings and leverage, which is true 
in the case of public banks in my results. This result also supports theories that suggest 
institutional ownership is a substitute for debt mainly in the role of reducing asymmetric 
information between management and outside shareholders. Yet, I cannot generalize since 
this can be true for only one category of institutional ownership in the results. 
 
Ownership concentration has no effect on debt ratio. The results are similar to (McConnell 
and Servaes, 1995; Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990, Booth and Maksimovic, 2001), who find that 
ownership concentration does not affect significantly the firm’s debt ratio for all industry 
sectors except for the sectors of information technology and research and development. 
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GDRs have positive and significant effect on debt ratio (5% level). This means that 
companies with high GDRs are associated with high debt ratio. Free float has a negative and 
significant effect (1% level). In Egypt, free float is often associated with low debt ratio, since 
the problem of financing is solved through offering more stocks to the public. 
5.9 Summary 
This chapter interprets the regression results of my models. It begins by analyzing the 
regression method and how it is applied. Also, it explains how I have compared the suitability 
of the models by testing them. It has been obvious from the tests that the fixed effect model is 
superior to any other models in dealing with the data. OLS is used for all regressions with 
corrective methods of robust White cross section covariance and White period to correct for 
heteroskedasticity if it is present in any form. The unit root test for stationarity reveals that all 
my variables are stationary. The Jarque-bera test for the normality of standardized residuals 
shows that the errors are not normally distributed. Also, the results of the endogeneity test 
confirmed that there is no endogeneity in the model. The variance-covariance matrix shows 
no presence of multicollinearity. 
Regarding the empirical results, the results show that institutional ownership as well as 
ownership concentration has no effect on stock returns, which coincide with some of the past 
studies. Also, institutional ownership has no effect on ex ante return except for companies, 
which have a positive and significant effect and individuals, who have a positive and 
significant effect. On the other hand, the relationship between ownership concentration and ex 
ante returns is positive and significant.  
The results also show that institutional ownership represented by top management and 
individuals have a negative and significant effect on stock volatility. Ownership concentration 
has no effect on stock volatility.  
 
Moreover, the results confirm that institutional ownership has no effect on ex ante risk except 
for employees associations that have positive and significant effect on ex ante risk, which 
coincides with the results on ex post risk. Ownership concentration shows positive and 
significant relationship with ex ante risk. Two important components of volatility, clustering 
and persistence show also significant relationship with ex ante risk. This means that the stock 
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market in Egypt displays other volatility behavior related to clustering and persistence that 
have to be taken into account when forecasting risk. 
 
The results show that institutional ownership has no effect on stock liquidity except 
employees associations and individuals who have a negative and significant effect on stock 
liquidity, but with a greater influence of individuals than for employees associations. In 
Egypt, employees associations are associated with higher risk and higher debt ratio, so it is 
expected that they have low stock liquidity. In addition, ownership concentration has a 
negative and significant effect on stock liquidity.  
 
Regarding the financial performance measures, the results show that institutional ownership 
represented by companies have negative and significant effect on financial performance 
represented by ROA and ROE, and holding companies have negative and significant effect on 
ROA. Only individuals have negative and significant effect on ROE. My results show that 
institutional ownership has very weak effect on firm financial performance. One reason might 
be that institutional investors in Egypt do not engage in active monitoring of the management. 
Moreover, the results show that ownership concentration has no effect on firm financial 
performance represented by ROA and ROE.  
 
Finally, the results confirm that institutional ownership has no effect on debt ratio except 
banks that have negative and significant effect and employee associations that have positive 
and significant effect. Also, ownership concentration has no effect on debt ratio.  
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the main findings and conclusions of the previous chapters are summarized. 
The main aim of this chapter is to bring together and highlight the most important conclusions 
related to the objectives of this research. Therefore, section 6.2 provides a summary of the 
research objectives and the research questions to address these objectives, the research 
hypotheses to answer these questions and the research methods followed in this thesis. 
Section 6.3 highlights the main findings. Section 6.4 displays the research contribution. 
Section 6.5 presents the research implications. Finally, Section 6.6 presents the research 
limitations and lists some suggestions for future research. 
 
6.2. Summary of Research Objectives and Research Methods 
The main objectives related to the research questions are evaluating the effect of institutional 
ownership on ex-post and ex-ante returns and volatility in the Egyptian stock market and 
stock liquidity, studying the effect of institutional ownership on firm financial performance, 
evaluating the effect of ownership concentration on ex-post and ex-ante returns and volatility 
and stock liquidity, and studying the effect of ownership concentration on firm financial 
performance. 
 
The research uses panel data model with unbalanced data after controlling for firm 
characteristics. In panel data, the same cross-sectional units (example; institutional ownership, 
firms, ownership concentration) are analyzed over time. Also, GARCH (1, 1)-GED model is 
used to generate ex-ante returns and volatility and to estimate volatility clustering and 
volatility persistence. A panel model is proposed that directly relates the predetermined firms 
ownership structures and firm characteristics to time and cross sectional varying stock returns 
and financial performance measures. Using a large cross section of companies over time, 
returns, risk, volume and financial performance ratios of companies are parsimoniously 
estimated as functions of ownership structure variables and firm characteristics.  
 
Hausman test statistic is used to test whether a fixed or random effects model should be used 
(Hausman, 1978), after running a pooled regression, which turned out to be inefficient. 
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Normality of observations and regression residuals are tested using Jarque Bera test of 
normality. Also, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (DF) unit root test is used to test for 
stationarity, and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is used to test for endogeneity. 
 
6.3 Main Findings 
This research is the first comprehensive study done to investigate the impact of ownership 
structure on ex post and ex ante returns and volatility on the stock returns and financial 
performance in the Egyptian Stock market. Past studies concentrate on past and 
contemporaneous returns and volatility and how they are affected by the percentage of 
institutional ownership and ownership concentration. Few studies test the impact on future 
returns and volatility. Moreover, the study analyzes the effect of two components of volatility, 
clustering and persistence on the historical and expected stock volatility. In addition, the study 
analyzes the effect of ownership structure on the firm financial performance, through 
measuring the effect on three important and strong performance variables (Return on assets, 
Return on equity and Debt to equity ratio). 
 
The detailed findings of this research are summarized as follows 
The results of the first research question show that institutional ownership has no effect on 
stock returns. Also, institutional ownership has no effect on ex ante return except for 
companies, which have a positive and significant effect and individuals, who have a positive 
and significant effect. The results also show that institutional ownership represented by top 
management and individuals have a negative and significant effect on stock volatility. 
Moreover, the results confirm that institutional ownership has no effect on ex ante risk except 
for employees associations that have positive and significant effect on ex ante risk, which 
coincides with the results on ex post risk. In addition, institutional ownership has no effect on 
stock liquidity except employees associations and individuals who have a negative and 
significant effect on stock liquidity, but with a greater influence of individuals than for 
employees associations.  
Regarding the financial performance measures, the results show that institutional ownership 
represented by companies have negative and significant effect on financial performance 
represented by ROA and ROE, and holding companies have negative and significant effect on 
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ROA. Individuals have negative and significant effect on ROE. Finally, the results confirm 
that institutional ownership has no effect on debt ratio except banks that have negative and 
significant effect and employee associations that have positive and significant effect.  
The results of the second research question show that ownership concentration has no effect 
on stock returns. Also, the relationship between ownership concentration and ex ante returns 
is positive and significant. While, ownership concentration has no effect on stock volatility, it 
shows positive and significant relationship with ex ante risk. In addition, ownership 
concentration has a negative and significant effect on stock liquidity.  
Regarding the financial performance measures, the results show that ownership concentration 
has no effect on firm financial performance represented by ROA, ROE and debt ratio. 
 
The results of the third research question show that Profitability (represented by ROA) has a 
positive and significant effect on ex post returns. Size has a negative and significant effect on 
ex post returns. Also, Volume has significant and negative effect on stock returns. Market 
return has a positive and significant effect on stock returns. Also, market to book ratio has a 
positive and significant impact on ex post returns. Two important components of volatility; 
clustering and persistence show significant relationship with ex post and ex ante risk. 
Volatility clustering has a negative and significant effect, while volatility persistence has a 
positive effect. Market to book ratio shows positive and significant effect on stock liquidity. 
Regarding the effect on firm financial performance; Cash has a positive and significant effect 
on financial performance represented by ROA, while free float has a negative and significant 
effect on ROA, ROE and debt ratio. Finally, GDRs have positive and significant effect on 
debt ratio.  
6.4 Research Contribution 
This thesis makes an original contribution to the literature in five respects: 
1. Most studies examine the relationship between the level or changes in institutional 
ownership and both the ex post and contemporaneous returns. Little emphasis is given 
to the relationship between institutional ownership and future returns. In this study, 
analyzing the impact of institutional ownership on ex ante returns and volatility fills 
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this gap left by former studies. No studies have been conducted to test the effect of 
ownership structure on ex-ante returns and risk in Egypt. 
2. The effect of both volatility clustering and persistence is tested on stock volatility for 
the first time as far as the Egyptian stock market is concerned. 
3. The analysis extends the literature by decomposing the institutional ownership to 
several types which are; insurance companies, employee associations, public and 
private banks, holdings, and companies. 
4.  The previous studies pay little attention to the small emerging countries, where the 
above-mentioned relationship could be different than what the previous papers have 
concluded, and have only dealt with developed and large emerging economies. This 
study is analyzed and tested using data from the Egyptian stock market, which is one 
of the small emerging markets that are overlooked in literature. The differences 
between Egypt and large emerging and developed countries in legal and political 
systems, country factors, and market structure and development make Egypt an 
interesting case to investigate. 
5. GARCH (1, 1)-GED model is used to generate ex-ante return and volatility, volatility 
clustering and volatility persistence. Previous studies have not used GARCH to 
measure forecasted returns and volatility and how they are affected by ownership 
structure according to the author’s knowledge. 
6.5 Implications of the Results 
The research has generated several implications that would be of interest to policy makers, 
investors (Local and foreigners) and capital market specialists. Firstly, it helps the investment 
community in Egypt to better understand the role of institutional investors and their effect in 
the capital market. The high degree of turbulence in the international capital markets in the 
last decade has led the foreign investors to raise their risk expectations and minimize their 
portfolio exposure to emerging markets, and made them worried with regards to equity 
investments in Egypt. Determining the risk factors through several studies of the Egyptian 
market should clarify the scene in one way or another. Secondly, it helps those who are in 
charge to consider the factors that affect in a significant way the financial and market 
performance of firms. It has been evident from the study that important variables such as; 
institutional ownership and ownership concentration does not have big effect on financial and 
market performance of firms in Egypt, contrary to other studies done in other countries. So, it 
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is very important to determine these factors to help improve the efficiency of firms in Egypt. 
Thirdly, it can help in identifying whether ownership concentration or dispersion is better in 
enhancing the market and financial performance of firms. In most studies, it has been reported 
that ownership concentration has a positive effect on firm performance. Yet, the case is 
different in Egypt, which also coincides with some studies done on transition economies, 
where the market monitoring is weak. Fourthly, the study can help in formulating certain 
policies that could help later in achieving a certain kind of transparency as far as the market is 
concerned. Returns and risks are important factors that are of major concern to any investor. It 
has been evident from this study that the Egyptian market is highly unexpected. So, the aim of 
the capital market specialists should be promoting a well-functioning stock market for the 
achievement of Egypt’s key policy objectives of higher rates of savings, investment and 
economic growth. Also, investors will find it difficult to make an investment decision in 
markets where information on firm performance and policies is less available and known 
sequentially to market participants. As a result, the uncertainty in such a market will induce 
investors to withdraw until the uncertainty issue is resolved.  
6.6 Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Future Research 
This research focuses mainly on quantitative variables as independent variables. Many other 
qualitative and quantitative variables are of extreme importance and can affect the returns and 
volatility in the Egyptian Stock Exchange. The research does not examine the effect of the 
industry type, political and economic factors on returns and volatility. Many factors such as; 
the legal system, macroeconomic variables, political instability, global financial crises and 
exchange rates can have an impact on stock returns and volatility as well as the financial 
performance, and may represent significant variables as well. The impact of the above-
mentioned variables on market and financial performance is beyond the interest of this 
research and calls for further investigations in future researches. 
 
In addition, the research focuses on Egypt. So, the results of this research must be interpreted 
carefully and not generalized to all emerging countries. Further researches must examine 
more emerging countries, in order to better understand the impact of ownership structure and 
concentration on returns and volatility. 
 
On the other hand, the researcher believes that this study provides wide scope for further 
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research to investigate other factors and their effect on the market and financial performance 
in Egypt. The following are some suggestions for future research: 
 
i) This research could be extended to cover more years (Pre and post the period covered). 
This helps to identify a clear picture of how ownership structure and concentration affects 
returns and volatility over time. 
ii) Moreover, a comparative study between Egypt and another emerging country in the same 
context can be investigated. In this case, one could gain better insight on the comparative 
impact of ownership structure and concentration on returns and volatility in two different 
environments. 
iii) In addition, as mentioned earlier, researchers can investigate other factors 
(macroeconomic, political, etc.) and their effect on returns and volatility in the Egyptian 
Stock Exchange.  
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Appendix 1: Literature Review Summary Table 
Study 
  
Objectives 
Methodology 
Main Results 
Variables Measures Method 
Arbel et 
al. (1983) 
Testing the relationship 
between the level of 
institutional holdings 
and the performance of 
firms in terms of return 
and risk (USA 1971-
1981) 
Institutional Concentration Ratio 
(ICR), Return, Risk, Risk-
Adjusted Returns, Company Size 
ICR measures the securities intensively held, 
moderately held & institutionally neglected by 
institutions. Return is the equally weighted 
monthly return for all the securities included in 
the portfolio during the year. Risk is the standard 
deviation of returns. Risk-Adjusted Returns is 
the return/unit of total risk and return/unit of 
systematic risk. Company Size is the log of 
market value. 
CAPM Firms neglected by 
institutions 
performed better 
than those widely held 
by institutions on a 
risk-adjusted basis. 
Sias (1996) Testing the 
“contemporaneous” 
relationship between 
institutional investors 
and volatility, testing 
whether an increase in 
institutional ownership 
is followed with an 
increase in volatility 
(USA 1977-1991) 
Contemporaneous Relationship: 
Volatility, Annual institutional 
holdings, Annual market 
capitalizations for all securities 
listed in NYSE, Institutional 
Ownership. Future Relationship: 
Volatility at time t, Volatility at 
time t-1, Institutional ownership 
at time t-1, Return at time t-1. 
Contemporaneous Relationship: Volatility 
measured by standard deviation of Weekly 
Returns, market capitalization measured by 
price multiplied by number of listed shares, 
Institutional ownership measured by number of 
shares held by institutional investors as of the 3rd 
quarter each year. Future Relationship: Natural 
Log of volatility in Year t, natural log of 
volatility in year t-1, change in institutional 
holdings in year t-1, returns in year t-1. 
Wallis rank-sum 
test, Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test, 
Fama-Macbeth 
method. 
Institutional Investors 
have a positive effect 
on stock return 
volatility, holding 
capitalization 
constant. Variation in 
lag changes in 
institutional 
ownership predicts 
variation in volatility. 
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Bushee & 
Noe 
(2000) 
Testing whether the 
disclosure practices of 
the firm affect the 
structure of 
institutional 
ownership and, as a 
result, its stock return 
volatility (USA 1982-
1996) 
Disclosure, Institutional holdings, 
Stock return volatility, control 
variables: firm performance, level 
of trading volume in the stock, firm 
size, an indicator variable, 
leverage, dividend yield, earnings-
price ratio, book-price ratio, sales 
growth, control the S&P stock 
rating, systematic risk, 
unsystematic risk. 
Disclosure measured by the percentile ranking of 
corporate disclosure practices published by 
AIMR, Institutional holding measured by the % 
ownership from the sum of shares owned by the 3 
groups of institutions, Stock return volatility is 
the log of the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns measured over a year, annual market- 
adjusted returns is a proxy for firm 
performance, level of trading volume in the 
stock measured by average monthly volume/year 
over average shares outstanding, firm size is the 
log of market value, an indicator variable 
measures the institutions' preference for firms 
listed in S&P500, , leverage is the ratio of debt-
to-assets, systematic risk calculated from a 
market model using daily stock returns over a 
year, unsystematic risk measured as the standard 
deviation of market model residuals over a yearly 
interval. 
Fama-Mcbeth 
methodology 
More transient 
Institutional 
ownership is 
associated with 
more future 
volatility, higher 
quasi-indexer & 
dedicated ownership 
lead to lower future 
volatility 
Gompers 
& 
Metrick 
(2001) 
The analysis of the 
institutional investors' 
demand for stock 
characteristics & the 
consequences of this 
Dependent Variable: Return to 
stock I in quarter t+1. Independent 
Variables: Firm age, dividend 
yield, S&P membership as a 
dummy variable, stock-price 
IO is the sum of all reporting institutional divided 
by the total shares outstanding for the firm, firm 
size measured by market capitalization, book-to-
market ratio is the book value for the fiscal year 
ended before June 30 divided by size as of 
Fama-Mcbeth 
methodolog, 
Weighted least 
squares. 
Institutional 
ownership at the 
end of the quarter 
has positive 
forecasting effect of 
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demand on stock 
prices and returns 
(USA 1989-1996) 
volatility, firm size, per-share stock 
price, share turnover, book-to-
market ratio, momentum, 
Institutional Ownership (IO). 
December 31, dividend yield is cash dividends 
for the fiscal year ended before June 30 divided 
by size as of December 31, stock-price volatility 
is the variance of monthly returns over the last 
two years, firm age is the number of months 
since first return shows in CRSP file, momentum 
is past three months gross return, and 9 months 
gross return before the quarter of filing, turnover 
is volume divided by outstanding shares measured 
for the month before the beginning of the quarter. 
the returns in the 
subsequent quarter. 
Ali et al. 
(2002) 
Examining the issue 
of informed trading by 
institutions utilizing a 
different approach 
from the previous 
studies and how this 
affects the future 
returns (USA 1985-
1999) 
Dependent Variable: AR is size 
adjusted abnormal return during 
the 3 day period around earnings 
announcement. Independent 
variables: change in the percentage 
of institutional ownership during a 
quarter. AR2 is size adjusted 
abnormal return during the three 
day earnings announcement period 
for the second next quarterly 
earnings announcement following 
the calendar quarter over which 
change in institutional ownership is 
measured. LCHE is lagged 
AR is calculated as total return during this period 
minus the return on the CRSP decile 
capitalization portfolio corresponding to the firms' 
market value at the last calendar year end 
(Bernard & Thomas, 1989). LCHE is measured 
as the change in earnings relative to the same 
quarter of the past year divided by the market 
value of common equity at the beginning of the 
quarter. 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
The change in a 
company's 
institutional 
ownership during a 
calendar quarter is 
positively related to 
the three-day 
abnormal returns at 
the time of the 
subsequent 
announcement of 
the company's 
quarterly earnings. 
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unexpected earnings. LRET is raw 
return measured during the 
quarter for which change in 
institutional ownership is 
measured. 
Sias 
(2004) 
Evaluating the 
relation between 
institutional demand 
and returns (USA 
03/1983- 12/1997) 
Dependent Variable: Previous 
quarter return, Same quarter 
return, Following quarter return, 
Following 6-month return, 
Following 12-month return. 
Independent Variable: Fraction of 
institutional traders increasing 
their position n a stock. 
Change in the fraction of shares held by 
institutional investors measured as the 
difference between the fraction of shares held by 
institutional investors at the beginning and end of 
the quarter. Returns = ln Pt-lnPt-1 
Cross-Sectional 
Regressions 
Positive correlation 
between changes in 
institutional 
ownership and the 
same and ex-post 
quarter returns, 
weak positive 
correlation between 
changes in 
institutional 
ownership and 
future returns. 
Clark & 
Wojcik 
(2005) 
Financial Valuation of 
the German Model 
(Germany 1997-
2001) 
Independent Variables: Ownership 
Concentration, Index of 
shareholder value orientation 
(SVO), Size of the company, the 
firm's inclusion in the DAX30 
index as a dummy variable 
Dependent Variable: Corporate 
Two Measures of Ownership Concentration: the 
share of the largest holder of voting rights in a 
firm, Herfindahl index calculated as Σ = S, n is 
the number of major holders of voting rights, S is 
the share of a holder in the total number of voting 
rights. SVO is composed of the quality of yearly 
reports information, investor relations quality, the 
Single factor 
regressions 
between 
ownership 
concentration and 
stock returns. 
Another 
Negative 
relationship 
between ownership 
concentration and 
stock market 
returns that holds 
for all variables 
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stock market returns. setup of profitability goals, the arrangement of 
managerial compensation with the firm's share 
price. Corporate stock market returns are 
measured using daily variations in the stock 
market prices of the DAX100 companies. Sharpe 
ratio is used as a measure of the risk-adjusted rate 
of return (Solnik 2000). Size of the company is 
measured as the log of its market capitalization. 
regression analysis 
but adding control 
variables. 
mentioned and for 
all indices DAX100, 
DAX30 and MDAX. 
Higher ownership 
concentration 
affects more risk-
adjusted returns 
than risk- undjusted 
returns. According 
to the Sharpe ratio, 
this means that 
there is a positive 
relationship 
between ownership 
concentration and 
stock return 
volatility. 
Cornett 
et al. 
(2005) 
Examining the 
relationship between 
institutional investor 
ownership and firm 
performance (USA 
1993-2000) 
Dependent Variable: Firm 
Performance. Independent 
Variables: Institutional ownership, 
other control variables such as: 
director and executive officer stock 
ownership, `board of director 
characteristics such as: % of 
Firm performance is measured y operating 
performance which is the yearly earnings before 
interest and taxes plus depreciation divided by 
total assets at the end of the year, denoted by 
ROA Industry -adjusted ROA (IAROA) is the 
firm cash-flow return on assets minus industry-
average cash-flow return on assets this year. 
Multivariate 
Regressions of 
first differences 
and fixed effect 
regressions with 
lag on institutional 
ownership. 
Changes in 
institutional 
ownership affect 
significantly in a 
positive way the 
firm financial 
performance as 
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independent outside directors on 
the board, CEO/`Chair duality, 
board size, age & tenure of CEO, 
CEO's pay-performance sensitivity 
and Firm size. 
Institutional investor ownership is measured by 
the percentage of total institutional investor 
ownership in each firm. CEO's pay-
performance sensitivity is measured by the ratio 
of the dollar value of stock options granted to the 
dollar value of total compensation, Firm Size is 
measured as the log of the market value of equity. 
revealed by the 
industry-adjusted 
ROA. Pressure-
insensitive 
institutional 
investors affect 
positively the firm 
performance. 
Lskavyan 
& 
Spatarea
nu (2006) 
Analyzing the 
relationship between 
ownership 
concentration and 
firm performance 
(UK, Czech & 
Poland 1995-1999) 
ROA, ownership concentration, 
PL, CZ, Size, Capex, Regul, ROA 
(-1), Ratio-debt, Ratio-tfas, SD 
Dependent and Independent: ROA is ratio of 
pre tax profits over total assets, Ownership 
concentration is Herfindahl index of 
concentration of ownership (above 5%). 
Independent variables: PL and CZ are country 
dummies for Poland and the Czech Republic, Size 
is log of total assets, Capex is a proxy for capital 
expenditures calculated as the difference between 
the level of tangible fixed assets from 1998 to 
1999 divided by the book value of the assets, 
Regul is a dummy variable for regulated 
industries, ROA(-1) stands for the the lagged (one 
year) ROA, Ratio_debt is the lagged ratio of debt 
to total assets, Ratio_tfas is the lagged ratio of 
tangible fixed assets to total assets, SD is the 
standard deviation of pre-tax returns on assets for 
Generalized 
Method of 
Moments (GMM) 
Ownership 
concentration is 
insignificant in 
explaining firm 
performance both in 
the transition 
countries, where 
market monitoring 
is weak, and in the 
UK, where market 
monitoring is  
strong. 
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the previous four years 
Sias, et al. 
(2006) 
The relationship 
between quarterly 
changes in 
institutional 
ownership and lag, 
immediate and future 
returns (USA 1979-
2000) 
Independent Variables: Quarterly 
change in the number of 
institutional investors, Quarterly 
change in the fraction of shares 
held by institutional investors. 
Dependent Variable: quarterly 
returns computed over three 
periods: the past quarter, the same 
quarter and the coming quarter. 
Quarterly change in the number of 
institutional investors measured as the 
difference between the number of institutional 
shareholders at the beginning and end of the 
quarter, Quarterly change in the fraction of 
shares held by institutional investors measured 
as the difference between the fraction of shares 
held by institutional investors at the beginning 
and end of the quarter. Returns = ln Pt-lnPt-1 
Estimating higher 
frequency 
correlations 
between variations 
in institutional 
ownership and 
past, current and 
future returns. 
Strong and positive 
correlation between 
change in 
institutional 
ownership and the 
same and past 
quarterly stock 
returns, while it is 
weak with regards 
to future stock 
returns. 
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Hong 
Zou & 
Mike B 
Adams 
(2008) 
Analyzing the effect 
of certain forms of 
corporate ownership 
on the company’ stock 
return and stock return 
volatility (China 
1996-2000) 
σ is the standard deviation of firm 
I"s daily return in year t. ADJR is 
the market-adjusted compound 
daily return for stock i in year t, α 
represent dummies for firm 
specific fixed effects, ϒ represents 
year dummies to account for the 
macroeconomic and policy 
variations over time. Control 
variables: Firm's MBV ratio to 
control for the effect of cross-
sectional variations in growth 
opportunities on equity risk, DEBT 
is the book value of long term debt 
+ short term liabilities, TA is the 
book value of total assets, company 
size, Financial & operating 
leverage, ratio of net fixed assets to 
total assets. Gov't subsidies, & 
Regulatory Influence. 
Daily returns are measured from share prices 
adjusted for dividends, rights offerings and share 
splits over the sample period, MBV calculated as 
(MVE+DEBT)/TA, where MVE is the firm's 
daily average share price per year times the no. of 
ordinary shares issued, Company Size measured 
as the log of the firm's total asset, Financial & 
operating leverage measured as the ratio of total 
debt to the book value of total assets 
Fixed effects Panel 
Data Model. 
Firms with more 
state ownership 
have higher stock 
volatility and lower 
stock returns and 
vice versa for firms 
with more “legal-
person” ownership. 
Bhattach
arya & 
Graham 
(2009) 
Studying the 
relationship between 
institutional 
ownership and firm 
Independent Variables: Equity 
ownership, Voting power, Identity 
of the institutional owners, Year-
end market value of common 
Firm performance is measured by Tobin's Q, 
two measures are used for voting powers, share 
differences and share concentration. Share 
difference is a herfindahl index, calculated as the 
Three Stage Least 
Squares, Ordinary 
Least Squares. 
Two-way feedback 
between firm 
performance and 
voting power. Two-
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performance in 
Finland (Finland 
2004) 
stocks, Cash flow, Sales growth, 
Firm size, Capital expenditure, 
Market risk, Leverage. Dependent 
Variables: Return on equity as a 
measure of firm performance 
log of the sum of squares of the differences 
between the largest and the second largest, and 
the second and third largest owners' ownership 
shares. Share concentration is calculated as the 
log of the sum of squares of the three largest 
owners' ownership shares. Sales growth is 
measured by the % change in yearly sales. 
Leverage is the ratio of total debts to assets, 
Capital expenditure is measured by total assets, 
Market risk is measured as the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns over the last 
six months, Firm size is the book value of total 
assets. 
way feedback 
between 
institutional 
ownership and firm 
performance. A 
negative 
relationship 
between voting 
power proxies and 
firm performance, 
which in return 
increases the 
possibility of more 
even distribution of 
voting power by 
institutional 
investors. A simple 
ownership 
concentration index 
does not affect firm 
performance. 
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Qiu 
(2009) 
Studying the return 
predictive power of 
institutional 
ownership (USA 
1982-2006) 
Dependent Variables: Returns. 
Independent variables:% change in 
the number of institutions holding 
stock I during quarter t, change in 
the fraction of shares of stock I 
owned by institutions during 
quarter t, Size, book to market, 
momentum 
Size is the log of market capitalization, book to 
market is the log of the ratio of book value of 
equity to market value of equity, momentum is 
the stock return of the previous six months up to 
the end of Q, where Q is the portfolio formation 
period. 
Fama-French 
(1993) 3-factor 
model and 
Carhart (1997) 4-
factor model. 
Institutional 
ownership strongly 
predicts short run 
future stock returns. 
Gutierrez 
& Kelly 
(2009) 
Examining the 
relation between 
longer run stock 
returns and 
institutional herding 
(USA 1980-2005) 
Independent Variables: Data on 
institutional stock ownership, stock 
prices, shares outstanding, and 
book value of equity, herding by 
institutions for each stock in 
quarter t. Dependent Variable: 
abnormal returns 
Herding t = number of net buyers/number of net 
buyers+ number of net sellers.  Abnormal 
Returns is calculated as the equally weighted 
returns for each of the benchmark portfolios over 
the next quarter& subtracting each specific stock's 
corresponding benchmark return from the stock's 
quarterly return. 
Cross-Sectional 
Regressions 
Herding forecasts 
future returns 
reversal. 
Balsmeier 
& 
Czarnitzk
i (2010) 
Analyzing the 
relationship between 
ownership 
concentration and 
firm performance  
(Central & Eastern 
Europe 2002-2009) 
Dependent Variable: Employment 
growth over the last 3 years as a 
proxy for firm performance. 
Independent Variables: Block 
holder, Block holder squared to 
allow for a nonlinear relation, 
Legal system development as an 
Employment growth measured as employment 
at time t minus employment at time t-3 divided 
employment at time t-3 times 100. Block holder 
is the % of a company's shares owned by the 
largest owner. Legal system development is 
measured by a dichotomous variable according to 
the Freedom House ratings of political rights & 
Panel Data Model Inverted U-shaped 
relationship 
between ownership 
concentration and 
firm performance in 
transition 
economies, with 
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alternative measure of institutional 
development, ln employment at 
time t-3, log of a firm's age, 2 
dummy variables indicating firms 
that are state-owned or foreign-
owned, a binary variable to 
indicate whether a firm is publicly 
quoted, Human capital intensity, 
Access to foreign markets, Black 
market competition is included as a 
dummy variable 
civil liberty, human capital intensity is 
measured by the fraction of employees with a 
university degree, access to foreign markets is 
measured by the % of sales to foreign customers 
weak institutional 
environments. 
Ownership 
concentration plays 
an important role in 
monitoring 
management in less 
developed non-EU 
member countries 
with weak legal 
systems. 
Elyasiani 
& Jia 
(2010) 
Analyzing the relation 
between firm 
performance and level 
of institutional 
ownership (USA 
1992-2004) 
Independent Variables: 
Institutional ownership stability, 
share volume turnover, transaction 
costs, dividend yield, a dummy for 
positive earnings in the previous 
year, the number of analysts 
following, log of stock's daily 
turnover, leverage, insider 
ownership and insider ownership 
squared. The control variables are: 
firm size, growth opportunities, 
firm risk, firm age, CEO incentive-
compensation ratio, S&P 500 
Institutional ownership stability measured by 
IOP (Institutional ownership persistence) or 
institutional ownership proportion standardized 
by its standard deviation. The second and third 
measures of institutional ownership stability 
are: Non-zero-points duration and maintain-stake-
points duration. Non-zero-points duration is the 
number of quarters in which an institutional 
investor has non-zero holdings out of the 20 
quarters over a 5-year period. Maintain-stake-
points duration is the number of quarters in 
which an institutional investor maintains its stake 
out of the 20 quarters. Leverage is total debt 
Simultaneous 
Equations Model, 
Probit Model 
Positive relationship 
between firm 
performance and 
institutional 
ownership stability. 
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dummy. Dependent Variable: Firm 
Performance 
divided by total assets, insider ownership is the 
% of company's stocks held by all the executives. 
Gowth opportunities are measured by the 3-year 
sales growth rate, Firm size is measured by the 
log value of total assets, Firm risk measured by 
the standard deviation of monthly stock returns, 
Firm age measured by the number of years a firm 
has been on the CRSP database, CEO incentive-
compensation ratio is the fraction of total pay 
that the CEO gets in stocks and options. 
Dependent variable:  Firm performance is 
measured by ROA, net income divided by the 
book value of assets 
Islam 
Azzam 
(2010) 
Examining the effect 
of institutional 
ownership on stock 
volatility, returns, and 
dividend policy in 
Egypt, with the effect 
of dividend policy on 
the direction of the 
relation between 
institutional 
ownership and stock 
Dependent variables: Risk, return 
& payout ratio. Independent 
variables: % of equity ownership 
held by the different institutions as 
classified by the author, Ownership 
concentration. Control variables: 
return on assets, return on equity, 
leverage, firm size, proxy for 
growth options, dummy variables 
for the industry and the year. 
Return measured as the average daily total return 
calculated yearly, Risk measured as the standard 
deviation of the daily total return per year, 
Payout ratio is ratio of dividend to earning per 
share per year, % of equity ownership held by 
each institution, Ownership concentration is the 
% of equity ownership held by the largest three 
private (public) shareholders who own more than 
5% in a firm. Return of assets is net income over 
total assets, Return on equity is net income over 
shareholders' equity, Leverage is ratio of total 
Panel Data, Two  
dimensional 
clustered standard 
errors. 
Positive relation 
between 
institutional 
ownership and stock 
volatility for the 
dividend paying 
stocks and negative 
for the non-dividend 
paying stocks. 
Ownership 
concentration has a 
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returns and volatility, 
testing the impact of 
dividend policy on the 
direction of the 
relation between 
ownership 
concentration and 
stock volatility 
(Egypt 2004-2007) 
debt to book value of total assets & ratio of total 
debt to book value of total equity, firm size is the 
log of total assets, ratio of market price/share to 
book value/share for common stock is the proxy 
for growth options. 
negative impact on 
volatility. 
Institutional 
ownership has 
insignificant effect 
on returns. 
Belghitar 
et al. 
(2011) 
Examining the effect 
of “Prudentially “ 
obligated strategic 
institutional 
ownership on the 
performance of the 
company’s stock 
returns (USA 2002-
2009) 
To test for prudent behavior, 
Dependent variable: annual 
average daily stock returns 
including dividends (RET), To test 
the effect on firm performance, 
Dependent variable: total stock 
performance (TSP) which includes 
moments such as: stock return 
volatility. Firm Size, leverage is 
used to control for the effect of the 
debt, dividend yield, firm age, 
auditing quality also is included as 
a dummy variable. 
Stock return volatility (annual standard 
deviation of daily returns), Firm Size measured 
as the log of total assets, leverage is used to 
control for the effect of the debt measured as total 
debt to total assets, dividend yield measured as 
total cash dividend to total assets, Firm age is the 
number of years since the establishment of the 
firm, auditing quality also is included as a 
dummy variable. 
Marginal 
Conditional 
Stochastic 
Dominance 
(MCSD), Applying 
the Chow test to 
compute total 
stock performance 
(TSP), measured 
as the ratio of the 
average difference 
in returns divided 
by the standard 
deviation of these 
differences. 
Positive 
Relationship 
between strategic 
institutional 
ownership and stock 
performance, 
Negative 
relationship 
between RET and 
institutional 
ownership 
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Uwuigbe 
& 
Olusanmi 
(2012) 
Examining the 
relationship between 
ownership structure 
and the financial 
performance of firms 
(Nigeria 2006-2010) 
Dependent variable: Return on 
assets. Independent variables: 
Board ownership, foreign 
ownership, institutional ownership. 
ROA calculated as net income divided by total 
assets. Board, foreign and institutional 
ownership is the percentage of ownership by 
each in the firm. 
Multivariate 
Multiple 
Regression 
Analysis 
Institutional 
ownership has a 
significant positive 
impact on the 
financial 
performance of 
Nigerian firms. 
Karaca & 
Eksi 
(2012) 
Investigating the 
relationship between 
ownership structure 
and firm performance 
(Istanbul 2005-2008) 
Ownership structure, tobin's q, 
ROA, leverage, size 
Ownership structure measures share of the 
largest shareholders, ROA is profit before taxes 
divided by total assets, size is log of total assets, 
leverage is long term liabilities divided by total 
assets 
Panel Data 
Analysis 
Ownership 
concentration shows 
insignificant effect 
on Tobin's Q and 
positive significant 
effect on ROA. 
Shkreta 
(2013) 
Testing the effect of 
institutional 
ownership on the 
financial performance 
of Real Estate 
Investment Trusts 
(USA 2007-2012) 
ROA, ROE, Institutional 
ownership, market capitalization, 
women on board of directors, 
corporate governance index, 
Tobin's q, Dividend payout ratio, 
free funds from operation, insider 
ownership 
Not Shown Univariate 
Regression, 
Multivariate 
Regression, Pooled 
OLS Regression 
Institutional 
ownership, in levels 
between 30% and 
50%, is 
accompanied by 
higher financial 
returns, represented 
by ROA and ROE. 
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Namzi & 
Kermani 
(2013) 
Testing the 
relationship between 
Companies' ownership 
structures and their 
performances (Iran 
2003-2008) 
Dependent variables: ROA, ROE, 
Q-Tobin's average and market to 
book value. Independent variables: 
institutional investors, corporate 
shareholding, managerial 
shareholding and foreign investors 
shareholding. 
ROA is profit before depreciation, interest 
expenses and taxes (PBDIT) divided by total 
assets. ROE is (PBDIT) divided by equity capital. 
Q-Tobin' average is total borrowings (TB) plus 
market value (equity) (MV) divided by total 
assets. Market to book value is TB+MV divided 
by book value. The independent variables are 
measured by the percentage of total equity 
shares held by each type of investors. 
Panel Data Model Institutional 
ownership has 
negative and 
significant effect on 
the firm 
performance. 
Hassanza
deh et al. 
(2013) 
Studying the 
relationship between 
institutional 
ownership and stock 
return fluctuations 
(Tehran 2006-2010) 
Dependent variable: Return 
fluctuation. Independent variables: 
Institutional ownership, Size, Age, 
Leverage, Market to book value, 
Ratio of firm's stock dividends 
Return fluctuation is equal to daily return 
deviation scale of firm I's stock in the year t, 
Institutional ownership is the percentage of 
institutional ownership in year t in firm I, Size is 
the log of total assets, Age is the number of days a 
company has been a member in stock exchange, 
Leverage is the long term liabilities divided by 
total assets, market to book value is the ratio of 
market price to the book value and the ratio of the 
firm's stock dividends in year t. 
Linear Regression 
model and Pooled 
data approach 
There is a positive 
relationship 
between 
institutional 
ownership and stock 
return fluctuations. 
 
